












































































Three Essays Examining the Effects of 
Mandatory Compensation Clawbacks on 
Judgment and Decision Making in Accounting 
Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung der Würde eines 
DOCTOR RERUM OECONOMICARUM 
der Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät 
der Universität Bern 
vorgelegt von 
Matthias S. Gnägi 
aus Bellmund BE, Schweiz 
2019 
 
Original document saved on the web server of the University Library of Bern 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-No 
derivative works 2.5 Switzerland license. To see the license go to 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ch/deed.en or write to Creative 
Commons, 171 Second Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, California 94105, USA.
 
- II - 
Copyright Notice 
This document is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-No 





You are free: 




Under the following conditions: 
 
 Attribution. You must give the original author credit.  
 
Non-Commercial. You may not use this work for commercial purposes.  
 
 No derivative works. You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work.  
 
 
For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of this work.  
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you get permission from the copyright holder.  
 
Nothing in this license impairs or restricts the author’s moral rights according to Swiss law. 
 
The detailed license agreement can be found at: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ch/legalcode.de (only in German) 
 
 
- III - 
The faculty accepted this work as dissertation on 23. May 2019 at the request of the two 
advisors Prof. Dr. Alexis H. Kunz and Prof. Dr. Anna Gold, without wishing to take a 
position on the view presented therein.  
 
- IV - 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Writing this dissertation at the Institute of Accounting of the University of Bern has been a very 
rewarding experience that would not have been possible without the great support I received 
from many people. 
First and foremost, my deepest gratitude goes to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Alexis H. Kunz for 
his support and continuous guidance throughout my dissertation. He inspired me with his 
enthusiasm for experimental research and his structured and analytical way of thinking. With 
his competence and experience he has been a great supervisor and mentor. He thoroughly 
reviewed my writings and provided me with critical feedback that substantially enhanced the 
quality of my research. I am also very grateful to him for giving me the opportunity to 
participate in numerous seminars, workshops, and conferences that allowed me to extend my 
knowledge, broaden my perspective, and meet members of the research community. 
Furthermore, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Markus C. Arnold for giving me constructive 
feedback on presentations of my dissertation projects and for organizing PhD-seminars with 
respected researchers. My work has also benefitted from comments of distinguished researchers 
including Scott H. Asay, Robert Bloomfield, Jeffrey Hales, Steven J. Kachelmeier, Kathryn 
Kadous, Kristina M. Rennekamp, and Shankar Venkataraman. 
I also thank my colleagues from the University of Bern for offering me a stimulating and 
motivating work environment and for being supportive in times when my spirits were low. A 
special credit goes to Dominique Wasna who has potentially read my work more times than 
anyone else. She helped me simplify my writing and improve the structure of my 
argumentation. I greatly appreciate all the fruitful discussions we had that often gave me a fresh 
perspective. I am very grateful to Andrea Probst who has impressed me with her organizational 
skill, her reliability, and her impeccable quality of work that kept my workload of university-
related administration at manageable levels. 
Finally, I thank my parents Dorothea and Ernst Gnägi and my twin brother Stefan Gnägi who 
have always supported and encouraged me. Of course my sincerest gratitude goes to my 
beloved girlfriend Tamina Bader. She has unconditionally supported me from day one and has 
always believed in me. With her positive way, she has given me the energy and motivation for 
this accomplishment. 
Bern, April 1st, 2019 
Matthias S. Gnägi 
 
- V - 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PREFACE .................................................................................................................... IX 
ESSAY 1 ........................................................................................................................ 1 
Does the Dodd-Frank Clawback Have the Potential to be a Valuable Corporate 
Governance Regulation? 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................... 2 
2. Compensation Clawbacks ................................................................................... 6 
2.1 Definition, Design, and Properties ..........................................................................6 
2.2 Institutional Background ........................................................................................7 
2.3 The DFA-Clawback ............................................................................................. 10 
3. Voluntary vs. Mandatory Compensation Clawbacks ...................................... 12 
4. Methodology ...................................................................................................... 16 
4.1 Framework ........................................................................................................... 16 
4.2 Identification of Clawback Studies ....................................................................... 18 
4.2.1 The Use of Voluntary Clawback Research to Assess a Mandate ............. 18 
4.2.2 Selection of Research Articles ................................................................ 20 
5. Determinants of Voluntary Clawback Adoption ............................................. 21 
5.1 Risk of Misbehavior ............................................................................................. 24 
5.1.1 Incentives to Misreport ........................................................................... 24 
5.1.2 Previous Misbehavior ............................................................................. 26 
5.2 Power Differential between Managers and Boards ............................................... 29 
5.3 Stakeholder Pressure and Monitoring ................................................................... 33 
5.4 Spillover Effects ................................................................................................... 35 
5.5 What Determinants Tell us About the Motives to Adopt Compensation 
Clawbacks ............................................................................................................ 37 
6. Consequences of Clawback Adoption .............................................................. 39 
 
- VI - 
6.1 Capital Market Effects ......................................................................................... 39 
6.2 Financial Reporting Effects .................................................................................. 44 
6.2.1 Actual Reporting Quality ........................................................................ 45 
6.2.2 Substitution Effects ................................................................................. 50 
6.2.3 Perceived Reporting Quality ................................................................... 53 
6.3 Management Reaction .......................................................................................... 57 
6.3.1 Employment Conditions ......................................................................... 57 
6.3.2 Managers’ Operating Decisions .............................................................. 62 
6.4 What Does Research on Consequences Tell us About Mandatory Clawback 
Adoption?............................................................................................................. 66 
6.5 Drawbacks of Evaluating Voluntary Clawbacks for a Mandate ............................ 69 
7. Conclusion, Limitations, and Avenues for Future Research .......................... 72 
References ................................................................................................................... 76 
Appendix A: Characteristics of Compensation Clawbacks ...................................... 86 
Appendix B: Overview of Research Articles on Compensation Clawbacks ............ 89 
ESSAY 2 .................................................................................................................... 104 
Mandatory Compensation Clawbacks: Do Directors Reimburse Managers for 
Compensation Recoveries that Managers may Perceive as Unfair? 
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 105 
2. Institutional Background and Previous Literature ....................................... 108 
3. Theory and Hypothesis Development ............................................................. 110 
3.1 Responsibility and Perceived Fairness ................................................................ 110 
3.2 Directors’ Response to Perceived Unfairness of Managers ................................. 111 
3.3 The Benefit of the Doubt .................................................................................... 112 
4. Experiment ...................................................................................................... 114 
4.1 Participants ........................................................................................................ 115 
 
- VII - 
4.2 Experimental Design .......................................................................................... 116 
4.2.1 Setting .................................................................................................. 116 
4.2.2 Multi-Period Production Game ............................................................. 117 
4.2.3 Participants’ Task ................................................................................. 119 
4.3 Manipulations and Dependent Variable .............................................................. 119 
4.4 Experimental Procedures .................................................................................... 120 
5. Results .............................................................................................................. 121 
5.1 Attention and Manipulation Checks ................................................................... 121 
5.2 Hypotheses Test ................................................................................................. 122 
5.2.1 Test of H1 ............................................................................................. 122 
5.2.2 Test of H2 - Mediation Analysis ........................................................... 124 
5.2.3 Supplemental Analysis .......................................................................... 127 
5.2.4 Test of H3 - The Benefit of the Doubt................................................... 127 
5.2.5 Test of H4 - Mediation Analysis ........................................................... 130 
5.2.6 Supplemental Analysis .......................................................................... 133 
6. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 134 
References ................................................................................................................. 137 
ESSAY 3 .................................................................................................................... 145 
Do Compensation Clawbacks Decrease Investor Skepticism Toward Real Earnings 
Management? 
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 146 
2. Background ..................................................................................................... 149 
2.1 Terminology ....................................................................................................... 149 
2.2 Institutional Background .................................................................................... 150 
3. Previous Research, Theory, and Hypothesis Development ........................... 151 
3.1 The Halo Effect .................................................................................................. 153 
3.2 Previous Restatements ........................................................................................ 155 
 
- VIII - 
3.3 Clawbacks and Previous Restatements ............................................................... 156 
3.4 Clawbacks and Investment Desirability .............................................................. 157 
4. Experiment ...................................................................................................... 158 
4.1 Participants ........................................................................................................ 158 
4.2 Design ................................................................................................................ 159 
4.3 Manipulations .................................................................................................... 159 
4.4 Materials and Procedure ..................................................................................... 160 
4.5 Dependent Measures .......................................................................................... 165 
5. Results .............................................................................................................. 166 
5.1 Manipulation Checks .......................................................................................... 166 
5.2 Test of H1 and H2 .............................................................................................. 166 
5.3 Test of H3 .......................................................................................................... 169 
5.4 Test of H4 .......................................................................................................... 171 
5.5 Supplemental Experiment .................................................................................. 174 
6. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 176 
References ................................................................................................................. 179 
Appendix A: Important Events Regarding Clawback Initiation in the U.S. ......... 186 
Appendix B: Main Features of Clawback Mandates .............................................. 187 
STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP .............................................................................. 188 
  
 
- IX - 
PREFACE 
This thesis consists of three essays, a literature review and two experimental studies, that 
examine costs and benefits of mandatory compensation clawbacks. Clawback provisions 
recover previously paid-out compensation from executives who acted in ways that are 
detrimental to companies and their shareholders (Kapner and Lucchetti 2012). This corporate 
governance instrument is aimed at increasing management accountability by more closely 
tying executive compensation to managers’ actions (Hodge and Winn 2012; Iskandar-Datta 
and Jia 2013). While some firms have adopted compensation clawbacks voluntarily 
(Babenko et al. 2017), recent regulatory attempts to mandate clawback provisions have 
fueled a debate on whether and how to implement clawback requirements by government 
regulation. In the U.S., the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) introduced a clawback mandate in 2010, 
requiring stock-exchange listed firms to adopt clawback provisions. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission proposed a rule to implement the DFA-clawback. Though not 
enforced yet, the rule will force firms to recover compensation from corporate executives 
upon the occurrence of an accounting restatement. The clawback mandate is intended to 
discourage managers from publishing misstated accounting information, as well as punish 
managers who nonetheless do so (Dehaan et al. 2013). However, as for any regulation, a 
mandatory compensation clawback does not only produce benefits but also imposes costs 
(Denis 2012). The objective of this dissertation is to shed light on potential benefits and costs 
of a mandatory clawback regulation in order to examine the impact that a clawback mandate 
might have on capital markets. 
The first essay, develops a framework to review current research on compensation clawbacks 
to gauge potential implications of the DFA-clawback. As such, Essay 1 consolidates the 
latest state of knowledge in the field of compensation clawbacks while laying out the 
theoretical foundations for this dissertation. Essay 2 and Essay 3 extend the literature on 
mandatory compensation clawbacks by investigating unintended consequences of a 
clawback mandate. Debates on financial accounting regulation often focus on dealing with 
current problems but neglect a discussion of possible problems that arise due to a response 
of those affected by the new policy (Arya et al. 2003). Essay 2 and Essay 3 add to our 
knowledge on potential unintended side-effects of mandatory clawbacks by providing 
empirical evidence from two experiments. Experiments are particularly suitable to explore 
the effects of mandatory clawbacks because data on existing clawback regulations is scarce 
and experiments allow to analyze mandatory clawbacks before they are actually enforced in 
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practice (Kachelmeier and King 2002; Libby et al. 2015). Overall, my dissertation informs 
regulators and researchers about the potential effects of both, the proposed clawback 
mandate in the U.S. and clawback regulations in general. The following subsections provide 
additional details on each of my three essays by highlighting the main findings of each study. 
The overall contribution of this dissertation is summarized in the last subsection. 
Essay 1 addresses the question of whether the proposal of the DFA-clawback may potentially 
be valuable for capital markets. The essay develops a framework to structure the existing 
literature on compensation clawbacks. The aim of the framework is to analyze whether the 
current environment, where clawbacks are voluntary, calls for a regulatory mandate and to 
gauge the potential effects of the proposed rule. An analysis of the literature on the determinants 
of voluntary clawback adoption suggests that there are market frictions that may justify a 
regulatory intervention. In particular, a considerable part of the literature suggests that managers 
use their power over the board of directors to resist voluntary clawback adoption. A regulatory 
mandate addresses this shortcoming by imposing clawbacks on all firms. However, an ill-
designed regulation may have unintended consequences such that the costs of the regulation 
exceed its benefits. Thus, in a second part, Essay 1 reviews the literature on consequences of 
compensation clawbacks to analyze the cost-benefit tradeoff of the proposed mandate. Due to 
lacking evidence on mandatory compensation clawbacks, the essay also considers studies on 
consequences of voluntary clawback adoption. The literature indicates that markets generally 
react positively to clawback adoption and that the provision increases firms’ reporting quality 
as well as improves the incentive alignment between managers and owners. However, a 
growing number of studies also find indications that managers try to circumvent the clawback 
by using misreporting practices that are not covered by the clawback. Interestingly, stakeholders 
appear to not fully account for these evading strategies when assessing firms that adopt 
compensation clawbacks. Analyses in Essay 1 reveal that there is a mismatch between 
stakeholder perception and actual firm behavior following clawback adoption for firms with 
previous misreporting or poor governance. This discrepancy could be induced by managers’ 
efforts to evade the provision while simultaneously maintaining the impression of having an 
effective governance instrument in place. The finding highlights that it is important to consider 
both, direct effects but also unintended secondary effects, to determine the overall value of a 
clawback mandate. 
Essay 2 reports the findings of a controlled experiment that studies how mandated clawback 
recoveries affect directors’ decisions on the future compensation of managers. In particular, 
the study explores how directors set a manager’s compensation after a clawback recovery 
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depending on i) whether the manager was responsible for triggering the clawback and ii) the 
cause for triggering the clawback. The essay provides evidence that, following clawback 
recoveries, directors make compensation decisions to favor corporate executives in two ways. 
First, directors increase the compensation of managers who are not responsible for triggering 
the clawback compared to managers who are responsible. Directors do so to reimburse non-
responsible managers for compensation recoveries that these managers may consider to be 
unfair. Second, directors give responsible managers the benefit of the doubt when directors are 
unaware of the cause that triggered the clawback (error vs. misconduct). That is, directors pay 
responsible managers a lower compensation if managers engaged in intentional misconduct 
compared to when managers made unintentional errors, but directors’ compensation decisions 
do not differ when directors are unaware of the cause for triggering the clawback compared to 
when the cause is known to be an error. Overall, the results indicate that, following clawback 
recoveries, directors incorporate justice considerations into their compensation decisions, 
thereby potentially distorting managers’ pay-for-performance incentives in periods after the 
clawback recovery.  
Essay 3 (in cooperation with Alexis H. Kunz) focuses on investors’ perception of compensation 
clawbacks. Prior research reports positive investor reactions to clawback adoption (Iskandar-
Datta and Jia 2013). However, a recent study provides evidence that firms’ long-term value is 
negatively affected by the adoption of clawbacks (Chan et al. 2015). The negative long-term 
effect appears to originate from managers’ increased use of real earnings management (REM) 
that is not covered by the clawback. Essay 3 investigates an investor bias that may explain the 
seemingly inconsistent findings in prior research. The study posits that investors do not 
anticipate the likely increase in REM following clawback initiation. Instead, the clawback 
lets investors fall prey to a judgment error, called halo effect, that makes them feel safe 
against financial statement manipulations, independent of whether these manipulations are 
covered by the clawback. That is, the clawback makes investors less skeptical toward any 
type of earnings manipulations, including REM. Thus, investors react positively to the 
introduction of a clawback mandate despite the potentially detrimental consequences on 
future firm value. Results of a controlled experiment largely indicate that clawbacks provoke 
a decrease in non-professional investors’ skepticism toward REM. Interestingly, the effect 
is more pronounced when a firm has a prior history of misreporting. Finally, our results 
indicate that the investor bias positively affects investors’ desirability to invest in a firm. The 
clawback-induced bias among non-professional investors is likely to adversely affect their 
investment decisions potentially resulting in a mispricing effect in capital markets. 
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My dissertation extends and complements current knowledge on the consequences of 
mandatory compensation clawbacks in several ways. First, Essay 1 proposes a framework to 
evaluate research on compensation clawbacks in order to assess potential implications of the 
the DFA-clawback. Given that a comprehensive review of clawback research has been lacking 
so far, the essay contributes to prior literature by consolidating the research on compensation 
clawbacks and by discussing the extent to which the findings might transfer to a mandate. 
Second, Essay 2 examines directors’ decisions about the future compensation of a manager 
following clawback recoveries. By reimbursing non-responsible managers, directors undermine 
the regulators’ intention to return paid-out excess compensation to the firm and may render the 
clawback partly obsolete. Furthermore, directors give managers the benefit of the doubt and 
pay excessive compensation to misreporting managers when the cause of the restatement is 
unknown. The compensation is paid out of shareholders’ pockets and is thus detrimental to 
shareholder value. Essay 2 suggests that directors’ compensation decisions following mandated 
clawback recoveries are likely to distort managers’ performance incentives. Thus, regulators 
should carefully consider the potential negative side effects from director behavior when 
deliberating about a clawback mandate. Lastly, Essay 3 reveals a bias among non-professional 
investors who become less skeptical toward REM following clawback initiation. The bias is 
likely to adversely affect non-professional investors’ investment decisions. Behavioral biases 
may persist in financial markets and potentially introduce mispricing in capital markets (Daniel 
et al. 2002). Furthermore, investors’ false sense of security against REM provides managers 
with a large potential to manipulate their reports using REM without being adequately 
sanctioned. Thus, the essay makes regulators aware that a clawback mandate may be associated 
with substantial costs due to this particular investor bias. In sum, by reviewing the current 
knowledge of compensation clawbacks and by detecting unintended consequences of a 
clawback mandate, this dissertation extends researchers’ understanding of compensation 
clawbacks and helps regulators make more informed decisions on whether and how to 
implement mandatory clawback requirements. 
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ESSAY 1 
Does the Dodd-Frank Clawback Have the Potential to be a Valuable 
Corporate Governance Regulation? 
Matthias S. Gnägi 
University of Bern 
Abstract 
The objective of this review is to assess whether the Dodd-Frank clawback as proposed by the SEC 
has the potential to be valuable for capital markets. This mandatory clawback is aimed at deterring 
top-managers from publishing misstated accounting information by recovering compensation from 
executives who do so. To date, many firms have adopted compensation clawbacks voluntarily. 
However, it is largely unclear, whether clawbacks should be imposed through regulatory action as 
intended by the Dodd-Frank clawback. I develop an organizing framework to review the clawback 
literature in order to analyze whether there is room for a regulatory mandate and to gauge the 
potential effects of the proposed rule. First, I review the literature on determinants of voluntary 
clawback adoption to detect potential market frictions that call for a regulatory intervention. A 
considerable part of the literature indicates that managers use their power over the board of directors 
to resist the adoption decision. This finding suggests that a government mandate may be suitable to 
address these inefficiencies. In a second part, I analyze the research on consequences of 
compensation clawbacks to form expectations about the implications of the prospective mandate. 
The literature predominantly examines effects of voluntary clawbacks. Results consistently suggest 
that markets react positively to clawback adoption and that the provisions enhance financial reporting 
quality and increase incentive alignment between owners and managers. The findings support the 
contention that clawbacks improve a firm’s corporate governance. However, a number of studies 
provide evidence that managers try to evade the clawback. That is, following clawback adoption, 
managers increasingly mislead investors by using misreporting practices that are not subject to the 
clawback. I discuss the extent to which the findings are attributable to the Dodd-Frank clawback and 
provide avenues for future research. 
Keywords: Clawback provisions; the Dodd-Frank Act, corporate governance; regulation. 
Send correspondence to Matthias Gnägi, University of Bern, Institute for Accounting, 
Engehaldenstrasse 4, CH-3012 Bern; Telephone: ++41 31-631-47-13; E-mail: 
matthias.gnaegi@iuc.unibe.ch.  
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to analyze whether the compensation clawback as required by 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) has the potential 
to be a valuable corporate governance regulation for capital markets. In 2010, the DFA 
mandated clawback policies for firms listed at U.S. stock exchanges (U.S. House of 
Representatives 2010). To enforce the regulation, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) proposed a rule. The rule requires firms to make incentive-based compensation of 
corporate managers subject to recovery in case of a material accounting restatement (SEC 
2015). In particular, the clawback will force executives to return any performance-related 
compensation they had earned based on overstated financial statements. The DFA-clawback 
is intended to strengthen managers’ incentives to accurately report financial results and to 
induce higher transparency and integrity of financial information (Denis 2012). However, 
the DFA-clawback has fueled a controversial discussion on the effectiveness of such a 
mandate. Opponents of the mandate argue that it constitutes an undesirable infringement of 
firms’ freedom of contract (Bainbridge 2011). A mandate would constrain firms’ flexibility 
in arranging clawback provisions and may prevent them from adopting the policy that is 
most beneficial to shareholders. Sceptics of a regulatory intervention thus posit that private 
ordering is superior (Ribstein 2010). Conversely, proponents of the regulation claim that 
market failures prevent firms from voluntarily adopting an optimal compensation regime 
(Fried and Shilon 2011). As such, a regulatory intervention may be necessary to overcome 
these market frictions. 
I develop a framework to organize the existing literature on compensation clawbacks to 
assess whether the DFA-clawback has the potential to be valuable for capital markets. The 
framework broadly partitions the research into two components: determinants and 
consequences of clawback adoption. Studies on determinants explore factors that contribute 
to a firm’s decision to voluntarily adopt clawbacks whereas studies on consequences 
investigate effects that result from clawback adoption. Using the framework, I first examine 
whether the current environment, where clawbacks are voluntary, calls for a regulatory 
mandate. For this reason, I analyze the literature on determinants of voluntary clawbacks to 
evaluate two competing theories on how firms enter into compensation contracts such as 
clawbacks (Weisbach 2007). The optimal contracting view assumes that firms voluntarily 
adopt efficient contracts that provide managers with incentives to act in the best interest of 
shareholders (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Murphy 1999). Firms for which clawbacks are 
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beneficial will thus include clawback provisions into managers’ compensation arrangements 
to maximize shareholder value. Under optimal contracting, regulatory intervention is not 
desirable as it unnecessarily restricts a firms’ contracting options. Conversely, the 
managerial power view presumes that managers misuse their bargaining power to negotiate 
contracts that are most beneficial for themselves but harm shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried 
2003; 2004). That is, managers may influence the design of clawback provisions such that 
the clawback is ineffective, or they may prevent the adoption of clawbacks in the first place. 
Evidence in line with the managerial power perspective would suggest that firms do not 
adopt value maximizing clawback provisions of their own accord. In such a case, a regulatory 
intervention can address the inefficiency by imposing policies against managers’ will. 
However, even in the presence of contracting frictions, a mandate may not necessarily be 
beneficial (Edmans et al. 2017). For example, an ill-designed regulation may have 
unintended consequences such that the costs of the regulation exceed its benefits. Thus, I 
examine, in a second step, the research on consequences of clawback adoption to gauge the 
potential implications of DFA-clawback as proposed by the SEC. Because research on 
mandatory clawbacks is scarce, I also review studies on voluntary clawback adoption. I 
group the literature into major topics to identify potential benefits and costs of the adoption 
of clawbacks. I discuss to which extent the findings in the literature are likely to be 
informative for the proposed regulation to assess potential implications of mandatory 
compensation clawbacks. I also identify gaps in the literature that need to be filled in order 
to more reliably judge the effects of the proposed mandate. 
From my literature review I derive a causal model that summarizes the most important 
determinants and consequences of clawback adoption. That is, the model informs about the 
main factors that contribute to a firm’s decision to adopt clawbacks and highlights the 
implications that a clawback policy is likely to provoke. As such, the model synthesizes the 
major findings in clawback research. 
My study adds to the literature in the following ways. First, I develop an organizing 
framework to evaluate the research on compensation clawbacks. Using the framework, I 
discuss the insights that the clawback literature provides for the DFA-clawback. Thereby, I 
inform regulators on the risks and benefits of the prospective mandate. Second, I draw on 
research on voluntary clawbacks to make inferences about the mandate. Previous studies 
have used a similar approach to gauge the potential effects of a regulation (e.g. Barth et al. 
2008; Daske et al. 2013). As such, my literature review contributes to the body of research 
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that examines how the voluntary adoption of policies can generate knowledge about 
government mandates. Third, I synthesize the current literature on compensation clawbacks 
and provide an overview of the latest state of knowledge in this field. Given that a 
comprehensive review on clawbacks has been missing so far, I contribute to the literature on 
corporate governance and executive compensation by consolidating the findings of research 
on compensation clawbacks.  
Inspection of the published research through the lens of my framework yields several 
conclusions. First, my review of determinants of voluntary clawbacks suggests that the 
adoption decision is influenced by self-serving parties who try to enforce their personal 
interests. Specifically, empirical evidence indicates that powerful managers resist clawback 
adoption (Chen and Vann 2014, 2017) and that board members rarely seek recovery when a 
clawback is triggered (Babenko et al. 2017; Glater 2005). These findings imply that firms 
may not necessarily adopt optimal provisions and that a regulatory intervention may thus be 
appropriate.  
The second part of the study examines the consequences of clawback adoption to assess 
potential benefits and costs of the DFA-clawback. A large part of the literature finds positive 
stock market reactions to voluntary clawback adoption (Chen et al. 2015; Iskandar-Datta and 
Jia 2013) and an increase in users’ reliance on financial information (Chan et al. 2012; 
Dehaan et al. 2013). Further evidence shows improved incentive alignment between 
managers and shareholders (Biddle et al. 2017; Chen and Vann 2014, 2017; Kroos et al. 
2017). The results suggest that clawbacks may achieve the objective of improving the 
reporting environment. 
However, it is also important to consider potential unintended consequences that clawback 
policies may generate (Denis 2012). In particular, an increasing number of studies suggests 
that managers of clawback-adopting firms mislead investors by using alternative forms of 
manipulations that are not subject to the clawback (Bao et al. 2018; Chan et al. 2015; Kyung 
et al. 2016) or influence gatekeepers to prevent the clawback from being triggered (Pyzoha 
2015). These effects provide indication that managers engage in potentially harmful 
activities to undermine the effectiveness of clawback provisions. Interestingly, though, 
investors appear not to be aware of such evading strategies. In contrast, there seems to be a 
misfit between the external perception of clawback adoption and the clawback’s actual 
effects on firm behavior. In particular, stakeholders react most positively to the voluntary 
clawback adoption of firms with prior incentive problems (e.g. poor corporate governance 
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or previous misreporting), presumably because they consider the clawback as a fix for 
misaligned incentives (e.g. Babenko et al. 2017; Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2013). However, 
these firms exhibit less incentive alignment and are also most likely to switch to alternative 
misreporting practices to evade the clawback provision (Bao et al. 2018; Hales et al. 2017; 
Kroos et al. 2017). These findings indicate that firms with prior incentive problems derive 
lower benefits from clawback adoption but reap the highest stakeholder reactions. 
Stakeholders may thus be subject to a bias that makes them overstate the clawback’s 
effectiveness. In sum, my analysis suggests that a mandate may generate substantial costs in 
terms of unintended consequences. 
Overall, it remains unclear how the costs of unintended consequences compare to the benefits 
of increased reporting quality. For the DFA-clawback, the above described costs may be 
limited as the clawback is considered to be relatively stringent and allows for little discretion 
(Beck 2015). That is, the mandate may prevent managers’ attempts to undermine its proper 
functioning and may serve as a remedy for weak voluntary provisions. Also, prior research 
consistently finds more positive capital market and financial reporting effects following the 
adoption of a more stringent clawback, suggesting high benefits. (Babenko et al. 2017; Beck 
2015; Erkens et al. 2017). Additional support for the hypothesis that the DFA-clawback is 
beneficial for capital markets is provided by event studies that report positive market 
reactions to important announcements regarding mandatory clawbacks (e.g. Bakke et al. 
2017; Li 2014). However, it is an empirical question of whether the DFA-clawback proves 
effective. 
To make more reliable predictions about the overall value of the DFA-clawback, more 
research is needed. I identify several gaps in the literature that appear to be fruitful areas for 
further work. First, future research should investigate clawbacks that exclusively use 
restatement-triggers to establish whether their effects differ from those of other clawbacks. 
Such research would increase our knowledge on the applicability of voluntary clawback 
research for the proposed mandate. Second, research could investigate how the consequences 
of compensation clawbacks depend on firm characteristics. The study of such interactions 
may help to understand the circumstances, under which clawbacks are likely to be effective. 
Lastly, there is a lack of studies on clawback mandates. Whereas the U.S. does not provide 
a suitable setting for such research, archival studies could investigate clawback mandates in 
other countries (e.g. the Netherlands). Experimental studies could complement this research 
to better understand the potential benefits and costs of mandatory clawbacks. Future research 
may find the underlying framework that I developed useful as it facilitates the understanding 
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of relations between determinants, clawback adoption, and consequences established so far. 
It also suggests an approach to evaluate a proposed regulatory intervention. 
My literature review is structured as follows: Section two describes how compensation 
clawbacks work and how they evolved. The section also outlines the characteristics of the 
proposed rule of the DFA-clawback. Section three establishes conditions under which a 
mandate can be effective. Section four lays out the methodological approach to the literature 
review and describes the framework. Section five examines the literature on determinants of 
clawback policies and the section six reviews the literature on consequences of the clawback 
adoption. Finally, the last section concludes and provides directions for future research. 
2. Compensation Clawbacks 
2.1 Definition, Design, and Properties 
Clawback policies are contractual agreements between a firm and its executives that specify 
conditions under which the firm can reclaim previously paid out compensation (Sharp 2012). 
They are typically arranged as clauses in executive employment contracts (Beck 2015). 
Clawbacks allow for recoupment of executive pay that was earned based on undesirable 
behavior (Kapner and Lucchetti 2012). As such, they constitute an instrument to tie executive 
compensation to conditions that can only be verified ex-post (Spindler 2012). The corporate 
governance mechanism is aimed at imposing greater accountability on executives (Iskandar-
Datta and Jia 2013) and improving the alignment of interests between managers and 
shareholders (Hodge and Winn 2012). 
Because clawbacks are contractual agreements between a firm and its managers, there is 
substantial flexibility as to how these provisions are designed (Babenko et al. 2017). To draft 
clawbacks, firms have to decide on a number of issues. Most importantly, they must 
determine (i) in which situations the clawback is activated – referred to as the trigger event, 
(ii) who is covered by the provision – i.e. employees under the scope of the clawback, (iii) 
what compensation components are subject to recovery, (iv) how far back in time the 
provision is applicable – also called the look-back-period, and (v) who is responsible for 
enforcing the recoveries and how much discretion is granted to the enforcement body 
(Babenko et al. 2017; Beck 2015; Gao et al. 2011). Appendix A presents a summary of the 
main characteristics of compensation clawbacks and explains how clawbacks are shaped in 
practice. 
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The most widely used trigger event is the issuance of an accounting restatement (Babenko 
et al. 2017). Clawback policies that tie incentive pay to restatements, allow for recovery of 
previously paid out bonuses if it comes to light that the financial statements, on which the 
bonus was based, did not accurately reflect the firm’s economic situation (Iskandar-Datta 
and Jia 2013). Thus, clawbacks should mitigate managers’ incentive to deliberately 
misreport financial information to maximize their compensation. The clawback is 
additionally expected to increase financial reporting quality as executives will be more 
cautious to prevent accounting errors (Dehaan et al. 2013). As such, the policy should 
strengthen a firms’ incentive to report financial results accurately, consequently inducing 
enhanced transparency and integrity of financial information (Denis 2012). 
In the absence of clawback provisions, a firm can still sue its executives based on unjust 
enrichment in the event of managerial misconduct. However, the burden of proof is much 
larger (Addy and Yoder 2011). Thus, a lawsuit is unlikely to be filed in smaller cases or with 
scant evidence. Compensation clawbacks, in contrast, are more efficient because they do not 
require litigation. A similar instrument to clawback policies are so-called holdback 
provisions (or malus clauses) which also lower executive compensation based on some pre-
specified events. Unlike clawback policies, holdback provisions only apply to compensation 
components that have not yet been paid-out (Hodge and Winn 2012). Holdback provisions 
defer management pay using bonus banks and reduce the account in case a trigger is 
activated. However, holdback provisions can be activated only for the periods of retention 
(Bettis et al. 2016; Gopalan et al. 2014) whereas clawbacks address the problem beyond the 
deferral of incentive pay. 
2.2 Institutional Background 
Despite the possibility of firms to adopt clawbacks voluntarily, several attempts have been 
taken by U.S. regulators to force firms to adopt such provisions (see Figure 1 for an 
overview). 
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FIGURE 1 




In 2002, mandatory compensation clawbacks were introduced by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) as a reaction to several accounting scandals (e.g. Enron and Worldcom). The SOX-
clawback authorized the SEC to recoup performance-based compensation paid to CEOs and 
CFOs when the firm had to restate its financial statements as a result of misconduct (U.S. 
House of Representatives 2002). The SEC had the sole authority to seek recovery of variable 
pay as well as any profits realized from the sale of securities awarded in the year following 
to the issuance of the faulty financial statements (Addy and Yoder 2011).1 Thus, the 
compensation clawback was aimed at ex-ante deterring top-managers from publishing 
misstated accounting information and ex-post penalizing executives for misconduct (Dehaan 
et al. 2013). However, the SEC was confronted with far more financial restatements than it 
could possibly process, not least due to financial restrictions (Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2013). 
In many cases, it also proved to be hard for the SEC to demonstrate that the restatement was 
triggered by misconduct (Fried and Shilon 2011). As a result, only a fraction of the 
                                                 
1  See United States District Court, Eastern District Pennsylvania in Neer v. Pelino in 2005. 
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accounting restatements filed with the SEC were litigated. McKenna (2015) reports that out 
of approximately 4,600 material accounting restatements from the introduction of the SOX-
clawback in 2002 up to 2015 the SEC sought recoupment in only 15 cases. Due to its lax 
enforcement, the regulation is unlikely to have acted as a credible deterrent to executive 
misbehavior. 
Following the introduction of the SOX-clawback, some firms started adopting clawbacks 
voluntarily (Dehaan et al. 2013), potentially to address the shortcomings of the SOX-
clawback. The firms were not required to disclose any information on their voluntary 
clawbacks until 2006. Thereafter, the amendment of the regulation S-K2 required firms to 
disclose their clawback policies in the compensation discussion and analysis (CD&A).3 Since 
2002, the number of firms that voluntarily adopted clawbacks has continuously increased. 
The SEC estimates that about 23% of all listed issuers have some kind of recoupment 
provision in place (SEC 2015). Babenko et al. (2017) document that 79.8% of entities in the 
S&P 500 had adopted voluntary clawbacks by 2013. In many cases, the adopted provisions 
differ from the ones proposed by the SOX in their respective designs (e.g. trigger event, 
look-back period, compensation coverage, etc.).4  
In 2008, during the financial crisis, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) allowed the 
Treasury to purchase toxic assets and equity from financial institutions. Any firm covered 
by the program had to include clawback provisions to recover incentive pay that was based 
on materially inaccurate financial statements or performance metrics (U.S. House of 
Representatives 2008). The TARP-clawback renounced the misconduct requirement of the 
SOX-clawback and extended the provision to senior executives and the next 20 most highly 
compensated employees (U.S. House of Representatives 2009). In addition, the TARP-
clawback transferred the responsibility for seeking recoupments to the firm rather than to the 
SEC. The clawback provisions only applied to firms covered by the TARP-program. To date, 
only a fraction of firms are still subject to the program.5 
                                                 
2  In 2006, section 402(b)(2)(viii) of regulation S-K was amended such that firms with voluntary clawback 
policies in place are required to disclose them. According to C&DI 117.03 of SEC Regulation S-K 
Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations, last updated October 18, 2016, firms also have to disclose 
amount, reasons for recovery, and how the amount was determined in their CD&A 
(https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/regs-kinterp.htm). 
3  Several studies report to have found information about clawbacks in filings other than the CD&A as well 
(e.g. Babenko et al. 2017; Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2013). 
4  Beck (2015) provides an overview of the defining features of voluntary clawback policies. 
5  See: https://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list/index 
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In 2010, the DFA was signed into law as a response to the financial crises of 2008 and with 
the objective of improving the financial regulation in the United States (U.S. House of 
Representatives 2010). With Section 954, the DFA introduced clawbacks that should address 
the shortcomings of the SOX-clawback. In particular, the regulation abandons the 
misconduct requirement and makes the board of directors responsible for seeking 
recoupment. In 2015, the SEC has proposed a rule for the implementation of the clawback 
for stock exchanges (SEC 2015). However, to date, the SEC has not yet finalized its rule, 
and, as a consequence, the DFA-clawback is not yet enforced. The following section 
highlights the most important properties of the proposed rule of the SEC. 
2.3 The DFA-Clawback 
Whereas voluntary clawbacks grant substantial flexibility regarding the design of the 
provisions, the DFA-clawback formulates minimum requirements for firms listed on U.S. 
securities exchanges. In the following I discuss the most important characteristics of the 
DFA-clawback as proposed by the SEC. 
Trigger event. The DFA-clawback is triggered by an accounting restatement due to material 
noncompliance with financial reporting requirements. That is, the clawback is activated 
when previous financial statements are materially incorrect and therefore need to be restated 
(SEC 2015). 
Scope. Under the rule, any current or former executive officer is subject to the clawback 
provision.6 The scope includes the firm’s president, principal financial officer, principal 
accounting officer, any vice-president in charge of a principal business unit, division, or 
function, and any other person who performs policy-making functions for the firm (SEC 
2015). The rule allows to make recoveries from executive officers who served any time 
during the performance period of the compensation that is subject to recoupment. The policy 
applies in absence of executives’ misconduct and independent of responsibility for the 
restatement (SEC 2015). 
Compensation subject to recovery. In case the clawback is activated, the rule provides that 
all compensation components granted, earned, or vested based upon attainment of any 
financial reporting measure are covered. However, only the amount paid out in excess of 
                                                 
6  The term “executive officer” draws on the definition of “officer” as in section 16 of the Securities 
Exchange Act. 
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what would have been paid without the restatement can be recovered. The amount of 
recovery equals the excess incentive-based compensation (including stock options) received 
based on the erroneous data (SEC 2015).  
Look-back period. The proposed rule covers the three-year period preceding the date on 
which the firm is required to prepare the accounting restatement. The excess compensation 
received during the look-back period is subject to recovery (SEC 2015). 
Enforcement body and discretion. The rule entrusts the board of directors (or the 
compensation committee) with the responsibility to seek recovery when the clawback is 
triggered. Recovery is always required except in two cases. The board can only abstain from 
litigation when i) the recovery violates the home country law of a foreign issuer, or ii) when 
the costs of enforcement would exceed the recoverable amount. However, before concluding 
that a recoupment is impractical as it imposes undue costs, the issuer would first need to 
make a reasonable attempt of recovery (SEC 2015). 
Disclosures. In case the clawback is activated, the proposed rule requires substantial 
disclosures including the names of executives subject to recoveries, amounts recovered, 
amounts outstanding as well as the reason when the board decided not to pursue recovery 
(SEC 2015). 
If a firm fails to comply with any of the above described requirements of the DFA-clawback, 
the issuer would be subject to delisting. If enacted, the provision would apply to 
approximately 4,800 issuers that are listed at U.S. stock exchanges (SEC 2015). It would 
cover accounting restatements reported on form 8-K under item 4.02. Thereof, 4,246 were 
filed between 2005 and 2012 (Tsang and Bachelder 2015). 
In comparison to the SOX-clawback, the DFA-clawback provides significant changes that 
may address the main defects of the former mandate. On the one hand, it delegates the 
responsibility to litigate the clawback to the firm itself. By designating the board of directors 
as the enforcement body, the SEC does not have to invest its constrained resources into the 
execution of clawbacks. Also, the SEC drops the misconduct requirement that was difficult 
to prove in court. Thus, recoupment is also possible when executives have no responsibility 
for the restatement. The regulation differs from the SOX-clawback in many other dimensions 
as well (Table 1 presents an overview of the main differences between the two regulations). 
First, the DFA-clawback requires stock exchange-listed firms to include provisions that 
cover any executive officer, instead of the CEO and the CFO only. Second, the clawback has 
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a look-back period of 3 years compared to the one-year period of the SOX-clawback. Third, 
only the excess incentive-based pay can be recovered rather than the total bonus.  
TABLE 1 
Comparison Between the SOX-Clawback and the DFA-Clawback 
 
 SOX-Clawback DFA-Clawback 
Trigger event Accounting restatement caused 
by misconduct. 
Accounting restatement 
(no misconduct required). 
Scope CEO and CFO Executive officers 
Compensation 
subject to recovery 
All incentive-based 




Look-back period The year following the issuance 
of the misstated financial 
statements. 
The 3 year period preceding 
the date on which the issuer is 
required to prepare an 
accounting restatement. 
Enforcement body SEC Firm (board of directors) 
 
 
Despite covering only excess pay rather than all incentive-based compensation, the SEC has 
established quite strict rules in comparison to both, previous mandates and existing voluntary 
clawbacks (Bakke et al. 2017; Beck 2015). As such, the DFA-clawback severely interferes 
with the board’s freedom to choose executives compensation contracts. However, by 
requiring a clawback that limits board discretion and by including a more objectively 
determinable no-fault based restatement trigger, the SEC has proposed a more suitable 
regulatory instrument compared to previous mandates.  
3. Voluntary vs. Mandatory Compensation Clawbacks 
Firms may want to consider compensation clawbacks voluntarily because they allow for ex-
post adjustments of management pay in case of undesirable executive behavior. By 
incorporating information into management pay that is revealed only after the payout date, 
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clawbacks should better align the interests of shareholders and managers. That is, they should 
deter executives from engaging in misbehavior by retrospectively penalizing corporate 
executives who do so (Dehaan et al. 2013). 
The benefit of an efficient clawback policy can be illustrated using the principal agent model. 
The principal is the firm owner who hires an agent (manager) to run her firm. The principal 
can motivate the agent and limit shirking behavior by tying the agent’s pay to the profits of 
the firm. However, the agent is better informed about her own actions than the principal. 
This information asymmetry creates a moral hazard problem as the agent will take advantage 
of the superior information (Jensen and Meckling 1976). That is, the agent may influence 
measures to which her compensation is tied in order to increase her pay at the expense of the 
owner. The actual performance of the agent may only be verified ex-post, e.g. when earnings 
manipulation is detected and a restatement is issued. Clawback provisions allow to mitigate 
the problem of ex-post verification of performance by recovering management pay when 
earnings management is subsequently detected. Importantly, the threat of recoveries 
mitigates moral hazard because the agent has less incentive ex-ante to manipulate earnings. 
As such, compensation clawbacks improve the link between agents’ compensation and their 
behavior. 
Despite the potential advantages of compensation clawbacks, it is largely unclear whether 
firms adopt provisions that are value maximizing for their shareholders. The academic 
literature is divided into two competing views on how contracts between principals and 
agents, such as clawback provisions, are generally negotiated: the optimal contracting view 
and the managerial power view (Larcker et al. 2011; Weisbach 2007). The first perspective 
assumes that parties involved in an agency conflict negotiate value-maximizing contracts in 
order to mitigate agency problems and align the interests between the parties (Jensen and 
Murphy 1990; Murphy 1999). Firms for which clawbacks are beneficial will adopt such 
policies and will automatically choose the characteristics that best fit the firm to achieve an 
optimal corporate governance. Under the optimal contracting view, a regulatory clawback 
mandate would unnecessarily constrain the flexibility that firms have in designing 
compensation clawbacks.7 By prescribing minimum requirements, a mandate would force 
firms to adopt a certain type of clawback even if a different set of policies or the non-adoption 
of clawbacks would maximize shareholder value. That is, the regulation would introduce 
                                                 
7  See Core et al. (2003) for a review of literature in line with this perspective. 
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inefficiencies and might even be value-destroying (e.g. see Murphy and Jensen 2018). In 
contrast, the managerial power view of governance suggests that top-managers are very 
powerful when it comes to determining their compensation contracts (Bebchuk and Fried 
2003; 2004). According to this perspective, managers will use their power to negotiate 
contracts that are most beneficial for themselves but not necessarily optimal for the owner. 
They will oppose clawback adoption or enter into contracts that are ineffective. The 
contracting power of managers is reinforced in practice because owners of a firm do not 
directly negotiate with managers. Rather, owners delegate the oversight function to directors 
who monitor the manager and determine her compensation (Singh 2006). As such, the board 
of directors adds another layer to the agency problem (Dew-Becker 2009). Directors may 
not act in the best interest of the owner as they have social and psychological reasons to 
favor executives (Bebchuk and Fried 2003).8 Therefore, they may collude with managers. 
Fried and Shilon (2011) argue that directors have only limited financial prospects from 
implementing clawback provisions. Most board members have low stock ownership such 
that recoveries of management pay do not have a large impact on directors’ holdings. 
However, their personal costs of implementing recoupment provisions are substantial. In 
particular, implementing clawbacks may put their own reputation at stake and they may face 
harsh resistance from managers. In sum, proponents of the managerial power perspective 
claim that firms are unlikely to adopt value maximizing clawback provisions of their own 
accord. Fried and Shilon (2011) argue that only a mandate can address the problem that 
managers resist clawbacks and that board members have no incentives to impose such 
policies against managers’ will.9 A mandate may introduce and enforce recoupment policies 
despite the large influence of powerful managers who have a disincentive to adopt effective 
clawback provisions.10 
                                                 
8  For evidence in favor of this perspective, see e.g. Bebchuk and Jackson (2005), Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein (2009), Core et al. (1999), and Greenstone et al. (2006). 
9  A third view is provided by Bainbridge (2000) who argues that behavioral biases (status quo bias, herding 
behavior, habit and tradition, and social norms) may lead to non-optimal choices of firms in a voluntary 
setting. Also in case of such biases, a mandate may solve the problem. 
10  Kleymenova and Tuna (2017) argue that mandates can even be value enhancing when the interests of 
shareholders and managers are perfectly aligned as in case of optimal contracting. They claim that markets 
fail when negative externalities exist that are not internalized by market participants (see Edmans et al. 
(2017) for further examples of externalities). For example, a bank failure affects other financial 
institutions to fail because of the high interconnectedness through the payment system. Shareholders do 
not bear the cost of failure of other institutions. Due to their limited downward risk they may show an 
increased risk propensity. As a consequence, even if the interests of shareholders and managers are 
perfectly aligned (and optimal from a private contracting point of view), managers will take more risk 
than is socially optimal. A regulation may therefore be beneficial in absence of agency conflicts. 
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Whether there is room for a mandatory prescription such as the DFA-clawback largely 
depends on firms’ ability to implement the mechanism that is optimal for them of their own 
accord (Edmans et al. 2017). In case that firms engage in optimal contracting, private 
ordering is likely to be value-maximizing. That is, the DFA-clawback would unnecessarily 
restrict the firms’ flexibility in choosing policies that best suit their needs, thereby destroying 
shareholder value (Aggarwal et al. 2016). Conversely, when contracting follows the 
managerial power perspective, a government intervention has the potential to address the 
contracting inefficiencies. 
Importantly, even when circumstances indicate that a regulatory intervention is desirable, 
the clawback mandate may not necessarily be value enhancing. That is, it is also important 
to consider whether the benefits of the DFA-clawback outweigh its costs (Edmans et al. 
2017). One of the main benefits of the DFA-clawback is that it should lead firms to report 
their financial results more accurately. The clawback mitigates firms’ incentives to issue 
misstated financial information by increasing the potential cost of doing so (Denis 2012). As 
such, the clawback should decrease managers’ incentives to manage earnings as well as make 
them more cautious of accounting errors. In sum, the benefits of clawback provisions 
materialize in fewer accounting mistakes, less managerial misreporting, and fewer 
incidences of financial fraud (Chen et al. 2015). In turn, this should lead to more accurate 
financial statements and, as a consequence, lower information asymmetry between 
executives and shareholders. A lower information asymmetry has been shown to attract 
increased demand from investors as well as to lower the cost of capital and increase stock 
liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). 
A clawback mandate does not only present the prospect of benefits but also imposes costs 
on the firm (Denis 2012). First, there are direct cost of implementation. The DFA-clawback 
is likely to impose some administrative costs on firms in terms of costs of introduction and 
increased disclosure. In case of mandatory clawbacks, also one-time and ongoing 
administrative costs on the part of the stock exchanges and the regulator may arise. Second, 
the mandate may also entail indirect costs of implementation. Specifically, there are likely 
to be unintended negative consequences because the players adapt to the new regulatory 
environment (Denis 2012). Regulations are frequently circumvented such that the policy is 
either ineffective or counterproductive (Edmans et al. 2017). That is, firms may switch to 
alternative forms of manipulations that are less likely to trigger the clawback, such as real 
earnings management (REM) or non-GAAP reporting (Chan et al. 2015; Kyung et al. 2016). 
Alternatively, managers may engage in activities that undermine the proper functioning of 
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the policy, e.g. by resisting the issuance of restatements (Pyzoha 2015). Third, there are 
opportunity cost. The mandated clawback may override more appropriate clawbacks that 
firms would otherwise have adopted (Denis 2012). Also, there may exist a different 
regulatory action instead of a clawback mandate that would have been more beneficial or 
could have reached the same objective at lower cost. For example Edmans et al. (2017) argue 
that because regulators are under-informed, it is unclear whether pay regulations are 
beneficial after all. They claim that regulations that target the principals’ incentives to adopt 
optimal contracts in the first place may be superior to interventions in executive pay.  
In sum, for mandatory clawbacks to be beneficial, two conditions need to be met. First, 
mandatory clawbacks can only be effective in the presence of contracting inefficiencies or 
market frictions that they address. Second, government-mandated claw-backs need to have 
positive net benefits to be valuable for capital markets. In this literature review, I analyze 
the research on compensation clawbacks with respect to these two criteria. 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Framework 
I develop a framework according to which I evaluate the literature on compensation 
clawbacks to assess the potential of the proposed rule of the DFA-clawback. The framework 
partitions the research into determinants and consequences of clawback adoption. Figure 2 
depicts the framework. 
FIGURE 2 
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In an environment where clawbacks are not mandated by a regulator, a firm is free to decide 
on whether or not to adopt clawback provisions. Studies on determinants of compensation 
clawbacks are primarily interested in the firm-specific attributes that predict the adoption or 
the non-adoption of voluntary clawbacks. Such studies add to the knowledge of how 
compensation plans evolve and provide insights as to why firms decide for or against 
clawbacks. I analyze the determinants of voluntary clawback adoption to identify potential 
frictions in the adoption process. I structure the review by classifying the determinants into 
a self-developed classification scheme that consists of four categories (Risk of misbehavior, 
Power differential between managers and boards, Stakeholder pressure and monitoring, and 
Spillover effects). For each category, I analyze the corresponding determinants to derive 
underlying motives that determine clawback adoption. I evaluate whether these motives are 
more in line with the optimal contracting view or the managerial power view (see, e.g. 
Gerakos 2010 for a similar approach). Indication of management power being associated 
with the non-adoption of clawbacks clears the way for a regulation to be effective. 
Conversely, evidence in accordance with optimal contracting would suggest that private 
ordering is preferable. 
In a second step, I assess whether the benefits of the DFA-clawback as proposed by the SEC 
are likely to outweigh its costs. To do so, I analyze the literature on consequences of 
compensation clawbacks. For this part of the review, research on mandatory as well as 
voluntary clawback adoption is discussed. I include all types of methods to allow for a 
comprehensive picture of possible effects of clawback adoption. I structure my review by 
grouping the consequences of clawback adoption into three thematic sections that represent 
the major topics of the clawback literature (Capital market effects, Financial reporting 
effects, and Management behavior). For each section, I identify potential benefits and costs 
of the adoption of clawbacks and discuss to which extent the findings are likely to be 
informative for the DFA-clawback. I weigh the potential benefits and costs of the proposed 
rule in a qualitative manner in order to gauge the net benefits of the mandate. In this review 
I abstain from making statements about how an optimal clawback mandate should look like. 
Rather, the clawback as proposed by the SEC serves as a benchmark that is examined with 
respect to its potential to be valuable for capital markets. 
In the process of analyzing the literature, I also derive a causal model that summarizes the 
most important determinants and consequences of clawback adoption. This model 
consolidates the main findings in clawback research and groups the results into my self-
developed sections to facilitate their interpretation. The model informs about the main 
 
- 18 - 
factors that determine clawback adoption and highlights implications that the policy is likely 
to provoke. As such, the model synthesizes the achievements in clawback research. 
My framework serves three purposes. First, it provides guidance on how this literature 
review is organized. It divides the research on compensation clawbacks into determinants 
and consequences. The former are analyzed to detect potential frictions that call for a 
regulation. The latter help to form expectations about the net benefits of the proposed 
clawback mandate. As such, the framework serves as a roadmap for the evaluation of the 
DFA-clawback. Second, this framework may be used to guide future reviews on other 
corporate governance policies in order to evaluate proposals for government mandates. That 
is, it suggests an approach of how to analyze the previous literature with respect to the 
potential value of a mandate. Lastly, the framework serves as the basis for the structure of 
my causal model that provides an overview of the major achievements in the domain of 
compensation clawbacks. 
4.2 Identification of Clawback Studies 
4.2.1 The Use of Voluntary Clawback Research to Assess a Mandate 
To assess whether the DFA-clawback has the potential to be a valuable corporate governance 
regulation I draw on both, research on mandatory as well as voluntary clawbacks. Studies on 
determinants of compensation clawbacks examine a voluntary clawback environment. 
Conversely, studies on effects of compensation clawbacks may investigate mandatory or 
voluntary clawbacks. The research on consequences of compensation clawbacks can be 
segmented into three subareas with respect to its value for assessing the effectiveness of the 
DFA-clawback. The most relevant research to draw on is archival research on the exact same 
mandatory clawbacks implemented in the same environment. However, such data is not 
available as there has not been a mandatory clawback in the U.S with the same characteristics 
as the DFA-clawback. A second best type of studies are those that examine a mandatory 
clawback with different characteristics in the same environment or a mandatory clawback 
with the same characteristics in a different environment. 
As described in chapter 2.2, so far there have been two mandatory clawbacks with different 
characteristics in the U.S.: the SOX-clawback and the TARP-clawback. However, few 
studies exist on these clawback mandates because their circumstances of adoption pose the 
risk that archival studies are severely flawed. The SOX-clawback was introduced 
concurrently with multiple other regulations that are aimed at enhancing firms’ corporate 
 
- 19 - 
governance. This makes it difficult for archival studies to separate the effects of the clawback 
from other simultaneously enacted prescriptions (Natarajan and Zheng 2017). Also, the 
SOX-clawback turned out to be of low effectiveness which diminishes the relevance of such 
research. In regard to TARP-clawback-studies (Davis-Friday et al. 2011), the adopters are 
likely to suffer from selection bias (Dehaan et al. 2013). Only firms that needed government 
support were mandated to adopt such clawbacks. 
Clawbacks are a relatively new phenomenon (Cherry and Wong 2009) and the U.S. is in a 
pioneering role in implementing mandatory clawbacks. Only few countries besides the U.S. 
have adopted government-initiated recoupment provisions (Apanpa and Ananaba 2016). 
Thus, there is a lack of studies that examine clawbacks in environments different than the 
U.S.  
In absence of sufficient research on mandated clawbacks, a third best type of studies are 
voluntary clawback studies. I primarily draw on research on consequences of voluntary 
clawback adoption to derive potential effects of the DFA-clawback. However, results from 
studies on voluntary clawbacks need not necessarily apply to a mandate (Denis 2012). First, 
rather than actually affecting the corporate governance, the adoption of compensation 
clawbacks may serve as a signaling device to communicate to the market that the firm already 
has a good reporting quality. If so, any effects found by voluntary clawback studies would 
not replicate in a mandatory setting. Second, voluntarily adopted clawbacks may differ in 
their characteristics from the government mandate. The results reported by voluntary 
clawback research could thus originate from clawbacks with different features (e.g. other 
trigger events) than the DFA-clawback. Third, to the extent that firms adopt optimal 
contracts, firms may already have implemented the policies that maximize shareholder value. 
That is, the effects found by voluntary clawback research would not apply to firms that are 
forced to adopt what would be value destroying provisions. Conversely, if firms do not adopt 
clawbacks in an optimal way, results from voluntary clawback research may be amplified 
under a mandatory setting. Lastly, some of the results from voluntary clawback research 
could be driven by confounding factors such as actions that are implemented simultaneously 
with the clawback adoption (Denis 2012). In this case, the effects reported by voluntary 
clawback research may not stem from the clawback policy itself, and thus, would not 
necessarily be transferrable to a mandate. 
Despite the mentioned drawbacks of including voluntary clawback research into the 
assessment of a mandate, such studies provide useful insights and help to form expectations 
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about the regulation (Daske et al. 2008). Other studies have used a similar approach when 
faced with a lack of research on a particular regulation (see e.g. Barth et al. 2008; Daske et 
al. 2013).11 I will thus use these studies to gauge effects of the DFA-clawback. For the sake 
of simplicity, I will assume during my review that effects from voluntary clawback adoption 
are transferable to the proposed government mandate. I will then discuss the extent to which 
each of the previously stated drawbacks is likely to affect my findings. 
4.2.2 Selection of Research Articles 
For the identification of the relevant literature I followed established guidelines of systematic 
literature reviews as recommended by Denyer and Tranfield (2009), Fink (2010), Jesson et 
al. (2011), Mulrow (1994), and Tranfield et al. (2003). 
I conducted a general search in the following electronic databases: Elsevier, EBSCO 
Business Source Premier, EBSCO EconLit, JSTOR, Wiley, Springer, SSRN, and Google 
Scholar. I used search terms that are most often employed in the archival literature to detect 
clawback provisions of firms in SEC filings (Babenko et al. 2017, Chen et al. 2015, Iskandar-
Datta and Jia 2013). The keywords I used are: “clawback”, “recover”, and “recoup”. To 
locate further relevant studies, I additionally examined the reference lists of the identified 
articles. Lastly, I made personal requests to researchers who are currently conducting 
research in this field. I included articles up to March 31, 2018. As the research area of 
compensation clawbacks is relatively new, many of the articles are not yet published. I 
therefore also considered working papers and conference proceedings. I did not restrict the 
method for the search of studies. However, I only considered research in English language 
that either examines i) mandatory clawbacks in any country, ii) voluntary clawbacks in the 
U.S., or iii) that is country-independent in case of experiments and theoretical work. 
I excluded several types of articles related to clawbacks. In particular, I did not consider the 
literature on the tax treatment of compensation clawbacks in my review. Clawbacks pose a 
problem regarding taxation because an executive from whom compensation is recovered is 
required to return the total amount of bonus compensation independent of the taxes she paid 
at the date of receipt (Melone 2010). I also excluded the technical literature that examines 
legal aspects of clawback provisions (e.g. Cherry and Wong 2009; Lombardi 2011). 
                                                 
11  Research has also drawn on findings on voluntary mechanisms to inform regulators about the potential 
effects of a mandate (see e.g. the introduction of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
in the European Union or regulations about mandating voluntary disclosures such as Regulation Fair 
Disclosure). 
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Equivalents to clawbacks also exist in other contexts such as in hedge funds, private equity, 
or mortgage brokerage (Spindler 2012) as well as in debt contracts (Goyal et al. 1998). I did 
not include literature on clawbacks other than those to structure executive compensation in 
my review. Also, some studies use the term clawback clauses to actually describe holdback 
clauses (e.g. Assel et al. 2017; Hirsch et al. 2017). Whereas the two instruments are similar 
in nature from an economic perspective, they are likely to have different psychological 
implications on executives (e.g. Brink and Rankin 2013; Hodge and Winn 2012). Also, 
holdback provisions often use trigger events different from accounting restatements. Thus, 
results of holdback studies are of low value to assess the effectiveness of the DFA-clawback. 
Therefore, I excluded studies that examine holdback clauses only. Lastly, I did not consider 
studies which exclusively cover trigger events that differ from the restatement trigger as 
required by the DFA-clawback (e.g. Thanassoulis and Tanaka 2018). The search procedure 
yielded a total of 52 studies (see Appendix B for an overview). 
5. Determinants of Voluntary Clawback Adoption 
Following my framework, I identify four groups of findings for the analysis of determinants 
(see Figure 2). First, a large portion of research examines whether a firm’s risk of 
misbehavior determines the adoption of clawback provisions. The clawback aims at reducing 
misbehavior and is thus expected to be more often adopted by firms with an increased risk 
of malfeasance. Second, a substantial part of research on determinants of compensation 
clawbacks investigates whether voluntary clawback adoption depends on the power 
differential between managers and the board of directors. While managers are suspected to 
try to avoid clawback implementation, directors are in charge of management oversight and 
may use the instrument for better incentive alignment. Research examines whether the 
adoption of clawbacks is dependent on who has the power to enforce their interest. A third 
stream of literature analyzes whether clawback adoption is associated with pressure from 
parties outside of the firm. Stakeholders of the firm may have their own preferences with 
respect to clawbacks and may try to influence the firm’s adoption decision. Fourth, clawback 
adoption may be affected by spillover effects of firms that have already adopted clawback 
provisions. Specifically, several studies examine if clawback adoption is a function of 
information available from other firms that have experience with such provisions.  
I review the findings in each of the four categories and discuss to which extent they reconcile 
with the optimal contracting view or with the managerial power view. Studies which suggest 
that clawbacks are not adopted in an optimal manner point toward frictions in the market and 
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indicate that a regulation may prove to be beneficial. Conversely, research that provides 
indication for optimal contracting behavior suggests that a regulatory intervention is not 
needed. 
For each of the four groups, I include the main factors that determine clawback adoption as 
well as their direction of influence into the causal model. The model depicted in Figure 3 
provides an overview of the major achievements in clawback research and is intended to 
serve as an aid to guide the reader through the review. 
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FIGURE 3 
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5.1 Risk of Misbehavior 
The first stream of research on determinants of compensation clawbacks examines whether 
firms with a high risk of misbehavior are more likely to include clawback provisions into the 
compensation contracts with their managers (e.g. Babenko et al. 2017; Brown et al. 2015). 
Clawbacks allow to mitigate misbehavior by recovering management compensation that was 
earned based on undesirable actions. As such clawbacks are likely to be more attractive for 
firms that are most prone to misbehavior. I divide the literature that examines the risk of 
misbehavior into i) studies that measure the incentives to misreport present in a firm and ii) 
studies that measure the level of previous misbehavior. 
5.1.1 Incentives to Misreport 
A first type of research investigates managers’ ease of misreporting as an indication of their 
incentives to misreport. Several studies expect firm complexity to be correlated with 
clawback adoption. Complex firms are assumed to be less transparent and may vary a lot in 
performance such that it is easier for managers to engage in malfeasance without being 
detected. Therefore, complex firms are suspected to have a higher need for clawback policies 
as they are more prone to misbehavior (Babenko et al. 2017). Babenko et al. (2017) measure 
complexity with firm size and research and development (R&D) intensity and additionally 
use prior stock return variability as a measure of difficulty of detecting malfeasance. Despite 
not finding significant differences for R&D intensity, they find support for their prediction 
with regard to firm size and prior stock return variability. Cashman et al. (2016) also report 
that complexity increases the likelihood of clawback adoption using an overlapping set of 
measures. 
Another indication of managers’ ease of misreporting are the resources that managers have 
at their disposal for misappropriation. Babenko et al. (2017) hypothesize that the scope of 
firm resources that are potentially subject to misappropriation is positively associated with 
clawback adoption. They use firm size and scaled cash flows as proxies for the scope of 
potential malfeasance and find support in favor of their hypothesis. Similarly, Levine and 
Smith (2010) set up a model in which they test a clawback contract against a no-clawback 
contract in a two-period setting. They demonstrate that the clawback contract dominates the 
no-clawback contract when the agent can easily engage in misreporting activities. 
The ease of misreporting is also a function of the range of different manipulation options 
that managers have at their disposal. Brown et al. (2015) hypothesize that firms will acquire 
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firms with low reporting quality to extend their range of earnings manipulations. In line with 
their expectations, they find an increased frequency of clawback adoption for firms that 
acquire targets with poor accounting quality.  
A second indicator of high incentives to misreport and thus high expected benefits from 
clawback adoption is the amount of compensation-related incentives. Prior research 
documents negative secondary effects of incentive compensation such as increased 
misreporting and lower firm performance (Burns and Kedia 2006; Collins et al. 2009; Core 
et al. 1999; Efendi et al. 2007). A clawback can discourage these negative effects and thereby 
increase pay-to-performance sensitivity. Thus, clawbacks are likely to be most valuable for 
firms that provide high compensation incentives for their managers. Babenko et al. (2017) 
find a significant association between clawback adoption and the percentage of named 
executive officers’ (NEO’s) equity-based pay, the presence of performance-vesting 
provisions on equity-based pay, and golden parachutes. The results indicate that clawback 
provisions are more likely to be adopted with higher amounts of incentive pay. Similarly, 
Brown et al. (2011) report that firms that paid significant bonuses related to mergers & 
acquisitions (M&A) adopt clawback provisions more frequently. CEOs are often rewarded 
for M&A deals even in case the transaction is value destroying (Bliss and Rosen 2011). 
Brown et al. (2011) believe that firms adopt clawbacks as a remedy for the wrong incentives 
of M&A bonuses. Addy et al. (2014), however, find little evidence of increased likelihood 
of clawback adoption if the bonus paid to executives is a material amount in comparison to 
total assets.  
A third type of studies examine career-related incentives that managers are subject to. 
Brown et al. (2015) argue that poor M&A outcomes reveal negative information about the 
CEO and pressure them to perform well in the future to avoid being dismissed. They build 
on prior research that suggests that poor M&A decisions evoke a higher amount of earnings 
manipulation and an increased risk of accounting restatements (Bens et al. 2012). Brown et 
al. (2015) suggest and find that firms are more likely to adopt clawback provisions when 
M&A announcement returns are negative. Clawback provisions allow the firm to preempt 
the likely increase in earnings management. 
In sum, findings provide evidence that clawback adoption is more likely when managers 
have high incentives to misreport. High misreporting incentives make clawbacks especially 
beneficial because they reduce the increased risk that these firms face. The result thus 
suggests that clawbacks work as a deterrent to misreporting. Consistent with the optimal 
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contracting perspective, the finding indicates that firms with high expected benefits from 
clawback adoption have already adopted compensation clawbacks. Conversely, a mandate 
would force firms to implement clawback provisions that have - on average - a lower 
misreporting risk and therefore lower expected benefits. As a result, the benefits of the non-
adopting firms are likely to be smaller or may even be negative. However, the finding that 
the firms with high misreporting incentives have an increased likelihood of clawback 
adoption may be driven by firms with low management power. That is, clawbacks may only 
be adopted by firms with high misreporting risk that simultaneously have low management 
power. If so, regulatory intervention may still be desirable as it would require firms with 
both, high misreporting incentives and high managerial power to adopt clawback policies. 
5.1.2 Previous Misbehavior 
Clawbacks are likely to be beneficial when there is evidence of previous misbehavior. This 
is the case if the previous misbehavior is indicative of future wrongdoing which can be 
mitigated by clawbacks. Several studies focus on how prior malfeasance affects clawback 
adoption. As clawbacks oftentimes use accounting restatements as trigger events, previous 
restatements are used as an indicator for misbehavior. The presence of a recent restatement 
makes the problem of inaccurate financial reports more salient to the board and to 
shareholders and increases the likelihood that clawbacks are discussed and introduced (Addy 
et al. 2014). Firms may adopt clawback provisions following restatements to discourage 
future misbehavior (Babenko et al. 2017) and to alleviate the shareholders’ wealth losses and 
reputational costs that occur after such incidences (Gao et al. 2011, 5).12 Prior research has 
shown that the probability of restatements is strongly related to executive compensation 
schemes (Burns and Kedia 2006; Efendi et al. 2007). Therefore, the adoption of 
compensation clawbacks is a credible signal to investors that past failures are redressed (Gao 
et al. 2011). Indeed, many research studies report a significant association between previous 
restatements and clawback adoption (Davis-Friday et al. 2011; Gao et al. 2011; Iskandar-
Datta and Jia 2013; Zhang and Zhou 2017). Also, some studies distinguish between 
restatements that stem from intentional misstatements (irregularity) and such that are a result 
of errors. They find some evidence of clawbacks being associated with intentional 
misstatements (Addy et al. 2014), but not with error misstatements (Brown et al. 2011). In 
                                                 
12  This is especially the case because there is no guarantee that the SEC will make use of the SOX clawbacks 
(Brown et al. 2011). 
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contrast, Babenko et al. (2017) and Chen et al. (2015) do not find that firms are more likely 
to make use of clawback provisions following a restatement. Babenko et al. (2017) 
additionally use class action lawsuits as evidence of prior executive misbehavior in the firm. 
Such lawsuits are often filed by shareholders of a firm to hold culpable managers accountable 
in case of fraud. Babenko et al. (2017) neither find a relation between prior class action 
lawsuits and the adoption of clawbacks.  
Previous literature suggests that managers use accruals to opportunistically influence 
earnings (e.g. Healy and Wahlen 1999). Low accruals quality is an indicator of opportunistic 
behavior (Givoly et al. 2010). Firms with low accruals quality have earnings that are less 
persistent, stock prices that are less reflective of current accruals, and are more often subject 
to SEC enforcement actions (Desai et al. 2006a; Desai et al. 2006b). Thus, firms with low 
quality accruals are suspected to have high levels of misreporting and are likely to have high 
benefits from clawback adoption. In contrast to this argument, Addy et al. (2014) document 
that firms with higher accruals quality adopt clawbacks more frequently. Addy et al. (2014) 
use total accruals to measure accruals quality.13 Their findings seem not to fit into the 
previous narrative which assumed that increased levels of misreporting make it more 
beneficial to adopt clawback policies. Addy et al.’s (2014) results rather suggest that firms 
are more likely to adopt a clawback when they are least affected by its consequences. A 
potential reason for the finding may be that firms with better accruals quality have superior 
governance structures and may thus face less resistance when adopting clawbacks. 
Brown et al. (2011) examine whether prior goodwill impairments affect the clawback 
adoption decision. Goodwill impairments may be indicative of previous misbehavior such 
as “big bath accounting”. However, the impairments need not stem from intentional 
misconduct but may also be a result of poor M&A decisions (Ramanna 2008). Brown et al.’s 
(2011) results indicate that prior goodwill impairments are more strongly associated with 
performance-based than with fraud-based clawback adoption. Thus, firms with goodwill 
impairments are likely to adopt clawbacks that trigger independent of misconduct, 
potentially because it is difficult to judge whether goodwill impairments stem from 
intentional misbehavior or from poor M&A decisions. As such, the result suggests that these 
firms choose to adopt a type of clawback that most directly addresses the problem. This 
                                                 
13  An earlier draft of Babenko et al. (2017) measures discretionary accruals according to the modified Jones 
model following Dechow et al. (1995) and does not find a significant relation to clawback adoption. 
However, this result is not included in Babenko et al. (2017). 
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underlines that firms choose the characteristics of the clawback to suit their needs. The 
finding puts into question whether the one-fits-all solution of the mandatory DFA-clawback 
is the best way to go. This is especially true as Denis (2012) warns that sometimes, a 
compulsory regulation overrides a more appropriate action. Thus, the mandatory DFA-
clawback may make firms forgo provisions that are more suitable for them because they are 
too concerned about adhering to the government mandate. Such effects would also speak 
against a government-imposed regulation. 
Overall, the literature on determinants of voluntary clawbacks finds some evidence that 
clawbacks are increasingly adopted following previous misbehavior. A clawback may be 
valuable following such instances because prior misreporting can be indicative of future 
malfeasance against which a clawback acts as a deterrent. Consistent with the optimal-
contracting view, firms with instances of prior malfeasance are more likely to adopt 
recoupment provisions. However, a frequently mentioned argument in the literature is that 
the clawback adoption following misbehavior may be used by firms to signal their 
willingness to improve financial integrity (e.g. Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2013). Rather than the 
clawback being itself effective at curbing misbehavior, the adoption conveys the firm’s plan 
to increase corporate governance. The signal is valuable because by adopting a costly 
clawback the firm can reliably communicate its willingness to increase governance. Thus, 
the clawback adoption may restore investors’ trust which is likely to be impaired.14 In case 
of a mandate, the clawback would lose its value as a signal because all firms would be 
required to comply with the clawback rule (Chan et al. 2012). To the extent that a clawback 
is ineffective, but is used as a signal to show a firm’s willingness to improve its corporate 
governance, a mandate is value destroying. Firms without clawbacks may be required to 
adopt a non-functioning instrument and would need to find other - potentially costlier - ways 
to communicate to investors that the firm is willing to improve its financial integrity 
following previous misbehavior.  
In sum, research on voluntary clawback adoption indicates that firms with increased 
incentives for managerial self-dealing behavior or firms with previous incidences of 
                                                 
14  Alternatively, the clawback could be misused by firms to let investors erroneously believe that the 
previous governance problem is solved (Chen and Vann 2017). In such a case, a government mandate 
would not be beneficial either. Rather it would introduce an unwarranted illusion of increased governance 
on the part of investors (Denis 2012). However, the fact that many studies find a decrease in misbehavior 
following clawback adoption (discussed in chapter 6) contradicts the view that clawbacks are adopted as 
a pretention of improved governance. 
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misbehavior are more likely to adopt clawback provisions. The effect is suspected to be due 
to the high benefits from clawback adoption. With respect to mandatory clawbacks, this 
could mean that non-adopters have lower expected benefits. The fact that only a fraction of 
firms have adopted clawbacks voluntarily15 could indicate that their expected benefits are too 
low in comparison with the expected cost of such provisions. Following this argumentation, 
a mandate would be associated with negative net benefits for non-adopters and would likely 
be value destroying. 
5.2 Power Differential between Managers and Boards 
The effects discussed so far support the view that firms estimate the expected benefits of 
voluntary clawbacks to decide about the adoption. The findings provide some indication that 
clawback adoption follows a process that is in line with the optimal-contracting perspective. 
However, previous research on management compensation indicates that the incentives of 
shareholder, directors, and managers are not perfectly aligned and cast doubt on whether 
firms adopt optimal contracts. For example, previous literature indicates that firms hid 
substantial CEO pension benefits in absence of disclosure mandates (Bebchuk and Jackson 
2005), experienced high excess returns following disclosure regulation (Greenstone et al. 
2006), or decreased management compensation substantially following board independence 
regulation (Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2009). Such findings suggest that mandated 
regulation with regards to compensation can be beneficial and provides a counterargument 
to advocates who believe that firms always make optimal contracting choices. Several 
studies therefore examine whether clawback adoption is a function of the respective power 
of managers and the board. These studies measure board independence, CEO power, and the 
firm’s corporate governance to assess how powerful managers are compared to the board of 
directors. 
Babenko et al. (2017) find a strong positive association between board independence and 
clawback adoption. Empirical literature documents that independent directors improve the 
governance of a firm as they have better incentives to carry out their monitoring tasks than 
inside directors (Agrawal and Chadha 2005; Beasley 1996; Weisbach 1988). Also, compared 
to inside directors, the reputation of independent directors is likely to suffer more from an 
accounting restatement which is reflected by an increased turnover of outside directors 
                                                 
15  The SEC estimates that 1,116 of 4,845 potentially affected filers had voluntarily adopted compensation 
clawbacks in 2015 (SEC 2015). 
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following restatements (Srinivasan 2005). Diligent boards are therefore suspected to be more 
interested in avoiding reputational damages (Gao et al. 2011). Gao et al. (2011) also report 
a significant relation between the percentage of directors without ties to the firm and the use 
of clawback provisions. Brown et al. (2011), however, do not find the percentage of inside 
directors to significantly reduce the likelihood of clawback adoption. 
Brown et al. (2011) and Gao et al. (2011) suggest that high CEO power will keep firms from 
adopting clawbacks as the board is more likely to be influenced by the manager who tries to 
avoid such clauses. They both test various governance characteristics that proxy for the 
power of the CEO. The results indicate that the influence of the CEO is negatively associated 
with the introduction of clawback provisions. Babenko et al. (2017) use CEO tenure as a 
proxy for CEO power and find effects consistent with power to negatively affect clawback 
adoption. The effects are in line with influential CEOs successfully resisting clawback 
provisions. In a different study, Huang et al. (2018) find that board co-option is negatively 
associated with clawback adoption. Board co-option refers to the percentage of board 
members that were appointed after the CEO assumed office. They argue that the CEO is 
highly involved in the selection of new board members and that such directors are unlikely 
to make a stand against the CEO. Interestingly, Huang et al. (2018) do not find that the power 
of the CEO is negatively associated with clawback adoption when they control for board co-
option.  
Several studies analyze the corporate governance as a determinant of clawback adoption. 
Addy et al. (2014) construct a Corporate Governance Index using 13 proxies to examine 
whether governance tilts toward management entrenchment or toward oversight. Addy et al. 
(2014) expect clawback adoption to be more likely when the index suggests good oversight. 
Overall, the results of the corporate governance index provide indication for oversight to be 
positively related to clawback adoption. Interestingly, CEO duality is positively related to 
clawback adoption. CEO duality is a measure of whether the CEO is also a chairman of the 
board. This finding is surprising because CEO duality is usually seen as an indicator for 
weak oversight (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 1993; Lipton and Lorsch 1992). However, 
other studies do not support the finding. Brown et al. (2011) who also test CEO duality as a 
determinant of clawback adoption do not find a significant relation. Beck (2015) reports that 
less stringent clawbacks are adopted when the CEO is also chair of the board. She suspects 
that because of her power, a manager who also serves as chair of the board will hinder the 
implementation of more stringent clawbacks. 
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Chen and Vann (2017) examine a set of proxies for governance with respect to the CEO (e.g. 
duality and tenure) as well as the board of directors (independence, diligence and size). They 
find evidence for clawback adoption being associated with strong governance characteristics. 
Similarly, Chen and Vann (2014) test a set of measures that proxy for the strength of the 
board of directors and the entrenchment of the management. They report the clawback 
adoption to be positively associated with their proxies for board strength and negatively 
associated with board entrenchment. They conclude that the clawback acts as a complement 
to a firm’s internal corporate governance. 
Erkens et al. (2014) create an index that measures the level of deterrence of clawback 
policies. They examine corporate governance factors that influence whether a high deterrent 
or a low deterrent clawback is adopted. By adopting high-deterrent clawbacks, directors 
renounce the discretion to forego recovery and therefore obligate themselves to enforce the 
clawback. Erkens et al. (2014) find evidence that weak corporate governance and high 
executive power is associated with the adoption of low-deterrent clawbacks. They suspect 
that firms with a weak governance structure misuse their discretion in designing clawbacks. 
Such firms adopt low-deterrent clawbacks that allow boards to retain discretion and forego 
recovery.  
By analyzing the clawback provisions in their sample in detail, Erkens et al. (2014) document 
that the clawbacks provide the board of directors with considerable discretion in deciding 
whether to seek recoupment. They argue that this is dangerous because boards have low 
financial incentives to litigate managers, have personal reasons not to confront executives, 
and are likely to benefit from maintaining a good relationship with the CEO due to her 
influence outside the firm. Similarly, Fried (2016) reports that the board oftentimes has 
considerable discretion when it comes to deciding whether to seek recovery in case that a 
clawback is triggered. Fried (2016) documents that of 225 examined clawback policies, 81% 
of the provisions gave directors complete discretion to avoid recovery even in the event of 
misconduct. From a theoretical viewpoint it seems intuitive to let the board, who monitors 
executives, make the recoupment decision. One would imagine that the board only disregards 
the recovery of compensation in case that it is not beneficial for the firm. However, findings 
from voluntary clawback adoption indicate that recoupment from executives is only sought 
in rare cases (Erkens et al. 2014). Out of 272 clawback adopters that issued a restatement 
Babenko et al. (2017) find only three instances of recoupment of management compensation 
between 2000 and 2013. Similarly, Glater (2005) finds very few firms that activate their 
compensation clawbacks following restatements and Morgenson (2013) reports that activist 
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shareholders start trying to address the problem.16 As Section 402(b)(2)(viii) of the regulation 
S-K prescribes that issuers disclose information on both, their recoupment policies in place 
as well as on amounts recovered, the low number of recoupment cases may not be due to 
non-disclosure. The finding strongly suggests that voluntary clawbacks are not activated 
because boards use their discretion. This evidence raises doubts about the effectiveness of 
voluntarily adopted clawback provisions. 
Overall, many of the determinants of compensation clawbacks suggest that the decision to 
adopt clawbacks highly depends on the power differential between top-management and the 
board of directors. The empirical evidence discussed in this chapter suggests that clawbacks 
are more likely adopted when the board is strong or when the management is weak. The 
results are mainly in line with the managerial power view and indicate that executives exert 
their power over the board to prevent clawback adoption. If the decision not to adopt 
clawbacks is driven by the resistance of high powered executives, a clawback mandate is 
potentially beneficial. Mandatory clawbacks would force any firm to comply with the rule, 
independent of the opposition of opportunistic manager. 
Several studies additionally indicate that even if clawbacks are adopted, board members 
often retain considerable discretion when it comes to the recoupment decision. Their 
financial, social, and psychological reasons to favor executives (Bebchuk and Fried 2004) 
prevent them from actually enforcing the clawback. This raises the concern that the legal 
provisions merely exist on paper without having actual consequences. The low effectiveness 
of existing voluntary clawbacks underline the importance of the design of mandated 
clawback provisions. The clawback rule needs to be very objective and specific in order to 
be effective. Any kind of discretion granted to the board runs the danger of being influenced 
by the powerful management. Consistent with this view, the proposed rule of the DFA-
clawback formulates clawbacks that allow very little room for board discretion. They require 
boards to always litigate managers in case of a restatement and make appropriate disclosure.  
In sum, the empirical evidence documents that clawback adoption is likely to be driven by 
the respective power of directors and managers which suggests that there is room for a 
regulatory intervention. A mandate would require the board to enforce the provision despite 
resistant managers. The proposed rule of the DFA-clawback provides a regulation that allows 
a minimum of discretion. As such, the rule has the potential to effectively counteract the 
                                                 
16  See Skroupa (2014) for an example of how the activist shareholder CtW initiated clawback adoption at 
Walmart. 
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collusion of directors and managers. Clearly, the value of such a mandate would still 
crucially depend on whether the initiative is effective at mitigating the problem without 
imposing undue costs. 
5.3 Stakeholder Pressure and Monitoring 
In the previous chapters, clawback adoption has so far been discussed as being mainly driven 
by the internal characteristics of the firm. Some research presumes that voluntary clawback 
adoption is a function of external pressure that firms experience. The pressure may stem 
from different players including regulators, analysts, creditors, and different types of 
shareholders. 
A first set of studies are concerned with pressure from regulators and the government. 
Brown et al. (2011) draw on Watts and Zimmerman’s (1986) political cost theory, which 
predicts that firms try to reduce the risk of a governmental intervention because it might 
negatively affect firm value. Highly visible firms are more exposed to such interventions by 
the regulator. Brown et al. (2011) therefore expect highly visible firms to adopt clawbacks 
voluntarily. By doing so, they can take actions in the event of managerial misbehavior which 
reduces the likelihood that the SEC steps in on the grounds of the SOX-clawback. This is in 
line with a statement of the SEC made in 2006 in which the SEC announced that it will 
penalize firms that issue restatements depending on their ways of remediation of such 
restatements (Addy et al. 2014). Brown et al. (2011) find that the recent issuance of debt as 
well as firm size as proxies of firm visibility increase the likelihood of clawback adoption 
significantly. However, recent equity issuance is not associated with clawback adoption. Gao 
et al. (2011) also find clawback adoption to be associated with firm size. The results hence 
indicate partial support for the visibility argument. Furthermore, a less documented 
phenomenon provides additional evidence that clawback adoption is affected by the pressure 
from regulators and the government. With the introduction of the DFA, firms knew that they 
will have to adopt clawbacks mandatorily as soon as the regulation is enforced. The debate 
fueled by the prospective mandate may also have prompted firms to discuss an early adoption 
in order to already suffice the requirements. Compared to Europe, where compulsory 
regulations to implement compensation clawbacks are less prevalent, the U.S. has by far a 
higher voluntary adoption rate. Ernst&Young (2016) find among a sample of European firms 
(primarily in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria) only 18% to have clawbacks in place in 
2015. In contrast, Frederic W. Cook & Co (2015) report that 90% among the largest 250 
firms in the S&P 500 had clawbacks in the same year. The high adoption rate in the U.S., 
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where mandatory clawbacks are soon to be enforced, suggests that increased pressure from 
the regulator makes clawback adoption more likely.17 
Babenko et al. (2017) investigate whether clawback adoption is a function of shareholder 
pressure. They use the support for management compensation in a firm’s most recent say-
on-pay vote and the presence of a compensation consultant as proxies of shareholder 
pressure. Both, low agreement with management pay and the presence of external experts 
for compensation decisions are indicators of increased scrutiny from investors. Babenko et 
al. (2017) find a significantly higher likelihood of clawback adoption when the two proxies 
indicate high shareholder pressure. 
Results from Cashman et al. (2016) also indicate that voluntary clawbacks are more 
frequently adopted with increased external monitoring pressures. They report that the 
presence of financial analysts as well as the percentage of institutional investors are 
positively associated with clawback adoption. Opposing to Cashman et al.’s (2016) results, 
Chen and Vann (2014) find that clawback adoption is negatively associated to monitoring 
from institutional investors. Chen and Vann (2014) also document that clawbacks are 
adopted less frequently with increasing supervision from creditors. They hold the differing 
risk preferences of managers and external parties accountable for their findings. Chen and 
Vann (2014) reason that external parties have higher risk preferences than managers and fear 
a reduction in risk-taking from clawback adoption (see Babenko et al. 2017). Therefore, 
external parties prefer other monitoring devices than clawbacks. Gao et al. (2011) also find 
supporting evidence for the result that clawback adoption is less likely when creditors exert 
pressure. They claim that creditor monitoring disciplines firms in a way that a clawback is 
of low additional value. Lastly, Cashman et al. (2016) find a significantly negative 
association between clawback adoption and the percentage of blockholders, supporting the 
argument that when good external monitoring is in place, the additional value of clawbacks 
may be low. 
In sum, there is a wide array of external parties that exert pressure on firms with respect to 
the adoption of governance instruments. The findings suggest that clawbacks are likely to be 
adopted when firms have high political costs from regulators or when there is pressure from 
                                                 
17  However, two studies indicate that the DFA-clawback is not the most important reason for early adoption. 
In Babenko et al. (2017), only 10.2% of respondents agreed that the DFA-clawback was the main reason 
for voluntary clawback adoption. Also, Addy et al. (2014) find that only 17 out of 114 clawback provisions 
they examined were similar to the DFA-clawback. 
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analysts or shareholder initiatives. The results indicate that clawbacks decrease monitoring 
costs and provide external parties some assurance when they have high interests at stake. 
Thus, the clawback seems to better protect stakeholders from the risks that they bear when 
interacting with the firm. The result that firms only adopt clawbacks in environments where 
they are highly monitored could indicate that clawbacks work but firms resist adoption unless 
there is sufficient external pressure. The argument is in line with the managerial power view 
because managers only agree to adopt clawbacks in presence of pressure from outside 
parties. A mandatory clawback may therefore facilitate interactions with stakeholders. 
However, Cheng et al. (2017) argue that if external parties can at low cost require firms to 
adopt clawbacks, a mandatory clawback may not be effective because not all firms need 
clawback provisions. Also, there is indication of some stakeholders (e.g. creditors and 
blockholders) having a preference not to adopt clawbacks. The motivation not to enforce a 
clawback may be because the instrument decreases managerial risk-taking or because the 
external monitoring is sufficient such that clawback provisions are not necessary.  
5.4 Spillover Effects 
So far, the determinants discussed with regard to voluntary clawback adoption depend on 
the firm’s characteristics or on internal and external players who try to enforce their interest 
with regards to clawback adoption. A last category examines potential spillover effects from 
other firms. Previous research suggests the existence of different types of spillovers of 
governance instruments across firms (e.g. see Kalodimos 2017). The studies discussed in 
this chapter analyze whether such effects also apply to the adoption of clawbacks.  
Addy et al. (2014) investigate whether director interlocks are related with the frequency of 
clawback adoption. Directors are interlocked when they serve on boards of other firms that 
already have clawback provisions in place. Previous literature has shown that other aspects 
of management compensation are significantly determined by such director interlocks 
(Cochran et al. 1985; Reppenhagen 2010; Singh and Harianto 1989). Addy et al.’s (2014) 
results show a significant relationship between interlocks of compensation committee 
members and the likelihood of clawback adoption. The findings indicate that directors who 
work for clawback firms can reduce the uncertainty associated with the adoption of a 
clawback by sharing their experience. Similar to Addy et al. (2014), Cheng et al. (2017) also 
find that director interlocks are a driver of the adoption of clawback provisions. 
 
- 36 - 
Remesal (2018) assumes that a firm’s decision to adopt clawback provisions is dominated 
by peer firm adoption within the same industry. The cost to set up governance, legal, and 
accounting structures for efficient clawbacks may be lower if clawbacks are common among 
peer firms. He argues that clawback adoption of a firm benefits other firms within the same 
industry by facilitating the process and reducing the cost of implementation. Remesal (2018) 
finds individual adoption of clawbacks to be positively correlated with industry adoption and 
negatively correlated with the trend of adoption in the remaining industries.  
Cheng et al. (2017) document that clawbacks spread across firms by common institutional 
activist blockholders. Institutional activist blockholders are institutional shareholders that 
own a minimum of 5% of shares of the firm and who engaged in at least one activist activity. 
Cheng et al. (2017) find that clawbacks are more likely to be adopted by a firm if another 
firm in the portfolio of the activist blockholder has already adopted clawbacks. They argue 
that blockholders play an important role at propagating clawback adoption across firms in 
their portfolios. Cheng et al. (2017) demonstrate that the effect is not driven by selective 
investments of blockholders into clawback firms. They show that a firm’s likelihood to adopt 
clawbacks similarly increases if a firm in the portfolio of the blockholder is forced to adopt 
mandatory clawbacks of the TARP program. Also, Cheng et al. (2017) provide evidence that 
the activist blockholder effect is independent of director interlocks and does not depend on 
industry affiliation or location. The “traveling governance effect”, as Cheng et al. (2017) call 
it, is more pronounced if firms had a previous restatement, have a weak governance or 
operate in a highly competitive market (Admati and Pfleiderer 2009).  
A less discussed spillover effect that could be responsible for clawback adoption is mimicry. 
Mimicry occurs when organizations imitate other organizations that they perceive as 
successful (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Instead of conducting a complete cost-benefit 
analysis, firms adopt the policies of successful others (Ugrin 2009). Such behavior helps 
alleviate uncertainty and saves time and resources (Ugrin 2009). However, the failure to 
perform a sound analysis may let the firm adopt policies that do not contribute to the 
organization’s objectives (Cyert and March 1963). Thus, a firm may adopt clawbacks to 
achieve parity with a successful peer in terms of governance. Rather than actually evaluating 
the need of clawbacks and the design that suits the firm the best, firms may just copy the 
provisions of their competitors.  
The above results suggest that a firm’s decision to adopt clawbacks is influenced by the 
adoption decision of other firms. Interlocked directors may have superior information about 
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clawbacks and can reduce the uncertainty that potentially exists with regards to the effects 
of an adoption. Non-adopters may not have implemented clawbacks because of the 
uncertainty rather than because the clawback is not beneficial. Spillover effects may also 
arise because the adoption of clawbacks by peer firms may reduce the cost of adoption for 
followers. In both cases, the adoption process can be reconciled with the optimal contracting 
view. Clawback adoption seems to be subject to high uncertainty and is associated with high 
costs of first movers. However, as soon as uncertainty and costs are reduced by interlocked 
or peer firms, the firms adopt clawbacks on their own accord. Still, a mandate would address 
the problem by accelerating the adoption process. However, it is questionable whether the 
one-fits-all solution of the DFA-clawback is the best way to go. 
Other spillover effects include the traveling governance effect and mimicry. Whether these 
spillover effects of clawback adoption are beneficial is a priori unclear. Previous research 
has shown that market forces are able to promote good governance practices using spillover 
effects (Aggarwal et al. 2011). However, when a firm includes clawback mainly because 
others do so (e.g. in case of mimicry), the adoption is unlikely to result in optimal provisions.  
5.5 What Determinants Tell us About the Motives to Adopt Compensation 
Clawbacks 
The analysis of determinants of compensation clawbacks suggests that firms have differing 
motivations to adopt clawback provisions. A first set of studies shows that firms with a high 
risk of misreporting are more likely to adopt clawbacks. The result is consistent with the 
view that firms adopt recoupment provisions as a function of net benefit expectations. This 
corroborates the argument of proponents of the optimal contracting view who expect the 
adopters to choose efficient policies. If firms that experience the greatest benefits from 
voluntary clawbacks have already adopted them, chances are that a mandate will not be a 
success. Also, since the choice of improving the corporate governance is endogenous, the 
value-maximizing choice may differ between firms (Larcker et al. 2011). The wide variety 
of clawbacks that are adopted could indicate that firms have different needs with regards to 
the characteristics of recoupment provisions. Whether the one-fits-all solution of the DFA-
clawback is adequate is highly questionable. The clawback mandate will implement 
minimum requirements that may be too far-reaching for some of the firms. By imposing a 
contract that does not fit the firm and its environment, a clawback could be detrimental to 
shareholders.  
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However, a second set of studies indicates that clawbacks are less prevalent across firms that 
suffer from poor corporate governance and have a powerful CEO. Proponents of mandatory 
clawbacks argue that managerial power prevents the movement toward an optimal regime. 
The board of directors may not have sufficient incentives or may be too weak to enforce 
clawbacks despite them being optimal for the firm (Fried and Shilon 2011). The findings 
suggest the power differential between managers and directors to be responsible for 
clawback adoption and raises the suspicion that there is room for a government mandate. 
The reasoning is additionally backed by studies that document that boards have large margins 
of discretion when it comes to the recoupment decision and hardly ever seek recovery. The 
low enforcement of voluntary clawback suggests that the provisions may be adopted on paper 
only. The proposed rule would address these potential pitfalls of voluntary clawbacks by 
forcing reluctant firms to adopt clawbacks and by minimizing the discretion of seeking 
recovery available to the board of directors.  
Another stream of literature additionally provides evidence for external pressure being 
responsible for clawback adoption. Parties who are not in charge of the adoption decision 
try to influence the firm to enforce their own interests. The results may indicate that firms 
do not adopt optimal contracts of their own accord, but give in if sufficient outside pressure 
exists. Such frictions may be solved by a clawback mandate. However, there are also 
arguments that external pressures successfully govern the firm (Cheng et al. 2017). These 
pressures make firms adopt provisions that are in line with the optimal contracting 
perspective such that a mandate is not needed. 
A fourth type of studies examine the dissemination of voluntary clawbacks and find that the 
adoption decision is a function of spillover effects. They provide evidence that firms that are 
somehow connected, influence a firm’s adoption decision. Whereas director interlocks and 
peer firm adoption may be reconciled with optimal contracting behavior because firms adopt 
clawbacks of their own accord as soon as uncertainty and adoption costs are sufficiently low, 
other effects are more difficult to clearly attribute to either the optimal contracting or the 
managerial power view.  
Overall, a substantial part of research can be reconciled with clawback adoption being 
largely influenced by the power of differing parties who try to enforce their own interests. If 
individual parties such as a powerful managers can prevent clawbacks, it is unlikely that 
firms adopt socially optimal provisions. In light of the frequent occurrence of restatements, 
the low enforcement rate of voluntary clawbacks is startling. In sum, there is evidence for 
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frictions that prevent firms from adopting value maximizing provisions for their managers. 
Thus, a government regulation can improve the current situation. 
6. Consequences of Clawback Adoption 
The previous chapter has demonstrated the existence of potential forces that prevent firms 
from adopting optimal compensation clawbacks. Hence, a regulation can help to alleviate 
those frictions. However, to be valuable, the new rule needs to be both, effective at mitigating 
the market failure and efficient in terms that its benefits outweigh the costs. In this chapter, 
I review the literature on consequences of compensation clawbacks to assess whether the 
DFA-clawback is likely to be a beneficial corporate governance regulation. Following my 
framework, I discuss the research on consequences of clawback adoption using three 
subsections (see Figure 2). I will start out with capital market effects of the clawback 
adoption, namely market response and liquidity. Research on the stock market effects of 
clawback adoption provides insights into how investors interpret the value of the clawback 
overall. Secondly, I will review the literature that examines the financial reporting effects of 
clawback adoption. Clawbacks should improve firms’ financial reporting by deterring 
managers from misreporting (SEC 2015). A large part of the literature therefore investigates 
whether clawbacks increase a firm’s reporting quality. I will differentiate between effects on 
actual and perceived reporting quality. The third subsection is concerned with effects from 
clawback adoption that are related to management behavior. The management is the party 
most directly affected by the clawback and is likely to show immediate reactions to the 
policy. The main findings and the direction of influence for each category are synthesized in 
my causal model (see Figure 3).  
For the overview, I include archival, experimental as well as theoretical studies. I use both, 
literature on voluntary and mandatory clawbacks to gauge the effects of the proposed 
regulation. It is possible that firms which adopted a policy voluntarily show differing 
consequences compared to firms that are forced to the treatment (Daske et al. 2008). For 
simplicity, I make the operational assumption that effects from voluntary clawback adoption 
do also apply to a government mandate. I will discuss limitations of this assumption at the 
end of this chapter. 
6.1 Capital Market Effects 
A first stream of research examines how the securities market reacts to the adoption of 
compensation clawbacks. I differentiate between two types of market effects. First, 
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numerous studies are interested in how the stock price reacts when the information that 
clawbacks have been adopted is communicated to the market. The market reaction is 
compared to non-adopters and indicates whether clawbacks are viewed as a valuable 
governance instrument by investors. A second type of capital market effects relate to 
liquidity. Liquidity changes provide information on how the policy affects the efficiency of 
price formation because liquidity is a measure of information asymmetry and adverse 
selection in markets (Copeland and Galai 1983; Golsten and Milgrom 1985). 
The market response to the communication of a governance change indicates how 
shareholders interpret the value of the new policy (Bebchuk et al. 2009; Larcker et al. 2011). 
A positive reaction to a clawback announcement suggests that the clawback policies are 
considered to be valuable. Most clawbacks are not published in the press, but are instead 
reported in SEC filings such as the proxy statement, 10K, or 8K (Babenko et al. 2017). 
Studies that are concerned with the market response to the adoption of clawbacks examine 
the stock price development around the date when a SEC filing communicates the clawback 
for the first time. 
Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2013) reason that due to its deterrent effect, the clawback improves 
the quality and integrity of the financial statements which should result in a positive market 
response. They use a hand-collected sample of 246 voluntary clawback adopters between 
2005 and 2009. They employ propensity score matching to find comparable non-adopters. 
The authors report positive abnormal returns following the announcement of voluntary 
clawbacks. They interpret the positive stock market reaction as an indication that investors 
perceive recovery policies as beneficial. Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2013) additionally find that 
the positive stock market reaction is stronger for firms that issued a restatement in the four 
years preceding the adoption. They argue that a previous restatement impairs the credibility 
of the firm and its management. As a consequence, firms with a history of previous 
misreporting are viewed with increased skepticism. The stronger positive market reaction to 
firms with an impaired reputation underlines that clawbacks are perceived as a deterrent 
against future misbehavior.  
Chen et al. (2015) examine a three year longer time period than Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2013) 
and document a positive market reaction to voluntary clawback adoption as well. They find 
convincing evidence for positive stock market returns following the adoption. 
Gao et al. (2011) also report a significant positive stock market reaction to the voluntary 
adoption of compensation clawbacks. Like Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2013), Gao et al. (2011) 
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find that the market reaction is more pronounced for firms that issued a restatement in the 
four years preceding the adoption. Also, they document the stock price reaction to clawback 
policies to be larger with higher management entrenchment. Entrenched managers are likely 
to abuse their power which can be restricted by clawbacks. The results are consistent with 
the view that clawbacks are perceived to be most effective when firms have a high risk of 
wealth expropriation or poor governance characteristics. 
Babenko et al.’s (2017) findings support the positive market response to clawbacks based on 
a much larger sample of 4,020 filings with clawback policies. They report the abnormal 
returns to be higher when the clawback-adopting firms have low board independence. The 
effect suggests that investors are more positively surprised to see poorly governed firms 
adopt clawbacks voluntarily, supporting the findings of Gao et al. (2011). Babenko et al. 
(2017) also find that the market response is more positive when a broad clawback is adopted. 
A broad clawback has more triggers and covers a higher number of employees and 
compensation categories. The lower reaction to clawbacks with minimal strength suggests 
that narrow clawbacks are viewed as less effective than broad clawbacks.  
Another finding of Babenko et al. (2017) is especially interesting with regards to mandatory 
clawback policies. They find that the stock market reaction to voluntary clawback adoption 
is larger in magnitude for firms that adopted clawbacks prior to the DFA. One reason for the 
stronger market reaction before the legislation could be that firms with the greatest net 
benefits from clawbacks adopt the provisions earlier. However, more interestingly, the DFA-
clawback announcement may have priced-in some of the positive investor response to 
voluntary clawback adoption because future adoption is expected. Thus, the market reactions 
to clawbacks after the DFA may be lower because investors already anticipate firms to adopt 
clawbacks mandatorily. Bakke et al. (2017) provide supporting evidence for the latter 
argument by using an event study approach. Their research is one of the few archival studies 
on mandatory clawbacks. Bakke et al. (2017) examine how clawback adopters and non-
adopters react to the issuance of the proposed rule of the DFA-clawback on July 1st 2015. 
They document that non-adopters react more positively to the rule than firms that have 
voluntarily included recoupment provisions. The authors argue that firms should experience 
negative reactions to a mandate if they chose their corporate governance practices optimally 
because any prescriptive regulation would destroy value. Since reactions are positive, they 
attribute the effect to mandatory clawbacks being value enhancing. 
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Bakke et al. (2017) additionally report that the market response is greater for non-adopters 
with powerful managers. They use the percentage of board members that was appointed after 
the CEO (board co-option) and whether the CEO serves as the chair of the board as proxies 
to measure the power relationship between managers and the board of directors and find 
support in line with their expectations for both of their measures. They argue that firms with 
powerful managers are likely to have larger agency problems and that the positive market 
response shows that the clawback is viewed as an effective deterrent against earnings 
manipulations. Their interpretation is in agreement with voluntary clawback studies that also 
report larger market reactions to clawback adoption of poorly governed firms (Babenko et 
al. 2017; Gao et al. 2011).  
The value of Bakke et al.’s (2017) study is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the proposed 
rule itself did not release the information that clawbacks will be mandatory. Rather, the 
information about the mandate was already released with the DFA. The publication of the 
proposed rule primarily issued information on the properties of the clawback. Any market 
reaction therefore only corrects for the prior expectations about the mandate. The study 
cannot rule out that a mandatory clawback is value-destroying and the positive reaction 
occurs because investors expected the clawback mandate to be broader and are pleased to 
see that the proposed clawback is less stringent than expected. However, the rule proposes 
clawbacks which are quite strict and far-reaching compared to both, existing voluntary and 
mandatory clawbacks (Bakke et al. 2017; Beck 2015). The positive stock market reaction is 
thus likely to provide indication for a mandate to be valuable to investors. 
A second event study also investigates effects of mandatory clawbacks. In her dissertation 
Li (2014) examines the market reaction of U.S.-firms to the compensation recovery of the 
Jenkins case. Drawing on the SOX-clawback, the SEC brought an enforcement action against 
Mr. Maynard Jenkins, who was the former CEO and chairman of CSK Auto Corp. The 
Jenkins case was one of the first SOX-clawback recoveries and drew much media attention 
in 2011. Before that case, the SEC only pursued a handful of cases with respect to the SOX-
clawback because the SEC had to prove that a manager was personally responsible for the 
accounting restatement of the firm. However, in the Jenkins case, the SEC changed its policy 
and charged Jenkins for violating clawback provisions without personally accusing him of 
misconduct. Top executives from then on had to fear clawback recoveries for restatements 
due to misconduct even if they were not personally responsible for it. Despite the SEC’s 
policy change, the number of enforcement actions remained small compared to the number 
of restatements. However, the case set precedents for the future enforcement of the SOX-
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clawback and thereby reshaped the expectations regarding its enforcement. As such, 
investors’ reaction to the communication of the event can be seen as a reaction to an 
extension of the SOX-clawback. Li (2014) hypothesizes and finds that firms with a higher 
likelihood of earnings restatements show a more positive market reaction to the publication 
of the Jenkins case. She attributes the effect to the SOX-clawback being a higher threat for 
executives of firms with high control weaknesses. The effect supports the results of Bakke 
et al. (2017) who also report poorly governed firms to experience a higher market reaction 
to the announcement event. Unfortunately, Li (2014) does not reveal whether she finds a 
significant positive market reaction to the Jenkin case using her full sample and whether 
effects differ between clawback adopters and non-adopters. Still, the study provides insights 
on how firms react to an increase in the breadth of a mandatory clawback depending on their 
characteristics. The more positive reaction of firms with a higher likelihood of misreporting 
suggests that broad clawbacks are viewed as more effective at curbing misbehavior. 
Overall, the findings provide consistent evidence that voluntarily adopted clawbacks are 
viewed as a valuable corporate governance instrument by investors. The reactions are more 
positive for poorly governed firms, firms with high misreporting risk, or when the adopted 
clawbacks are broad (i.e. large scope of the clawback in terms of number of triggers, 
coverage of employees, and compensation categories subject to recovery). The results 
indicate that recoupment provisions are perceived to work as a deterrent against 
misreporting. Also, event studies regarding mandatory clawbacks provide some evidence 
that mandatory clawbacks are beneficial and that they are viewed to improve the governance 
of firms that have not yet adopted a clawback. Under the presumption that investor reactions 
are rational, this is good news for the imminent enforcement of the DFA-clawback. They 
indicate that the regulation is interpreted as being value enhancing. 
Besides the stock market reaction, a second measure that is often examined following policy 
changes is the liquidity of the stock market (e.g. Brüggemann et al. 2013; Hirst et al. 2008). 
It has been well established that information asymmetry among market participants 
introduces adverse selection into stock markets (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). Uninformed 
investors face the risk of trading with better informed market participants. As a result, 
uninformed investors anticipate the potential informational advantage of their counterparty 
and buy (sell) at lower (higher) prices. This introduces a bid-ask spread which protects 
uninformed investors against exploitation by informed traders. Also, uninformed investors 
decrease the number of shares they are willing to trade which results in lower turnover (Kim 
and Verrecchia 1994).  
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Drawing on these mechanisms, Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2013) claim that clawbacks reduce 
the information asymmetry between shareholders and the management because the 
management has higher incentives to report truthfully. The lower information asymmetry 
allows for less private information, on which informed investors can trade. Iskandar-Datta 
and Jia (2013) therefore hypothesize that a clawback policy reduces bid-ask spreads and 
increases turnover of a firm’s stock. They additionally predict that effects are larger for firms 
with a previous restatement, as for such firms the information quality increases more. As 
expected, the bid-ask spread is negatively associated with clawback adoption. However, the 
difference to non-adopters is only significant for firms with a previous restatement. 
Conversely, Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2013) find share turnover to be significantly associated 
with clawback adoption using their full sample, but the effects does not reach significance 
levels when only examining the restating firms. In sum, the results provide evidence that 
voluntary clawbacks increase stock market liquidity and suggest that the provisions decrease 
the information asymmetry between shareholders and managers. 
Overall, the adoption of voluntary compensation clawbacks seems to improve capital 
markets. Investors react positively to clawback adoption and the provisions are likely to 
increase market liquidity. The findings suggest that benefits of recoupment provisions 
outweigh their costs and that the instrument increases the efficiency of financial markets. 
The positive market reaction to voluntary clawbacks could originate because firms that 
benefit from clawback provisions self-select into clawback structures. As such, results may 
not necessarily apply to firms that are forced to adopt clawbacks by a mandate. However, 
event studies find some evidence that investors also react positively when information 
about mandatory clawbacks is released. There is consistent evidence that market reactions 
to both voluntary and mandatory clawbacks are stronger when there is evidence of 
previous misreporting or when governance structures are poor. The results provide support 
that clawbacks are a functioning corporate governance mechanism and that a mandate may 
be beneficial.  
6.2 Financial Reporting Effects 
Next, I analyze the effects of clawback adoption on a firm’s financial reporting. Many studies 
investigate measures of reporting quality. The reporting quality denotes how precise the 
financial reporting conveys information about a firm’s operations (Biddle et al. 2009). 
Clawbacks that have a restatement trigger should increase managers’ incentives to report 
truthfully because of the risk of compensation recoveries. Also, the SEC mentions in their 
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proposed rule of the DFA-clawback that financial reporting quality is likely to be affected 
by the adoption of clawbacks (SEC 2015). High quality accounting information is essential 
for the functioning of financial markets (Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2013). As such, the quality 
of a firm’s financial reporting is likely to ultimately also affect capital market reactions. The 
studies that focus on how clawbacks relate to the financial reporting of a firm can be divided 
in three sub-categories depending on their primary dependent variable. One set of proxies 
are direct measures of a firms’ financial reporting quality. The second set of variables 
examine alternative means that managers use to influence investors that are not subject to 
the clawback. A third type of studies use indirect measures which indicate how the reporting 
quality is perceived by stakeholders. 
6.2.1 Actual Reporting Quality 
Prior studies suggest that high quality financial reporting reduces the information asymmetry 
between managers and investors and improve investor decision-making (e.g. Leuz and 
Verrecchia 2000). The clawback literature assesses reporting quality by identifying 
incidences of poor reporting quality such as restatements and indication of earnings 
management. 
Similar to the proposed rule of the DFA-clawback, the majority of voluntary clawbacks use 
a restatement as the trigger event (Babenko et al. 2017). Such clawbacks are likely to 
decrease the number of accounting restatements because they make untruthful reporting 
more costly to managers. Chan et al. (2012) and Dehaan et al. (2013) examine whether 
clawback firms and non-adopting firms differ with respect to restatements. They expect that 
managers covered by clawbacks understand that they will be prosecuted in case a 
misstatement is detected. This should in turn change their behavior ex-ante such that they 
engage in less misreporting. Both studies find that the adoption of clawback policies is 
associated with fewer financial misstatements in the post adoption period compared to non-
adopters. 
Erkens et al. (2017) also examine whether the adoption of clawbacks influences the 
likelihood of accounting restatements. They construct a “Clawback Strength Index” similar 
to the concept of broad clawbacks employed by Babenko et al. (2017). They examine five 
dimensions (compensation coverage, employee coverage, amount of discretion granted, 
look-back period, and trigger events) of clawbacks to define the strength of a provision. 
Erkens et al. (2017) report a decrease in restatements for firms with strong clawbacks but do 
not find evidence for a decrease in restatements when clawbacks are less stringent. Their 
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finding provides some evidence that stronger clawbacks are more effective as a deterrent for 
restatements. However, they do not provide further information on which of the dimensions 
of their index drives the results. Lin (2013) partitions a sample of clawback adopters into 
fraud triggers and unintentional error triggers and thereby more closely examines the trigger 
dimension of Erkens et al.’s (2017) strength index. Lin (2013) documents a reduction in 
restatements following clawback adoption for fraud-based clawbacks but does not find such 
an effect for clawbacks that also punish executives for unintentional errors. 
Natarajan and Zheng (2017) examine how the SOX-clawback affects firms with previous 
restatements. They use ex-post restatement data to identify firms that had a high restatement 
risk around the introduction of the SOX. They find that after the SOX, CEOs’ in-the-money 
option value is less associated with the likelihood of financial misstatements. The effect 
indicates that after the SOX, CEOs engage less in misstating behavior to maximize their 
stock option value. However, Natarajan and Zheng’s (2017) results may not necessarily be 
attributed to the SOX-clawback as the SOX implemented a whole series of regulations 
concurrently. The results could similarly be due to another regulation that was introduced 
with the SOX. 
Despite the persuasive evidence that accounting restatements decrease following clawback 
adoption, Pyzoha (2015) argues that the effect need not be an indication of improved 
accounting quality. Pyzoha (2015) uses an experiment to investigate the interaction between 
managers and auditors when it comes to a restatement recommendation. He finds that 
managers are less likely to accept a restatement recommendation of a low quality auditor if 
the incentive-based compensation subject to the clawback is high. The effect suggests that 
managers try to prevent firms from restating their accounting numbers because doing so 
reduces their bonus. The decrease in restatements could therefore at least partially be driven 
by managers’ reluctance to issue a restatement. That is, the reduction in accounting 
restatements could in fact be indicative of decreased instead of increased accounting quality 
because misrepresentations and errors are not adjusted even when the auditor detects them.  
Pyzoha’s (2015) concern is somewhat mitigated by the findings of Chen and Deng (2012). 
They model a setting where a manager can manipulate both, the earnings report based on 
which she is paid as well as the signal that triggers the clawback. This relates to Pyzoha’s 
(2015) research because managers can influence the trigger event of the clawback to avoid 
the activation of the provision (e.g. by convincing the auditor to not require an accounting 
restatement). Chen and Deng (2012) argue that a clawback has two opposing effects. On the 
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one hand, the provision mitigates a manager’s incentive to manipulate the earnings report, 
but, at the same time, it exacerbates the manager’s incentive to influence the trigger signal. 
That is, a clawback triggered by a restatement will make it less attractive for managers to 
misreport but will simultaneously increase their willingness to oppose to the issuance of a 
restatement if a report is misstated. In their setting, Chen and Deng (2012) show that 
clawbacks can be beneficial even if the manager can distort the trigger signal at no cost. This 
is because, in their model, the earnings reported in one period determine the manager’s target 
for the next period. Managers’ efforts to prevent a restatement from being issued allows 
managers to avoid clawback recoveries in the current period. However, the next period’s 
target level will be relatively higher because it is based on overstated earnings. Consequently 
managers must exert more effort in the next period in order to achieve the target. Given that 
the degree of their misreporting in the current period influences the difficulty of reaching the 
next period’s target, managers will overstate earnings less in the current period. Thus, 
clawbacks may deter managers’ misreporting incentives even when managers can influence 
the restatement decision. 
There are two additional factors that lessen the problem of managers’ resistance against the 
restatement recommendation. First, Pyzoha (2015) finds that executives’ reluctance to issue 
a restatement is lower in the presence of a high quality auditor. Second, Brink et al. (2018) 
investigate whether auditors anticipate the management’s reaction. They suspect that 
auditors are less willing to propose a restatement when clawbacks are in place because they 
do not want to upset managers. Drawing on motivated reasoning, Brink et al. (2018) predict 
that auditors make their judgments consistent with their preferred conclusion. Using three 
separate experiments Brink et al. (2018) find - contrary to expectations - that a clawback 
does not affect auditors’ likelihood of proposing a restatement. Thus, clawbacks will not 
influence auditors’ ethical decision-making despite potentially great opposition from the 
management as reported by Pyzoha (2015). That is, auditors are likely to continue to propose 
restatements as they deem appropriate, rather than constraining themselves to avoid 
upsetting managers.  
Overall, the findings show that clawback provisions are likely to decrease the risk of a 
restatement. However, recovery policies may create incentives for managers to oppose 
restatement recommendations (Pyzoha 2015). Research suggests that auditors, on the other 
hand, are unlikely to be influenced in their decision to propose a restatement (Brink et al. 
2018). Pyzoha (2015) also finds that a high quality auditor mitigates the problem of 
executives’ disagreement with the auditor’s restatement recommendation. The results 
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underline the importance of sound control mechanisms complementary to the provisions. 
Therefore, audit quality should be a focus of regulators after the mandatory adoption of 
clawback. 
A second proxy that the clawback literature uses for reporting quality is the amount of 
accrual-based earnings management that firms engage in. Due to their incentive-based pay 
which is intended to increase their effort, managers have an incentive to manipulate their 
earnings in order to maximize their compensation. Research suggests that managers self-
interestedly manage earnings using discretionary accruals to increase their bonus (Healy and 
Wahlen 1999). A clawback with a restatement trigger should curb earnings manipulations 
because it recovers bonus payments of managers when such behavior is detected. Especially 
clawbacks with misconduct triggers have the primary intention of penalizing deliberate 
misreporting. However, also the DFA-clawback sanctions earnings manipulations. It is 
therefore of interest for the mandate whether voluntary clawbacks are effective in reducing 
earnings management. 
Chan et al. (2015), Chen et al. (2015), and Cheng et al. (2017) all use the modified Jones 
(1991) model to measure discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings quality. They argue 
that, because of the clawback policy, managers have fewer incentives to engage in accrual-
based earnings management (AEM). All studies find convincing evidence for a decrease in 
discretionary accruals indicating less AEM of clawback adopters. 
Remesal (2018) proposes a theoretical model which assumes that firms face costs because 
managers oppose the adoption as well as the activation of clawbacks. Thus, the model 
integrates the idea that firms may face frictions with regard to the clawback, both ex-ante 
(e.g. opposition from managers) and ex-post (e.g. resistance to restate earnings). These 
frictions increase when internal monitoring is weak. Remesal (2018) uses the model to 
rationalize the clawback adoption decision in presence of such frictions. Using empirical 
data he documents that clawbacks reduce earnings management and that the effect is lower 
when monitoring is weak. As such, Remesal (2018) shows that clawbacks have the potential 
to be effective at reducing earnings management even in presence of high frictions. 
Rather than examining the effect of the adoption itself, Beck (2015) investigates how the 
stringency of clawbacks affects earning manipulations. She develops a metric to measure 
stringency of the clawbacks similar to Babenko et al. (2017) and Erkens et al. (2017). She 
finds some evidence that stringency of clawbacks is associated with lower levels of AEM. 
That is, a strong clawback is more effective at deterring manipulations than a weak clawback. 
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Dehaan et al. (2013) use an alternative way of measuring earnings management by 
examining whether a clawback decreases a firm’s meet-or-beat behavior. They expect that a 
clawback will make it riskier for executives to manage earnings upwards in order to meet or 
beat the consensus analyst forecast. Consistent with their hypothesis Dehaan et al. (2013) 
find that clawback adopters exhibit lower levels of meet-and-beat behavior. 
Dehaan et al. (2013) additionally argue that clawbacks should decrease accounting quality 
related audit fees. As a compensation for their increased risk, auditors generally require a 
premium from firms with low reporting quality. The premium manifests in unexplained audit 
fees. Conversely, a clawback should increase a firm’s reporting behavior and reduce 
unexplained audit fees. In line with their expectations, Dehaan et al. (2013) report lower 
unexplained audit fees of firms that adopt a clawback policy. 
A study by Fung et al. (2015) use a probability metric to estimate the fraud risk of a firm. 
They report a negative relation between the clawback adoption and the risk of fraudulent 
financial reporting. The association is mitigated in presence of insider trading. Neither 
voluntary clawbacks nor the DFA-clawback allow for the recoupment of the proceeds from 
the sale of managers’ existing equity holdings. Thus, top-executives can manage the share 
price and use their insider knowledge to trade on stock that they earned in previous years 
without fearing recoveries. To the extent that managers are prepared to engage in insider 
trading, incentives to manipulate the share price are likely to persist after clawback adoption. 
Hence, Fung et al. (2015) suggest that clawback rules need also to address insider sales to 
be fully effective. 
Hodge and Winn (2012) go one step further and experimentally investigate how clawback 
recoveries affect managers’ future reporting decisions. They examine the reporting behavior 
of managers subject to a clawback and compare it to the behavior of managers covered by 
an economically equivalent holdback clause. Unlike a clawback, the holdback clause defers 
the payout of the covered compensation into the future. When the restatement trigger is 
activated, the holdback clause cancels the promised pay instead of recouping paid-out 
compensation as is the case under a clawback provision. Hodge and Winn (2012) find that 
both, under a clawback and a holdback clause, managers make less risky reporting choices 
following a restatement. However, executives who were relatively conservative in their 
reporting choices prior to the restatement made riskier reporting decisions following the 
restatement when covered by a clawback than when covered by a holdback clause. The latter 
 
- 50 - 
effect is consistent with executives feeling treated unfairly because they are forced to return 
their compensation despite not feeling responsible for the restatement. 
In sum, the literature on voluntary compensation clawbacks finds widely consistent evidence 
that clawback provisions reduce misreporting behavior of managers. The studies document 
that clawbacks decrease the number of accounting restatements, the amount of earnings 
management, accounting quality related audit fees, and fraud risk. Stringent clawbacks seem 
to work better than weak clawbacks in increasing reporting quality. The results are in line 
with the capital market reactions that are more pronounced for firms with high misreporting 
risks and for broad clawbacks. Whereas Pyzoha (2015) warns that the decrease in 
restatements could partially stem from managers’ reluctance to publish restatements, the 
reduction in AEM indicates that clawbacks are effective at inducing more truthful reports. 
Collectively, the results increase the confidence that the stringent DFA-clawback will be 
effective at improving firms’ reporting quality which in turn mitigates the information 
asymmetry between shareholders and managers. An interesting observation made by 
experimental research is that non-responsible managers may feel treated unfairly when their 
compensation is recovered which can lead to adverse reactions. This result is somewhat 
worrying because the DFA-clawback will trigger independent of responsibility. There is a 
potential threat that executives covered by the clawback may be demotivated, or worse, 
terminate their job in response to recoupments when they do not feel responsible for the 
restatement. 
6.2.2 Substitution Effects 
Concurrent to the widely consistent results in terms of financial reporting quality, there is 
evidence that managers try to circumvent clawback policies. To influence investors, they 
switch to manipulations that are less likely to trigger restatements. 
Chan et al. (2015) find a reduction in AEM but simultaneously report an increase in measures 
for real earnings management (REM). REM represents a manager’s deviation from optimal 
plans of action to affect earnings (Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005). Because REM is achieved 
through operating decisions it is not subject to the clawback. Chan et al.’s (2015) result 
suggests that AEM is substituted by REM following clawback adoption. Previous research 
has documented long-term negative effects of REM for firm performance (e.g. Cohen and 
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Zarowin 2010; Gunny 2005; Vorst 2016).18 Congruent to those studies, Chan et al. (2015) 
report that firms that adopted a clawback policy are likely to sacrifice long-term firm value. 
The substitution between AEM and REM is more pronounced for firms with high growth 
opportunities and with high institutional ownership. Growth firms (Skinner and Sloan 2002) 
and firms with institutional ownership (Matsumoto 2002) place a higher focus on earnings 
targets and therefore have higher incentives to manage earnings to avoid earnings 
disappointments.  
Similar to Chan et al. (2015), two dissertations examine the effect of clawback adoption on 
AEM and REM. Yu (2015) reports that her measures indicate a decline in AEM as well as 
REM following the adoption of clawbacks. She attributes the effect to firms adopting 
clawback policies voluntarily in order to signal their commitment to improve overall 
financial reporting. Mburu (2015) reports mixed results in terms of REM after the adoption 
of clawbacks. The differing results are likely to be influenced by the studies employing 
differing data sets, sample periods, and models to estimate REM. 
Instead of investigating the effects of the clawback adoption itself, Ng et al. (2018) examine 
how shareholder proposals that demand compensation clawbacks affect a firms’ AEM and 
REM. They provide evidence that firms substitute AEM with REM following clawback 
initiatives of their shareholders. The effect is more pronounced when monitoring from 
auditors and external parties is low. The results are consistent with the view that managers 
who are poorly monitored have more room for AEM ex-ante and thus shift more strongly to 
REM when faced with governance improvements. 
Hales et al. (2017) use an experiment to examine how board monitoring as well as mandatory 
clawback adoption affect managers’ use of AEM and REM. Consistent with Chan et al. 
(2015), they find that when a mandatory clawback is introduced, managers switch from AEM 
to REM, but total earnings management is unaffected. They also find that managers reduce 
total manipulations (i.e. AEM and REM) when board scrutiny is high. Lastly, they report 
that the substitution effect is present under low, but not under high board monitoring. In sum, 
these effects are in line with economic predictions which assume that clawbacks make AEM 
more costly to executives and board monitoring makes managers more accountable for both, 
AEM and REM.  
                                                 
18  Contrary to that notion, Gunny (2010) argues that REM is used as a signaling device of long-term earnings 
and may therefore be beneficial. 
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Bao et al. (2018) also demonstrate that managers switch to alternative channels to conceal 
negative information when compensation clawbacks make AEM more costly. Similar to 
other studies, they report an increase of upward REM, but they additionally find a decrease 
in readability of financial reports subsequent to clawback adoption with a restatement 
trigger. Bao et al. (2018) show that both, the increase in upward REM and the decrease in 
readability of 10-K reports following clawback adoption, increase the firms’ stock price 
crash risk. Bao et al. (2018) draw on bad news concealment theory which argues that 
managers strategically hide bad news to maximize their personal interests. Their theory 
suggests that the amount of bad news that can be hidden is limited and is released at once 
when a certain threshold is exceeded. This leads to a stock price crash. Bao et al. (2018) 
argue that the stock price crash risk increases with REM because real transactions are likely 
to have negative economic consequences. Investors will react more strongly when managers 
give up hiding negative information using REM. Similar to REM, making financial reports 
less readable also allows to conceal negative information (Kim et al. 2018). By decreasing 
readability, information is less completely reflected in the market price. The market reaction 
is delayed, thereby increasing the risk of a price crash (Bloomfield 2002). Additional 
analyses by Bao et al. (2018) reveal that the effect of clawback adoption on stock price crash 
risk depend on the management, the incentive system, as well as external monitoring. 
Specifically, results show that stock price crash risk is concentrated in clawback firms with 
high ex-ante fraud risk, managers of low ability, high CEO equity incentives and low 
dedicated institutional holdings. 
Another substitution effect is reported by Kyung et al. (2016) who find that managers 
increase the frequency and decrease the quality of non-GAAP disclosures after clawback 
adoption. The authors argue that clawbacks constrain managers’ discretion over GAAP 
reporting by making misreporting subject to compensation recovery. Managers therefore 
switch to alternative methods to influence investors. Kyung et al. (2016) provide evidence 
of a substitution effect between AEM and non-GAAP earnings. Also, they find that the 
quality of non-GAAP earnings deteriorates after clawback adoption, consistent with the 
hypothesis that managers use non-GAAP disclosures opportunistically. The effect is more 
pronounced the less managers are able to use accruals to manage earnings. 
There is, however, indication that clawbacks do not simply produce negative substitution 
effects. Fung et al. (2017) investigate how the adoption of voluntary clawbacks relates to the 
frequency of earnings forecasts. They find indication of an increase in earnings forecasts 
following clawback adoption consistent with the view that the two mechanisms work as 
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complements. The increase in earnings forecasts is independent of the nature (good or bad) 
of the news. Fung et al. (2017) argue that clawbacks increase reporting quality and thereby 
induce managers to issue more truthful forecasts. The improved credibility of forecasts in 
turn increases the demand for forecasts. The increase in earnings forecasts could also be seen 
as an instrument to opportunistically influence investors with earnings forecasts. However, 
the authors show that the increase in earnings guidance is mainly driven by the adopters with 
low levels of abnormal accruals and fraud risk. Fung et al. (2017) also examine the time-
horizon of the forecasts. Long-term forecasts are likely to be published to reduce information 
asymmetry, whereas short-term forecasts are often used to pre-announce period-specific 
performance and alleviate litigation risk. They report that the increase in earnings guidance 
primarily applies to long-term forecasts. Collectively, the findings advocate that voluntary 
clawbacks have positive spillover effects on management earnings forecasts and therefore 
increase the information environment. 
The research underlines that, in addition to direct effects of the clawback adoption, it is also 
important to examine measures that account for potential secondary effects. Research shows 
that managers will try to find ways to circumvent the clawbacks using practices that are not 
subject to the clawback (Bao et al. 2018; Chan et al. 2015; Kyung et al. 2016). The literature 
provides evidence that firms with clawback provisions increase REM, decrease the 
readability of their reports, and use lower quality non-GAAP reporting. The results are more 
pronounced for firms that are subject to strong performance pressure (e.g. from institutional 
ownership) and for firms that exhibit high managerial incentives or poor governance 
structures. These unintended secondary effects challenge the usefulness of the clawback 
policy as an instrument to improve financial reporting. Whereas the results are mostly based 
on voluntary clawback research, experimental evidence suggests that the substitution effects 
are likely to persist in a mandatory setting. The consistent evidence of the shift in 
manipulations is highly concerning with respect to the DFA-clawback. Previous research 
also indicates that this shift may have adverse effects on long-term firm value. It is therefore 
vital to carefully consider the implications of clawbacks on earnings management practices 
before enforcing the new regulation. 
6.2.3 Perceived Reporting Quality 
In addition to variables that measure the quality of financial reporting in a direct way, 
researchers use proxies to capture how different stakeholders perceive the information 
quality of reports. The perception of the reporting quality sheds light on how much the 
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stakeholders rely on financial statements following clawback adoption. The literature 
distinguishes between the reliance on accounting information of investors, analysts, auditors, 
and bondholders. 
If clawbacks change managerial actions such that managers report more truthfully, users of 
financial statements should more heavily rely on the financial information provided by such 
firms. As a consequence, investors will exhibit stronger reactions to financial reports because 
they perceive the information as more credible (Chan et al. 2012). Chan et al. (2012) use the 
earnings response coefficient (ERC) to measure the strength of investor reactions to 
unexpected earnings information. In line with their expectations they report an increase in 
investors’ reliance on reporting information following clawback adoption. Dehaan et al. 
(2013) find supporting evidence for a positive effect of clawback adoption on ERC. Davis-
Friday et al. (2011), on the other hand, report a decline in the ERC following voluntary 
clawback adoption for both, fraud- and performance-based clawbacks.19 The reduction in the 
ERC indicates that investors perceive the financials to be less credible and thus react less 
strongly to unexpected information. Davis-Friday et al.’s (2011) finding suggests a decline 
in information quality following clawback adoption. The authors additionally examine a 
separate sample of firms that was subject to the mandatory TARP-clawback. They document 
a marginal increase in ERC for mandatory adopters. However, the effect may stem from a 
selection effect as TARP-firms tended to have bad financials and are likely to be perceived 
as more credible after accepting government bailouts.  
Using a different approach to analyze investor reliance on accounting information, Huang et 
al. (2016) examine how compensation clawbacks affect investors’ valuation of the cash 
holdings of a firm. They argue that, compared to other assets, cash can be most easily 
accessed by managers who may use it for private benefits. Clawbacks are expected to 
improve a firm’s reporting quality. In turn, this reduces information asymmetry and the risk 
that managers use cash holdings of the firm for self-dealing behavior. As a consequence, 
investors value cash holdings of firms higher. Consistent with their reasoning, Huang et al. 
(2016) report that cash holdings are more highly valued when a firm has adopted 
                                                 
19  Compared to the other studies, they refrained from using a matching procedure. Propensity score matching 
(PSM) addresses endogeneity concerns when the relation between outcome and explanatory variable is 
misspecified (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). However, a recent study by Shipman et al. (2017) claims that 
results may strongly be influenced by the design choices of PSM (propensity score matching) such as 
specification of the prediction model (i.e. choice of the matching variables) and matching rules (e.g. 
with/without replacement; maximum allowable distance for a match; one-to-one/one-to-many matching). 
Shipman et al. (2017) recommend showing robustness to alternate design choices. 
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compensation clawbacks. They additionally demonstrate that the effect is more pronounced 
for firms with a previous restatement.  
Dehaan et al. (2013) examine how analyst perceive a firm’s reporting quality following 
clawback adoption. They presume that if analysts rely more on the financial reports, they 
will provide more similar forecasts. Consistent with their reasoning they find a decrease in 
analyst forecast dispersion after the adoption of clawbacks. 
Chan et al. (2012) investigate how compensation clawbacks are perceived by auditors by 
measuring the perceived audit risk. They find that external auditors of clawback firms report 
less control weaknesses, charge lower audit fees and issue their audit report more timely. 
They argue that firms that adopt clawbacks improve their internal controls and, as a 
consequence, auditors perceive the control risk of such firms to be lower. 
Chan et al. (2013) investigate loan contracting terms to learn how bondholders react to the 
adoption of firm-initiated clawback policies. Accounting measures are regularly used as 
inputs for loan contracts. Debt covenants are based on accounting measures to track the credit 
quality of the firm and performance-pricing provisions are typically used to adjust interest 
rates depending on performance. If a clawback improves accounting quality, counterparties 
are better able to use financial information of clawback firms for contracting. Also, debt 
contractors face less information risk which allows them to provide loans for better 
conditions to clawback adopters. Chan et al. (2013) report that, when contracting with 
clawback adopters, banks increase the use of debt covenants and performance-pricing 
provisions which both rely on accounting numbers. They also find that clawback adopters 
benefit from lower interest rates, longer maturities, and fewer collateral requirements 
compared to non-adopters. In a related study, Zhang et al. (2016) provide supporting 
evidence that the costs of debt decrease following both, fraud-based and performance-based 
clawbacks. These results indicate that banks perceive financial information of clawback 
adopters to be less risky and of higher quality. Chan et al. (2013) additionally examine how 
the effects differ between firms which had a high vs. low restatement risk. They find that, 
except for the loan maturity, effects are stronger for firms that had a higher pre-adoption 
restatement risk. These findings coincide with those of Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2013) who 
report more positive effects of clawback adoption for firms with a previous restatement. Both 
studies indicate that firms with poor reporting quality profit the most when introducing 
clawback provisions. Overall, Chan et al. (2013) provide evidence that bondholders perceive 
financial information of firms to be less risky and more credible when clawbacks are in place. 
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They claim that their study provides stronger support for the usefulness of compensation 
clawbacks than studies that examine shareholders. Banks have better access to private 
information of firms than shareholders. Thus, their reaction should be more adequate than 
shareholders’ reaction. 
The majority of results indicate that stakeholders perceive the financial information of firms 
to improve following the adoption of compensation clawbacks. Shareholders, analysts, and 
auditors rely more heavily on financial reports and bondholders use financial information 
more for contracting purposes. However, Denis (2012) warns that stakeholders may react 
positively to clawback adoption solely because they erroneously interpret the clawback to 
be an effective corporate governance instrument. Rather than actually improving the 
information environment, clawbacks may create an “unwarranted illusion of information 
quality” (Denis 2012, 199). Gnägi and Kunz (2018) investigate this concern by 
experimentally testing whether a clawback makes investors less skeptical users of financial 
statements. They provide some indication that a clawback reduces investor skepticism 
toward REM to which clawbacks do not apply. However, their results only hold for 
unsophisticated investors whereas accounting professionals seem not to be affected by the 
bias. The positive reactions of accounting professionals documented by the empirical 
literature (Chan et al. 2012; Dehaan et al. 2013) therefore suggest that the “unwarranted 
illusion of information quality” is not the sole driver of the favorable stakeholder responses. 
The results reported by voluntary clawback studies with respect to capital market effects and 
reporting quality provide consistent evidence of clawbacks being an effective deterrent 
against accounting manipulation and improving the information environment. Stakeholders 
echo these effects by putting more weight on financial statement information. The SEC 
believes that the results also hold for mandatory compensation clawbacks (SEC 2015). 
However, several authors argue that some of the supposedly positive consequences may in 
fact originate from phenomena that are harmful to market participants. For example, the 
reduction in restatements could stem form managers who take actions to prevent the 
clawback from being activated (Pyzoha 2015; Remesal 2018). Also, the increase in perceived 
reporting quality could be partially due to an illusion of information quality on the part of 
investors (Gnägi and Kunz 2018). Still, the consistent findings that clawbacks have positive 
effects on a wide range of measures of reporting quality and that various stakeholders view 
the provisions as being valuable increase the confidence that these negative effects are of 
lower importance. The main concern is, however, that the deterrence effect prompts 
managers to switch to alternative practices such as REM to influence investors. If clawback 
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firms substitute AEM with manipulations that are not subject to the recoupment provision, 
the drawbacks may outweigh the benefits of the policy. The board of directors could mitigate 
such problems by increasing internal controls, such as making budget variance analyses to 
detect an increase in REM (SEC 2015). Problematically, research documents that firms with 
weak governance structures show the strongest switch to alternative manipulations (e.g. Ng 
et al. 2018; Hales et al. 2017). Poorly governed firms are least likely to take actions to prevent 
the manager from switching behavior. Thus, the firms that are most prone to be subject to 
these unintended effects are unlikely to take counteractions. As such, mandatory clawbacks 
run the risk of being detrimental to shareholders. 
6.3 Management Reaction 
After having examined how clawback adoption affects markets and the firm’s provision of 
financial information, I assess the reaction of managers who are directly covered by the 
recoupment policy. A considerable amount of research is concerned with the question of how 
managers react to clawback policies. One stream of literature examines how clawbacks affect 
managers’ employment conditions such as compensation and tenure. A second literature 
focuses on managers’ operating decisions upon clawback adoption. 
6.3.1 Employment Conditions 
The inclusion of clawback provisions into an employment contract is likely to affect the 
composition of managers’ compensation. Economic theory predicts that clawback provisions 
impose additional risk to a manager’s incentive compensation because they make executive 
compensation subject to recovery. Compared to the situation without clawbacks in place, a 
manager faces the risk of losing part of his compensation. From a contracting perspective, 
managers therefore require a higher total amount of pay to compensate them for the increased 
risk introduced by a clawback provision. Alternatively, they may demand a shift in pay 
towards a higher percentage of fix compensation which cannot be recouped (Spindler 2012).  
The theoretical implications of clawbacks on management pay are underlined by Chen et al. 
(2015) who use an agency model to derive hypotheses for their empirical tests. In their 
setting, investors hire a manager who exerts effort, privately observes a noisy signal of 
earnings, and issues a report which he can manipulate using earnings management. The true 
earnings only become known in the long-run. Investors can either offer an incentive contract 
with or without clawback policies. In case of a clawback, the compensation of the manager 
will be adjusted ex-post for any manipulations. Chen et al. (2015) use their model to illustrate 
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that managers require a higher total pay under a clawback provision because they bear a 
higher risk than when they are not subject to a clawback. In line with expectations, Chen et 
al. (2015) find empirical evidence for an increase in total compensation. Dehaan et al. (2013) 
report that both, total pay and the fixed base salary, increase with firm-initiated clawback 
introduction. Their results suggest that managers are compensated for the increase in risk by 
both, an increase in compensation as well as a shift toward pay that is not covered by the 
clawback. Babenko et al. (2017) corroborate the finding of an increase in total pay and report 
that it is driven by a rise in variable rather than fixed pay. They provide two explanations 
that are in line with optimal contracting behavior. First, boards may compensate managers 
for the increased risk with more incentive-based pay to prevent a reduction in managers’ 
risk-taking behavior as a result of the clawback. Alternatively, the increased incentive 
alignment of managers and shareholders allows for a higher incentive-based pay.  
In contrast, Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2013) and Erkens et al. (2017) do not find a relation 
between total CEO compensation and clawback adoption. The latter argue that executives 
may already receive an amount larger than justified under performance-related arguments as 
they have considerable power to influence their pay. As a consequence there may be no need 
for an increase. The null results could also stem from two opposing effects that cancel each 
other out. Core et al. (1999) document that CEOs receive greater compensation when 
governance structures are weak. An improvement of the corporate governance such as a 
clawback adoption should decrease compensation because of decreased agency problems. 
On the other hand, the demand for a higher pay due to increased risk introduced by the 
clawback may cancel out this effect. 
Most of the research that examines compensation development following clawback adoption 
does not include moderators to examine under which conditions an increase in pay is more 
likely. One exception are Natarajan and Zheng (2017) who examine how the mandatory 
SOX-clawback affects management compensation. The authors find that after the SOX, the 
CEO’s fixed base-salary increases significantly when firms have high misreporting risk as 
well as a powerful CEO. The effect indicates that strong CEOs use their power to enforce 
their demand for a higher compensation. 
In a different study on mandatory clawback policies, Ang et al. (2013) investigate whether 
potential recoveries under the DFA-clawback constitute a substantial part of executive pay. 
Specifically, Ang et al. (2013) attempt to find out whether the amounts that could be 
recovered under the DFA-clawback are economically significant in relation to the total gains 
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that CEOs earn as a result of the overstated financials. From over 9,300 restatements 
announced between 2000 and 2010 they calculate the maximum amount of money that could 
be recovered under the DFA-clawback. Despite the limited look-back period of 3 years, the 
DFA-clawback covers a large part of excess incentive-based pay earned by CEOs (73.38%). 
However, Ang et al. (2013) show that CEOs experience large profits from the sale or exercise 
of previously awarded stock and options due to the overstated financial reports. These 
indirect gains are not subject to the DFA-clawback. As a consequence, the compensation 
components which would be subject to recovery constitute only an insignificant portion of a 
CEO’s total gains from misreporting. Ang et al. (2013) conclude that a major problem of the 
DFA-clawback is that it only recovers excess incentive compensation. As such, the clawback 
does not cover enough compensation to provide a sufficient threat to management 
compensation. 
In conclusion, the results of studies that examine how the clawback affects managerial pay 
are somewhat mixed. Whereas, a majority of research documents an increase in management 
pay, other studies do not find a relation between executive compensation and clawback 
adoption. Economic theory predicts that managers require a higher pay because clawbacks 
make compensation more risky. However, even an increase in management compensation 
may not necessarily mean that the costs of the clawback outweigh its benefits. Rather, the 
increase in compensation may be offset by the benefits of increased incentive alignment. 
However, powerful manager may take advantage of the clawback adoption to negotiate 
excessive pay increases (Natarajan and Zheng 2017). If so, poorly governed firms may face 
high costs of clawback implementation because their executives have a higher bargaining 
power. These undue costs may outweigh the benefits of a clawback policy and pose a threat 
to clawback adoption. 
Since clawback policies are viewed as an instrument to improve incentive alignment, another 
set of studies examines how CEO pay is related to accounting performance following 
clawback adoption. By tieing compensation more strongly to performance, clawbacks should 
increase the pay-for-performance sensitivity. Conversely, if clawbacks induce a shift in 
management pay toward fixed compensation, this could reduce the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity. Most academic literature finds evidence for a higher pay-for-performance 
sensitivity after clawback adoption indicating that managers are compensated more closely 
according to how well they run their firms (Biddle et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2015; Dehaan et 
al. 2013). The findings are in line with previous models of Goldman and Slezak (2006) and 
Laux and Laux (2009) who analytically show that pay-for-performance sensitivity should 
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increase with better governance. However, according to Dehaan et al. (2013) who measure 
how sensitive pay reacts to the return on assets (ROA), the evidence only holds for positive 
but not for negative changes in ROA. The result corroborates previous research that 
documents that sensitivity is generally lower to negative changes in performance compared 
to positive changes (Garvey and Milbourn 2006). Overall, the findings are consistent with 
executive pay being more sensitive to accounting measures which are more indicative of 
CEO effort due to the clawback. Conversely, the sensitivity of management pay to stock 
returns is less clear (Biddle et al. 2017; Gao et al. 2011).  
Rather than examining CEO pay, Kroos et al. (2017) examine the compensation of CFOs 
who have the primary responsibility for the preparation of financial reports. Usually, firms 
face a trade-off between emphasizing the fiduciary duties or decision-making duties when 
compensating CFOs. By increasing incentive compensation managers may make better 
decisions to increase the performance of the firm (decision-making duty) but may neglect 
their responsibility to prepare sound financial information (fiduciary duty). Kroos et al. 
(2017) argue that clawbacks allow to tie CFOs’ pay more closely to firm performance (i.e. 
increasing the decision-making duty) without compromising their fiduciary responsibilities. 
They report an increase in sensitivity of CFO performance pay to both, accounting measures 
and stock market performance following clawback adoption. The increase in the sensitivity 
of performance pay to accounting information also applies to other executives but is less 
pronounced compared to CFOs. Kroos et al. (2017) additionally find some evidence that the 
increase in pay-for-performance sensitivity of the CFO is stronger for performance-based 
clawbacks. Compared to fraud-based clawbacks, performance-based clawbacks impose 
additional risk on executives as they punish for behavior that may not be fully in control of 
the manager (e.g. accounting errors). Conversely, the increase in CFO pay-to-performance 
sensitivity is less pronounced when the firm is more susceptible to misreporting such as in 
case of internal control deficiencies, high abnormal accruals, high CEO power, and low audit 
committee power. The result suggests that clawbacks are less effective at aligning incentives 
in firms with great susceptibility to misreporting. 
Overall, there is a large consensus in archival research that clawbacks increase the pay-for-
performance sensitivity (Biddle et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2015; Dehaan et al. 2013). The 
finding suggests that accounting numbers are more reflective of managerial effort and are 
therefore increasingly used to incentivize executives. However, the reported effects are 
lower for firms with high previous misreporting and poor internal controls. The result 
coincides with the finding that poorly governed firms with powerful CEOs are less able to 
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prevent an increase in fixed pay following clawback adoption (Natarajan and Zheng 2017). 
The higher amount of fixed pay is likely to prevent a better pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
This suggests that, for firms with the highest governance deficiencies, clawbacks are more 
costly in terms of management pay as well as less effective at improving incentive alignment.  
Another stream of literature investigates whether the changed compensation contracts 
following clawback adoption affect executive turnover. Clawback policies may reduce 
executives’ employment horizon in two ways (Erkens et al. 2017). First, they explicitly 
communicate to top-executives that financial restatements are being punished. The threat of 
punishment is communicated much more clearly than with the implicit threat of dismissal 
after a restatement. As a consequence, managers may engage in less earnings management 
and therefore run a lower risk of being terminated. Second, the clawback provides the board 
with an instrument that allows for more adequate punishment. In absence of clawbacks, the 
firm can either keep its manager or dismiss her, but has no means of recovering her 
compensation. Previous research shows that restatements often entail layoffs of managers 
(Hennes et al. 2008). A clawback introduces a more complete contract and increases the 
available means of the board to penalize the manager apart from a dismissal. This, too, should 
decrease the likelihood of CEO turnover. Erkens et al. (2017) report that firms with strong 
clawbacks have lower turnover following clawback adoption consistent with their 
expectations. However, the effect does not apply to firms that have adopted a weak clawback. 
The findings indicate that weak clawbacks seem to insufficiently provide the board with 
punishment mechanisms that may serve as alternatives to CEO termination.  
The study from Ang et al. (2013) takes a different approach to analyze how clawbacks affect 
turnover. They examine whether the DFA-clawback as proposed by the SEC is strong enough 
to affect CEO tenure. Ang et al. (2013) claim that a portion of managers manipulate earnings 
to avoid or delay being fired for underperformance. According to Ang et al. (2013), a 
stringent clawback could curb such misbehavior by severely penalizing managers for the 
earnings management. Ang et al. (2013) compare firms that reached earnings benchmarks 
by manipulating financials that are later restated to firms that did not reach the earnings 
benchmarks. They show that CEOs face a significantly lower risk of being fired due to 
underperformance if they engage in upward manipulation that is subsequently restated. Thus, 
earnings manipulation provides career-related benefits to CEOs. Ang et al. (2013) calculate 
the benefit of these CEOs from their further employment by estimating their gain from 
delayed termination. The gains from delayed termination outweigh the threat of the 
clawbacks to recover excess incentive-based pay. As such, Ang et al. (2013) argue that the 
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clawback is not strong enough to deter manipulations that are aimed at preventing 
termination due to underperformance.  
In sum, the literature provides some evidence that the effect of clawback adoption on 
turnover depends on the strength of the adopted provisions. Strong clawbacks are suggested 
to provide firms with an effective punishment alternative to management dismissal and thus 
decrease turnover. There is, however, some indication that the proposed DFA-clawback may 
not be stringent enough to deter misbehavior, as the benefits of earnings manipulations still 
outweigh the cost. The argument that managers will continue to hide their underperformance 
to avoid being dismissed is backed by the finding that executives use REM to meet their 
objectives. Nonetheless, the clawback may still make it more costly for managers to 
manipulate earnings to prolong their tenure. 
The empirical studies that more closely examine the effects of clawbacks on executives’ 
employment conditions indicate that recoupment policies are beneficial in improving the 
sensitivity of management pay to accounting measures and in providing the board with an 
instrument to adequately punish managers rather than dismiss them in case of misbehavior. 
However, the introduction of clawback provisions comes at a cost. Recoupment provisions 
may increase the total management pay or trigger a shift towards compensation that is not 
subject to the clawback. How the costs of increased compensation relate to the benefits of 
the DFA-clawback is difficult to estimate and the net benefit likely varies with firm 
characteristics. However, a serious concern of the DFA-clawback is that the compensation 
subject to recovery constitutes only a small portion of the total gains that managers earn from 
misreporting (Ang et al. 2013). As such, the DFA-clawback may not be stringent enough to 
deter managerial misbehavior. 
6.3.2 Managers’ Operating Decisions 
Other than having effects on managers’ employment conditions, compensation clawbacks 
are likely to affect managements’ operating decisions. By changing properties of executive 
compensation, clawbacks are likely to have effects on managers’ risk-taking behavior. Their 
risk-taking propensity influences their choice of projects. As such, clawbacks may affect the 
investment efficiency of a firm. Studies on compensation clawbacks analyze both, managers’ 
risk-taking behavior and investment efficiency following clawback adoption. Another 
stream of literature additionally investigates how clawback adoption relates to managers’ 
decisions regarding tax planning. 
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The literature on compensation clawbacks identifies various reasons why compensation 
clawbacks could reduce managerial risk-taking. Clawback provisions that use a restatement 
trigger allow to recover compensation of managers when the accounting information is 
incorrect. More risky investment decisions increase the likelihood that a reporting error 
occurs (Chen and Vann 2017). To avoid recoupments, managers are likely to make less risky 
investments when a clawback is in place.20 In addition, prospect theory predicts that 
managers will avoid recoveries because their perceived loss of repaying compensation 
exceeds their perceived gain of the initial endowment (Mburu and Tang 2015). Many 
clawbacks allow to reclaim more than just the excess compensation and cover managers also 
in absence of responsibility (Dehaan et al. 2013). As such, executives have even larger 
incentives to reduce their own risk-taking behavior and suppress risky choices of other 
employees. Also, a considerable number of clawbacks use trigger events that are specifically 
aimed at mitigating risk-taking behavior, e.g. by activating clawbacks in case of excessive 
risk-taking (Babenko et al. 2017).21 
Using stock price volatility, R&D expenditure, capital investments, and number of patents 
filed as measures of risk taken by managers, Babenko et al. (2017) find indication for less 
managerial risk-taking after clawback adoption. Consistent with the theoretical 
argumentation, the effects are strongest for firms that use clawbacks policies with triggers 
that aim at mitigating excessive risk-taking behavior. However, also accounting-based 
restatement triggers have significant effects on managerial risk-taking behavior. Babenko et 
al. (2017) additionally investigate whether the reduction in risk-taking is associated with the 
strength of the clawback. Consistent with the view that more stringent clawbacks have a 
greater impact on managerial behavior, they report that stronger clawbacks decrease risk-
taking more than weak clawbacks. They further examine the individual dimensions of 
clawback strength: Employee coverage, number of triggers, responsible party, and 
compensation coverage. They find that the differences are driven by each of the underlying 
measures of clawback strength. Babenko et al. (2017) additionally document that risk-taking 
behavior declines more for clawback adopters with a strong corporate governance. The 
                                                 
20  Conversely, clawbacks may increase rather than decrease risk-taking behavior when managers expect a 
loss (see. Hirsch et al. 2017). 
21  The problem with those triggers, however, is that they are subjective. Whether poor management or 
excessive risk-taking is present may be hard to determine as it is difficult to find out ex-post whether a 
bad outcome of a project was due to excessive risk-taking or due to bad luck. 
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authors explain the results in that a better corporate governance poses a higher threat of 
actually enforcing the clawback. 
Chen and Vann (2017) also find support for a decrease in risky investments using the 
standard deviation of earnings as a proxy for risk-taking. Similarly, Mburu and Tang (2015) 
examine whether clawbacks affect the risk-taking behavior of the CEO and the CFO. They 
find weak evidence for a decrease in executive risk-taking as measured by Vega (sensitivity 
of CEO wealth to stock volatility) and by unexercised in-the-money stock options following 
clawback adoption. In a different study, Mburu (2015) reports that the amount of patents 
filed following clawback adoption decreases significantly suggesting less executive risk-
taking. Mariola and Ryan (2013) use firm level proxies to measure whether a firm’s risk-
taking behavior changes subsequent to the adoption of compensation clawbacks. Contrary to 
most other studies they find some indication for an increase in risk-taking. However, due to 
a complete absence of controls, their research suffers from serious endogeneity problems 
and their sample of less than 70 firms is small and unlikely to produce reliable results. 
Taken together, empirical literature supports the hypothesis that clawback adoption induces 
a reduction in managers’ risk-taking behavior. When a clawback is in place, managers face 
a riskier compensation profile and reduce their risk exposure by changing their operating 
decisions. The contrasting findings of Mariola and Ryan (2013) lack both, theoretical 
foundation and sound hypothesis testing, rendering their evidence of an increase in 
managers’ risk-taking less consequential. Reported findings on a decrease in risk-taking are 
relatively consistent despite the wide variety of individual and firm-level measures that are 
used as proxies. Also, there is strong indication that the reduction in investment risk taken 
by executives persists for different trigger events. Congruent with other consequences of 
voluntary clawback adoption, the effect is more pronounced when stronger clawbacks are 
adopted.  
The reported findings on managerial risk-taking do not tell us whether a reduction in risk-
taking behavior is optimal for the firm. Less risky investment decisions are beneficial to the 
extent that the risk reduction pertains to activities that are undesirable. For example, the 
increased incentive to produce high quality financial information should increase the 
informational efficiency of investment opportunities and help managers reduce undesirable 
projects. However, managers may be tempted to also reduce the firm’s risk in ways that are 
inefficient (Spindler 2012). For example, they may forego value-enhancing projects if doing 
so would decrease the likelihood of an accounting restatement. A second stream of literature 
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therefore analyzes how compensation clawbacks affect managers’ investment decisions and 
whether they increase or decrease investment efficiency. 
The efficiency of a manager’s investment decisions is usually tracked by the level of 
abnormal investments of a firm. Chen and Vann (2017) report a lower amount of abnormal 
investment subsequent to clawback adoption. They explain the results with the increase in 
accounting quality reported in previous studies. The improved quality of financial statements 
allows shareholders to monitor investment decisions more appropriately. The increased 
shareholder scrutiny in turn leads to more adequate levels of investing. Lin (2017) measures 
the adequacy of investment decisions by determining the amount of overinvestment. He uses 
a large sample of 1093 hand-collected clawback adopters and finds that clawbacks reduce 
overinvestment. His results show that the effects are stronger for firms with overconfident 
and over-incentivized managers. Liu et al.’s (2018) findings corroborate the reduction in 
overinvestments following clawback adoption. They document that the relationship is 
materially weakened when board governance is poor. Liu et al. (2018) thereby show that a 
good previous corporate governance is vital for the clawback to be effective. 
The results of a study by Chen and Vann (2014) support the finding that managers make 
better investment decisions following clawback adoption. Chen and Vann (2014) examine 
how the voluntary clawback adoption affects the return on equity (ROE) of S&P 1500 firms. 
They report that firms exhibit a significantly higher performance subsequent to clawback 
adoption. 
In a study with a Chinese sample, Allen and Li (2011) examine a type of clawback that was 
introduced in 1998 in the Big 4 banks and made employees responsible for loan defaults and 
allowed for recovery of their bonuses. Allen and Li (2011) find that subsequent to the 
clawback, bank lending is based on fundamentals of the borrower rather than on political 
connections as in the pre-adoption period. The findings indicate that clawbacks may strongly 
improve the allocation of investments, especially when the previous compensation system 
did a poor job in aligning interests. 
Biddle et al. (2017) provide an exception to the consistent findings of increased investment 
efficiency following clawback adoption. They argue that managers under clawbacks have an 
incentive to focus on less-risky investments that pay off in the short-run, such as investments 
in property, plant and equipment (PP&E) or acquisitions. Conversely, they expect R&D 
investments which are less predictable and more long-term to decrease. As hypothesized, 
Biddle et al. (2017) document a shift of investments of clawback adopters from R&D towards 
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PP&E. They also find an increase in acquisitions made by clawback-adopting firms, but only 
when there is ample liquidity. Their analyses suggest that the shift in the investment mix is 
consistent with capital overinvestments. However, the lack of other studies that find evidence 
in this direction challenges the generalizability of Biddle et al.’s (2017) results, particularly 
because economic theory predicts that clawbacks should increase - rather than decrease - 
investment efficiency due to improved incentive alignment. 
Kubick et al. (2017) conjecture that clawback adopting firms engage in improved tax 
planning to reduce the tax rate. Drawing on Fried (2016), they argue that clawbacks enhance 
the efficient deployment of capital and provide managers with stronger incentives to increase 
shareholder wealth. As such, clawbacks encourage managers to better exploit potential 
avenues for tax savings. Kubick et al. (2017) expect that managers will engage in increased 
tax planning in order to achieve their objectives. As predicted, they report a significant 
decrease in firms’ effective tax rates after clawback adoption. Kubick et al. (2017) examine 
the use of three specific tax planning activities in more detail and find evidence that firms 
use more auditor-provided tax services, increase in the likelihood of using new tax haven 
subsidiaries, and improve connections to other low-tax firms. 
The studies that investigate the manager’s operating decisions following clawback adoption 
show an improvement in managers’ investment decisions. Whereas there is evidence of a 
decrease in risk-taking when clawbacks are in place, results largely suggest that managers 
make more efficient investments. Research also finds indication that managers use better tax 
planning to achieve their earnings objectives. In sum, there is evidence that managers 
allocate capital more efficiently if they are covered by recoupment provisions. The findings 
indicate that clawbacks motivate managers to make better investment decisions and 
corroborate the positive stock market reactions to the adoption decision. If the results 
similarly apply to the DFA-clawback, a mandate has the potential to improve shareholder 
value. 
6.4 What Does Research on Consequences Tell us About Mandatory 
Clawback Adoption?  
Many of the reviewed studies find positive effects from the adoption of voluntary 
compensation clawbacks. Research indicates a positive stock market reaction (Iskandar-
Datta and Jia 2013), an increase in financial reporting quality (Dehaan et al. 2013), and a 
higher reliance of stakeholders on financial information for contracting purposes (Chan et 
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al. 2013). These effects point toward compensation clawbacks being beneficial for users of 
accounting information. Additionally, the increase in pay-for-performance sensitivity (Kroos 
et al. 2017) and investment efficiency (Chen and Vann 2017) are indicative of improved 
incentive alignment between managers and shareholders. These effects suggest that 
clawbacks are a functioning corporate governance instrument.  
However, besides these favorable effects of voluntary clawback adoption, the literature has 
also detected potential negative and unintended consequences. Archival research provides 
some indication of an increase in the level of executive compensation following the adoption 
decision (Babenko et al. 2017). Also, several studies suggest that managers try to circumvent 
the clawback by opposing restatement recommendations (Pyzoha 2015) or by engaging in 
alternative practices to influence investors such as REM (Chan et al. 2015), low readability 
of financial reports (Bao et al. 2018), or non-GAAP reporting (Kyung et al. 2016). Therefore, 
a potential threat of compensation clawbacks is that firms substitute AEM with malfeasance 
that is even more harmful to the firm.  
Interestingly, stakeholders seem not to fully take these evading strategies into account when 
assessing firms that adopted compensation clawbacks. Studies that use moderators to 
examine how the clawback works under different conditions find a discrepancy between the 
perception of the clawback by stakeholders and actual firm behavior. In particular, the 
literature finds more favorable stakeholder reactions to the clawback adoption of firms with 
a previous restatement. Reported effects include a more positive market response (Iskandar-
Datta and Jia 2013; Gao et al. 2011), higher liquidity (Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2013), an 
increased value of a firm’s cash holdings (Huang et al. 2016), and better contract conditions 
from bondholders (Chan et al. 2013). However, studies that concentrate on actual behavior 
of these misreporting firms show a different picture. Rather than having stronger positive 
effects, the clawback is less effective and has more negative consequences for firms with 
prior malfeasance. Following clawback adoption, firms with previous misreporting engage 
in more bad news concealment (Bao et al. 2018), are less likely to provide earnings forecasts 
(Fung et al. 2017), demand a higher compensation (Natarajan and Zheng 2017), and have 
lower increases in CFO pay-to-performance sensitivity (Kroos et al. 2017) compared to their 
non-restating counterparts. The findings suggest that firms with prior misbehavior have 
lower actual benefits from clawback adoption but reap the highest stakeholder reactions. One 
explanation for the discrepancy could be that managers of such firms are unwilling to give 
up their accounting discretion and thus resist the enforcement or engage in alternative types 
of misbehavior. Outsiders, on the other hand, may not recognize that clawbacks are less 
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effective for misreporting firms, but instead presume that clawbacks are most beneficial for 
such firms as they fix the previous incentive problems. That is, stakeholders may be subject 
to a bias that makes them overestimate the clawback’s effectiveness. 
The pattern is repeated for studies that use the previous corporate governance structure as a 
moderator of clawback adoption. Shareholders show larger positive market reactions for 
adopters that are poorly governed (Babenko et al. 2017). The stronger shareholder response 
stands in stark contrast to the increased substitution between AEM and REM (Hales et al. 
2017) and the lower increase in CFO pay-for performance sensitivity (Kroos et al. 2017). 
The findings suggest that analogous to firms with previous misbehavior, also firms with a 
poor governance show larger stakeholder reactions but less favorable actual effects upon 
clawback adoption. The reason could again be that shareholders are unable to realize that 
managers in poorly governed firms have more room for alternative sorts of malfeasance. 
This potential investor bias together with the other unintended consequences documented in 
the literature suggest that the costs resulting from the clawback mandate are likely to be 
substantial. 
Nonetheless, how these costs of the clawback mandate relate to the benefits (e.g. increased 
reporting quality and improved investment efficiency) is difficult to judge. The proposed 
rule of the DFA-clawback may prevent some of the unintended consequences documented 
by voluntary clawback research as it allows for little board discretion. In particular, whereas 
research documents that managers resist clawback enforcement (Pyzoha 2015) and board 
members almost never seek recovery (Babenko et al. 2017), the mandate would force boards 
to always litigate managers, thereby posing a more credible threat to misbehavior. Also, the 
DFA-clawback is likely to benefit from strong positive effects as it is a relatively stringent 
clawback (Beck 2015). Research documents more favorable consequences of stringent 
clawbacks compared to weak clawbacks across-the-board. Compared to less stringent 
recoupment provisions, strong clawbacks are associated with stronger positive market 
reactions (Babenko et al. 2017), fewer accounting restatements (Erkens et al. 2017), less 
AEM (Beck 2015), less turnover (Erkens et al. 2017), and less risk-taking behavior (Babenko 
et al. 2017). As such, there is some indication that the design of the DFA-clawback is suitable 
to reap high benefits while avoiding some of the unintended consequences documented by 
voluntary clawback research. Additional support for the conjecture that the DFA-clawback 
may be beneficial for capital markets is provided by event studies that investigate market 
reactions to important announcements regarding mandatory clawbacks. The positive stock 
market reaction to the proposed rule of the DFA-clawback (Bakke et al. 2017) together with 
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the lower stock market reactions to voluntary clawbacks after the DFA (Babenko et al. 2017) 
provide some evidence that investors perceive mandatory clawbacks to be value enhancing. 
Still, it remains an empirical question of whether the DFA-clawback proves effective. 
However, even when assuming that the benefits of DFA-clawback outweigh all direct and 
indirect costs of the regulation, there are still opportunity cost to consider. There may exist 
government interventions that are more efficient or effective at improving financial reporting 
than mandatory compensation clawbacks. For example, Edmans et al. (2017) argue that 
regulations that directly target executive compensation are likely to be problematic because 
regulators are under-informed. Rather, a regulatory intervention should attempt to affect the 
objectives of decision makers (e.g. boards and shareholders) such that they implement 
optimal contracts on their own initiative. For example, governance could be strengthened 
through board independence requirements to achieve increased incentive alignment between 
shareholders and directors. The DFA-clawback is therefore unlikely to be the best potential 
regulation to improve truthful reporting. However, in absence of other promising proposals, 
it may still be worth implementing it if the benefits of the regulation exceed its cost. 
6.5 Drawbacks of Evaluating Voluntary Clawbacks for a Mandate 
In absence of sufficient research on mandatory clawbacks, the present review has drawn on 
studies that analyze consequences of voluntary compensation clawbacks. The review has 
implicitly assumed that the effects are transferrable to mandatory clawbacks. Denis (2012) 
warns that results from studies on voluntary clawbacks do not necessarily apply to mandatory 
recoupment provisions. There are several reasons why findings of voluntary clawback 
research may produce effects that differ from effects one would find when examining the 
mandate itself. In the following, I will discuss reasons why findings from voluntary clawback 
may not be transferrable to a mandate. I will then provide arguments why I consider it 
unlikely that effects observed in voluntary clawback research do not replicate in a mandatory 
setting. 
Signaling 
A first reason why effects from voluntary clawback research may not apply to a mandate is 
because studies on voluntary clawbacks may report effects that stem from the signaling value 
of the clawback rather than from its governance effects (Chan et al. 2012). Thus, the 
compensation clawback itself may not be a functioning governance mechanism. Rather, it 
may be used by well governed firms as a signal to distinguish themselves from poorly 
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governed firms. Signaling theory predicts that when there is information asymmetry in 
markets, above average quality firms may use signals to communicate their superior quality 
to market participants (Spence 1973). Since the quality of corporate governance of a firm is 
not easily observable by investors, high quality firms release a costly signal of quality. 
Compensation clawbacks are likely to be less costly to implement for firms with a high 
corporate governance than for poorly governed firms. It may therefore be worthwhile to 
adopt a clawback simply to communicate a good corporate governance to investors even in 
absence of any actual effects of the clawback. A mandate would take away any signaling 
value of the clawback and the effects found in voluntary clawback research would not carry 
over to a mandate (Chan et al. 2012). 
Contrary to this argument, studies on consequences of compensation clawbacks find 
convincing evidence that the amount of AEM (Chan et al. 2015; Chen et al. 2015) and the 
number of restatements (Chan et al. 2012; Dehaan et al. 2013) decrease following clawback 
adoption. The results suggest that clawbacks have actual effects on managerial reporting 
decisions and therefore provide a strong counterargument to the signaling only view. 
Different Clawback Characteristics 
Even if effects from voluntary adoption stem from the clawback itself rather than from the 
information content of the clawback as a signal, it does not necessarily mean that results 
apply to mandated clawback policies. Clawbacks offer a large array of trigger events and 
voluntary adopters differ in the triggers included into their provisions (see Babenko et al. 
2017). Any effects found by voluntary clawback research could originate from clawbacks 
with other trigger events than the DFA-clawback. The large majority of clawback studies do 
not distinguish between different trigger events. As a consequence, results may not replicate 
for mandated clawbacks with a restatement trigger. The same argument can be made with 
any other characteristic of the clawback. Results from voluntary clawback adoption may not 
apply to a mandatory setting because results stem from clawbacks with differing look-back 
periods, compensation components covered, or executives affected.  
This reasoning is countered by studies that distinguish between trigger events of clawbacks. 
They often find similar results for performance-based and fraud-based compensation 
clawbacks (Davis Friday et al. 2011; Gao et al. 2011; Kroos et al. 2017). Also, preliminary 
evidence of research that focuses on restatement-triggered clawbacks only (Bao et al. 2018) 
corroborates findings of literature that does not distinguish between clawback characteristics 
(Chan et al. 2015). Lastly, the restatement trigger as implemented in the DFA-clawback is 
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the most widespread trigger event among voluntary clawback adopters (Babenko et al. 2017) 
and is therefore most likely to be responsible for the results. The proposed rule of the DFA-
clawback may in fact even produce stronger results as it constitutes are more stringent 
recoupment provision than most voluntarily adopted clawbacks (Beck 2015). 
Optimal Contracting 
Effects from voluntary clawback adoption may not replicate for a mandate to the extent that 
firms engage in optimal contracting behavior. Under the premise that clawbacks are not 
equally beneficial to all firms, only firms with positive net benefits from clawbacks will 
adopt clawbacks when firms engage in optimal contracting behavior. Some firms may assess 
that clawbacks would harm rather than improve their economic situation. For instance, a firm 
may operate in an environment that requires little or no incentive compensation to motivate 
its managers. In this case, the benefit of the clawback may be too low to exceed its costs 
(e.g. costs of administration and litigation). Also, a firm may have other corporate 
governance instruments in place that make clawbacks superfluous (Chen and Vann 2014). 
In both examples, the firms are unlikely to voluntarily adopt compensation clawbacks. 
Conversely, firms with high expected net benefits from clawback adoption may self-select 
into clawback structures. Any effects found by voluntary clawback research may therefore 
not apply to firms that decided against voluntary clawback adoption under optimal 
contracting. As a consequence, imposing a clawback policy on firms that did not adopt 
recoupment provisions voluntarily may result in effects that differ from those found by 
voluntary research. 
As discussed in chapter 5, the optimal contracting view is contrasted by both, indication that 
powerful managers resist the adoption decision (Brown et al. 2011; Gao et al. 2011) and the 
low enforcement of clawbacks by the board (Babenko et al. 2017). Thus, there is strong 
indication that firms do not adopt efficient provisions and that effects of voluntary adoption 
may replicate in a mandatory setting. 
Confounding Factors 
An additional argument made in the literature is that firms may adopt clawbacks as part of a 
broader plan to increase the firm’s reporting quality (Denis 2012). Rather than stemming 
from the clawback itself, effects reported by the literature may be due to other corporate 
governance instruments adopted simultaneous with the recoupment provisions. Thus, the 
observed effects are due to confounding factors. This argument is difficult to rule out and 
applies to most archival research. However, to the extent that findings on voluntary 
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clawbacks are in agreement with the findings on mandatory clawback studies, they increase 
the confidence that such effects are not driven by factors other than the adoption of 
clawbacks. For example, stock market reactions to information about both, voluntary and 
mandatory clawbacks are more positive when there is evidence of previous misreporting or 
when governance structures are poor (e.g. Bakke et al. 2017, Gao et al. 2011). Also, Hales 
et al. (2017) experimentally reproduce the substitution effect between AEM and REM 
reported by Chan et al. (2015) in a mandatory setting. Davis-Friday et al. (2011) report an 
increase in the ERC following the TARP-clawback in line with Chan et al. (2012) who report 
the same effect for voluntary adopters. 
In conclusion, none of the arguments laid out above seem to reasonably explain why research 
on voluntary clawbacks cannot be applied to a mandate. Also, prior research largely reports 
conforming results of voluntary and mandatory clawback introduction, suggesting that 
results of voluntary clawback research, at least in part, replicate in a mandatory setting (e.g. 
Chan et al. 2015; Hales et al. 2017). Still, a mandate is likely to have somewhat different 
implications compared to a voluntary clawback. For instance, the extent to which firms use 
clawbacks as a signaling device or self-select into clawback structures reduces the potential 
to make inferences from voluntary clawback research to mandatory settings. Nonetheless, it 
is worthwhile and important to study research on voluntary clawback adoption to make 
inferences about potential effects of a clawback mandate (Daske et al. 2008). For example, 
expectations about consequences of the mandatory adoption of IFRS were not least formed 
using research based on voluntary early adoption (see e.g. Barth et al. 2008; Daske et al. 
2013). Similarly, I argue that also the transfer of effects from voluntary research to the 
mandate is reasonable. At worst, voluntary clawback research provides an impression of the 
unintended effects from the adoption which are unlikely to vanish in a mandatory setting.  
7. Conclusion, Limitations, and Avenues for Future Research 
In this study, I develop a framework to review the literature on voluntary and mandatory 
clawbacks to examine whether the DFA-clawback has the potential to be valuable for capital 
markets. In a first step, I analyze determinants of voluntary compensation clawbacks. I find 
that a large part of the literature indicates that the adoption decision is a function of the power 
differential between managers and the board of directors. This finding is in line with the 
managerial power view (Bebchuk et al. 2002) that predicts non-optimal contracting due to 
managerial rent-extraction. Also, research suggests that clawbacks are only activated in rare 
cases, posing the risk that clawbacks are merely adopted on paper (Babenko et al. 2017). The 
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findings imply that firms are unlikely to adopt optimal provisions of their own accord which 
provides room for a regulatory mandate such as the DFA-clawback. However, the extent to 
which a regulation is beneficial relies on the mandates’ ability to address the non-optimal 
contracting behavior. I review the research on consequences of compensation clawbacks to 
gauge potential effects of recoupment provisions. Negative or no effects subsequent to 
voluntary clawback adoption would allow the reasonable conclusion of a low likelihood for 
mandatory clawbacks to be beneficial (Denis 2012). However, a majority of studies find a 
positive stock market reaction to the introduction of firm-initiated compensation clawbacks. 
The measures also indicate an improvement of the informational environment and increased 
incentive alignment subsequent to the adoption decision. Still, findings on clawback 
provisions are not without caveat. Some studies document managers’ attempts to circumvent 
the clauses or to resist their enforcement. Further analyses reveal that there is a mismatch 
between the stakeholder reaction and the actual firm behavior following clawback adoption 
for firms with previous misreporting or poor governance. The discrepancy could stem from 
managers who successfully evade the provision while maintaining the impression of having 
an effective governance instrument in place. Overall, these potential unintended 
consequences of clawbacks are likely to put substantial costs on firms. However, the 
stringent design of the proposed mandate provides some comfort that the costs may not 
outweigh the benefits of the regulation. The DFA-clawback as proposed by the SEC is based 
on an objective trigger and allows little board discretion. As such, the rule restricts firms’ 
leeway to abstain from recoupment and potentially solves the problem of the low 
enforcement of recoveries. Also, prior research documents stronger capital market and 
financial reporting effects from the adoption stringent clawback policies, suggesting high 
benefits. The few event studies that examine investor reactions to information about 
mandatory clawbacks additionally increase the confidence that the regulation may be 
beneficial. Still, uncertainty remains whether the proposed rule of the DFA-clawback is an 
adequate instrument to improve the reporting environment and whether a different 
intervention would be superior. 
My review has several limitations with regard to making predictions about the DFA-
clawback. First, only a minority of research on clawback provisions examines a mandatory 
setting. The few studies that examine consequences of mandatory clawbacks are either 
archival studies that examine the SOX-clawback (Natarajan and Zheng 2017) or the TARP-
clawback (Davis-Friday et al. 2011). Alternatively, event studies (Bakke et al. 2017; Li 2014) 
or experiments (Hales et al. 2017; Hodge and Winn 2012) are used to investigate effects of 
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mandatory clawbacks. Each of these different types of research has their own drawbacks 
such as selection effects (TARP-clawback), confounding events (SOX-clawbacks, event 
studies), or a lack of generalizability (experiments).22 The potential pitfalls reduce the value 
of such studies for predicting outcomes of government-initiated clawback adoption. Second, 
in absence of sufficient research on clawback mandates, I complement the review with 
research on voluntary clawback adoption. Voluntary clawback research may not be 
applicable to a mandate because effects may stem from the signaling value of the clawback, 
from clawbacks with different characteristics, or from confounding factors. Firms may also 
optimally choose their compensation contracts such that any regulation would be 
impractical. To the extent that the results of voluntary clawbacks research do not apply to a 
mandatory clawbacks, the insights provided in this review are of limited value. Lastly, the 
findings are somewhat diminished by the fact that archival research on voluntary 
compensation clawbacks relies on hand-collected data. Studies differ in their choice of 
database, search words, and covered filings used to identify the clawback provisions. For 
example, from 2005-2009, Chen et al. (2015) find 58 more clawback adopters than Iskandar-
Datta and Jia (2013) despite only examining a subset of firms (Fortune 1000 only vs. Fortune 
1000, Russel 3000, and S&P 1500) and applying the search words to fewer filings (proxy 
statements/10-K vs. proxy statements/10-K/8-K/6-K). However, while misclassifications 
seem possible, they would make it less likely to find any effects from clawback adoption. 
Additional research is needed to be able to more reliably judge the effects of the proposed 
mandate. My review thus provides several avenues for future research. First, Babenko et al. 
(2017) report only three instances of compensation being recouped following a restatement. 
This indicates that, in most of the cases, clawbacks are not activated even when the trigger 
event is met. More research is needed to examine to what extent voluntary clawbacks are 
enforced and to shed light on the reasons for non-enforcements. Such research would 
increase our knowledge as to whether clawbacks are adopted on paper only and could more 
reliably determine the presence of inefficiencies. Second, the previous literature only 
sparsely considers the trigger event of voluntary clawbacks. Differing trigger events may 
pursue different aims and are likely to have differing consequences. Future research could 
more strongly focus on restatement-triggers to shed light on how outcomes differ from 
clawbacks with other triggers. Such research could provide insights on the applicability of 
                                                 
22  However, the use of differing research methods to examine mandatory clawbacks alleviates the 
weaknesses of each individual method. E.g. the problem of generalizability in Hales et al. (2017) is 
mitigated as the authors reproduce effects that have already been found in archival research. 
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voluntary clawback research for the proposed mandate. Third, consequences of clawback 
adoption are only rarely analyzed with respect to specific firm characteristics (for examples, 
see Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2013; Chan et al. 2013). Future research on interactions between 
clawbacks and firm characteristics could help to understand the circumstances under which 
clawbacks are effective. Lastly, most of the studies covered in the literature review focused 
on voluntary compensation clawbacks. Despite some countries having clawbacks in place 
(Apanpa and Ananaba 2016), no research exists to my knowledge on their consequences. 
Research on effects of such regulations may provide valuable insights for the DFA-
clawback. 
Whereas the research gaps identified by this study provide opportunities for future 
investigations, this literature review has also revealed several important patterns in the 
existing literature. That is, voluntary clawback research provides consistent and convincing 
evidence that markets react positively to clawback adoption and that the provisions improve 
reporting quality and increase incentive alignment between owners and managers. The main 
pitfall is that managers attempt to circumvent the policies using practices that are not subject 
to the clawback but may harm the firm. Both, voluntary clawback adopters as well as 
regulators crafting a clawback mandate should be wary of the potentially substantial costs 
associated with these unintended consequences. 
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Appendix A: Characteristics of Compensation Clawbacks 
Clawbacks are contractual agreements between a firm and its manager. When they are 
adopted voluntarly, there is substantial flexibility as to how the provisions are defined. 
Previous literature has attempted to define dimensions, based on which clawbacks can be 
characterized. Babenko et al. (2017), Beck (2015), and Gao et al. (2011) each make 
classifications of major characteristics. They use largely overlapping categories on which I 
draw to discuss the most important characteristics. 
Trigger event. The conditions, under which a clawback triggers, can vary widely and range 
from misstated accounting information over excessive risk-taking to breaking non-compete 
agreements. Literature often distinguishes between performance-based and fraud-based 
clawbacks. The former determine trigger events that are based on a performance metric. The 
latter require executives to repay their compensation if they engage in misconduct, e.g. by 
intentionally misreporting financial information. The Corporate Library, a corporate 
governance research company, additionally distinguishes non-compete covenants as a 
separate type of trigger event and uses a residual category of triggers that serves as a catch-
all category (the category captures triggers such as leaving without notice). Gao et al. (2011) 
report that 79% of firms that adopted clawbacks voluntarily use a performance-based trigger, 
63.9% a fraud-based trigger, and 21.1% a non-compete provision. The finding suggests that 
firms make use of both, performance-based and fraud-based clawbacks. However, using a 
more detailed categorization, Babenko et al. (2017) identify accounting restatements (76.6%) 
as the most widely used trigger. This may be because some firms early adopt the restatement-
triggered provisions that are likely to be mandated by the DFA-clawback.  
Scope. Compensation clawbacks are typically directed at (top-) executives of a firm. 
However, they may extend to all employees. To which extent lower-level employees are 
covered may depend on the clawbacks’ expected deterrence effects on undesirable behavior 
as well as the firms’ cost expectations of recouping compensation from those employees. 
Babenko et al. (2017) document that almost all provisions cover top executives such as the 
CEO (99.6%) and named executive officers (NEO’s) (91.7%). In far less cases, the clawback 
is also directed at non-NEO executive officers (56.3%) or other employee groups (12.8%). 
The low percentage of adopters that make lower level employees subject to the provisions 
indicates that many firms consider a broad coverage not to be worthwhile. 
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Compensation subject to recovery. Clawbacks can cover any type of performance-based pay 
including equity and option-based pay. Clawbacks often make the excess bonus received by 
executives subject to recapture. The excess bonus is that part of the bonus which was 
additionally earned due to non-compliance. As an example, a clawback may recover the part 
of the performance-based pay that was earned due to misreporting, error, or excessive risk 
taking. However, more stringent clawback policies make all bonus pay subject to recovery. 
In such a case, a manager has to return the total compensation which was based on 
performance measures (plus interest) as well as equity/option-based pay (plus any gains from 
such instruments). Excess bonus clawbacks aim at recouping the financial loss that the firm 
incurred whereas clawbacks that make all bonus pay subject to recovery additionally intend 
to punish executives for their non-compliance. Addy et al. (2014) report that out of 145 
clawback adopters, 26 (18%) specify to cover the excess bonus only. In most cases (72%), 
voluntary clawbacks make more than the excess bonus subject to recovery. This may indicate 
that many firms use clawbacks as an instrument to punish non-compliance, rather than to 
merely recoup compensation that managers are not eligible to. Babenko et al. (2017) 
document that cash bonus, equity, and option compensation are similarly covered. 
Look-back period. The length of the period during which compensation can be recovered is 
commonly referred to as the look-back-period.23 Starting from short periods such as one year, 
the look-back-period can cover long time spans, such as up to 10 years in the UK banking 
industry (Thanassoulis and Tanaka 2018), or even attempt to remain in force indefinitely. 
Babenko et al. (2017) report that the majority of voluntary clawback adopters in the U.S. 
does not define a look-back period. Of the firms that do, most choose either the one-year 
period found in the SOX-clawback or the three-year period from the DFA-clawback. 
Enforcement body. While the SOX-clawback denotes the SEC to be the sole enforcement 
institution, firms that voluntarily adopt clawbacks enforce the provisions themselves. 
Babenko et al. (2017) document the compensation committee to be the primary enforcer in 
60.9% of the cases, followed by the entire board in 34.4% of cases. From a theoretical 
viewpoint it would also be possible to delegate enforcement to an external party as proposed 
                                                 
23  Starting from the point in time when the firm establishes (or should reasonably have established) that 
compensation needs to be recovered, the look-back-period denotes the length of time back that it can 
recoup compensation. Alternatively, clawback policies with a restatement as a trigger may instead state a 
period of time after the restatement in which compensation is subject to recovery (forward-looking 
period), independent of when it is determined that a restatement must be issued.  
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by Liebman and Kossovsky (2016). However, such clawback policies have not been 
documented to date. 
Extent of enforcement body’s discretion. Clawback policies also differ in the extent to which 
they grant discretion to the enforcement body when it comes to recoveries. When a clawback 
is triggered, the board of directors or the compensation committee may decide on whether to 
recover pay from covered executives. Alternatively, the provisions may advise the enforcer 
to always recoup executive compensation when a clawback is triggerd. Fried (2016) finds 
that of 225 clawback policies that he examined, 81% of the provisions give directors 
complete discretion to avoid recovery. Another 16% force the board to seek recovery only 
when misconduct is discovered to have led to the restatement. However, the proof of 
misconduct also grants board members with substantial discretion such that Fried (2016) 
concludes that in 97% of firms, board members have substantial discretion when it comes to 
initiating the clawback. The finding indicates that firms consider it important to leave the 
final decision about compensation recoveries to the enforcement party. 
As documented by prior literature, voluntary adopters make use of the freedom to tailor the 
provisions to suit their own needs. It is apparent from archival research that many of the 
voluntarily adopted clawbacks deviate from the characteristics of the DFA-clawback. The 
choice of what kind of clawbacks are adopted is likely to depend on the objective that shall 
be achieved with the provision as well as the characteristics of the firms that adopt the 
clawback. 
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Method Antecedents Moderators & interaction 
terms 
Consequences Main findings [1] Clawback type 
[2] Sample 
[3] Evaluation period 
[4] # of adopters 
Addy, Chu, Yoder 
2014 
J. Account Public 
Policy 
Archival  Corporate governance 
index 
 Interlocks of directors 
of the compensation 
committee with a 
clawback company 
 Previous restatement 
from irregularity 
 Accruals 
 Total assets 
n/a n/a Firms are more likely to adopt 
clawbacks when corporate governance 
is good. Also, when compensation 
committee members have interlocks 
with other clawback firms an adoption 
of recoupment provisions is more 
likely. Large firms, firms with low 
accruals, and firms with a previous 
irregularity restatement increase the 
likelihood of clawback adoption. 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 







Archival n/a  Political connectedness 
 Big4 bank indicator 
 Loan availability 
 Loan size 
 Loan spread 
 Frequency of repeat lending 
The study examines a special type of 
mandatory clawbacks for Chinese 
banks. Loans were previously given 
out depending on political 
connectedness as Big4 banks are all 
owned by the Chinese government. 
Most of those loans were not repaid. 
The authors use data after clawback 
introduction and find a negative 
relation between political connections 
and loan availability at the Big4 banks. 
Conversely, lending at small banks 
where the clawback is not effective is 
more politically motivated.  








Archival n/a n/a n/a The study examines restatement firms 
rather than clawback adopters. The 
paper documents that the amount of 
restating companies’ CEO 
compensation that could have been 
recovered under the DFA-clawback is 
low compared to total gains that CEOs 
experience from the overstated 
financials. The DFA-clawback covers 
the excess incentive-based 
compensation but does not target 
[1] Mandatory clawbacks 
[2] n/a 
[3] 2000-2010 
[4] 249 restatement firms 
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profits from sale/exercise of 
stock/options that were awarded in 
previous years. These indirect gains 
are much larger than the direct gains. 
Also, by overstating the performance 
of the firm, CEOs prolong their tenure. 
The authors argue that without the 
upward manipulations, many of the 
CEOs would have been terminated 
much earlier due to low performance. 
The authors show that the gains from 
delayed termination outweigh the 
threat of the clawback to recover the 





Archival  Damage from 
misappropriation of firm 
resources  
 Log of total assets 
 Scaled cash flow 
 Difficulty of detecting 
malfeasance  
 Prior stock return 
volatility 
 Firm size 
 R&D intensity 
 Compensation related 
incentives to mispresent 
performance 
 Percentage equity 
based pay of NEOs 
 P-v provisions 
attached to equity-
based pay of NEOs 
 Golden parachutes 
 Enforceability of 
clawback provisions  
 Corporate governance  
 Board independence 
 Institutional 
ownership 
 CEO power  
 External pressure  
Moderators for risk-taking 
behavior as a consequence: 
 Corporate governance  
 Board independence 
 CEO tenure,  
 Institutional ownership 
 Strength of the clawback  
 Employee coverage 
 Number of triggers 




Moderators for market 
response as a consequence: 
 Strength of clawback  
 Employee coverage 
 Number of triggers 
 Responsible party 
 Compensation 
coverage 
 Board independence 
 Growth opportunities  
 Expected reduction in 
risk 
 
Moderator for antecedents 
of clawback adoption 
 Market response  
 Risk-taking behavior  
 Stock price volatility 
 Capital investments 
 R&D expenditures 
 Patents filed 
 Executive turnover  
 CEO tenure 
 NEO turnover 
 Executive compensation  
 Total NEO compensation 
 NEO equity-based 
compensation 
 P-v provisions 
 New equity grants to NEOs 
Adoption of clawbacks is related to the 
scope of executive malfeasance, 
misreporting incentives, and firm 
governance. Stock markets react 
positively to clawback adoption, and 
firms subsequently exhibit reduced 
risk-taking behavior. Executive pay, 
incentive-based pay, as well as 
turnover increases following clawback 
adoption. 
In terms of determinants, firms are 
more likely to adopt clawbacks (and 
adopt provisions that are broader in 
scope) when there is more scope for 
executive malfeasance, when 
executives have pay-related reasons to 
misreport, when corporate governance 
is better, and when there is strong 
outside pressure.  
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 
[2] S&P 1500 
[3] 2000-2013 
[4] 4103 clawback 
 provisions 
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 Say-on-Pay vote 
 Presence of a 
compensation 
consultant 
 Stringency of clawbacks 






Event study n/a  Voluntary clawback 
adoption previous to the 
release of the proposed 
rules 
 Management power  
 Indicator whether 
more than 50% of the 
board was appointed 
after the CEO  
 Indicator whether CEO 
is chair for the board 
 Market reaction  The study examines the stock market 
reaction to the SEC's announcement of 
proposed rule 10D-1. Firms without 
voluntary clawbacks in place 
experience higher positive stock 
market reactions than firms with 
recoupment provisions. The positive 
market reaction to the publication of 
the proposed rule is more pronounced 
for non-adopters with powerful 
managers. 
[1] Mandatory clawbacks 
[2] S&P 1500 
[3] June 1, 2015 
[4] 1123 
Bao, Fung, Su 
2018 
CAR 
Archival n/a  REM 
 Readability of 10-K 
reports 
 Ex ante fraud risk 
 Management ability 
 CEO equity incentives 
 Dedicated institutional 
ownership 
 REM 
 Upward REM 
 Downward REM 
 Total REM 
 Readability of 10-K reports 
 Stock price crash risk 
The adoption of clawbacks with a 
restatement trigger is associated with 
an increase in upward REM, a 
decrease in readability of 10-K reports, 
and an increase in a firm's stock price 
crash risk. The effect of clawbacks on 
the risk of stock price crashes is more 
pronounced among clawback adopters 
with an increase in upward REM or a 
decrease in readability of 10-K reports. 
Also, increased crash risk is 
concentrated in firms with high ex ante 
fraud risk, managers of low ability, 
high CEO equity incentives, or low 
dedicated institutional holdings. 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 






Archival  CEO duality 
 Governance index 
 Stringency of the 
clawback 
 CEO duality 
 AEM 
 Abnormal accruals 
 Percent operating accruals 
 Total accruals 
 
The author develops a summary 
measure of clawback stringency and 
finds that increased stringency is 
associated with lower earnings 
management. The negative relation 
between clawback stringency and 
earnings management is higher when 
the CEO is also the chairman of the 
board. Firms with CEO duality adopt 
less stringent clawbacks but the overall 
governance of the firm does not affect 
the stringency of compensation 
clawbacks. 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 
[2] n/a 
[3] up to 2010 
[4] 375 
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Biddle, Chan, Joo 
2017 
Working Paper 
Archival n/a  Liquidity 
 Percentage of 
performance-based pay in 
total pay 
 
 Capital investment mix 
 Total investments 
 R&D investments 
 Capital expenditure in PP&E 
 Investment into acquisitions 
 Executive compensation 
incentives 
 Pay-for-performance 
sensitivity of total pay/equity 
grants/cash pay 
 % of salary/stock 
grants/option grants to total 
pay 
 Risk tolerance 
 Capital investment efficiency 
Following clawback adoption, firms 
shift away from R&D investments and 
toward capital expenditures, or - when 
liquidity allows it – toward 
acquisitions. The effects are driven by 
firms that pay high percentages of 
performance-based pay. The authors 
find that clawback firms exhibit capital 
overinvestments, especially when 
performance-based pay is high.  









Experiment n/a  Importance of the client 
to the audit firm 
 Likelihood of proposing a 
restatement 
 Assessed risk of a material 
misstatement 
Using three experiments, the study 
examines whether auditors are less 
willing to propose restatements when a 
firm has clawbacks in place. None of 
the experiments finds an association 
between the clawback and the 
likelihood of proposing a restatement. 
[1] n/a 






Experiment n/a  Risk aversion 
 Contract type 
 Bonus-only 
 Penalty-only 
 Bonus and penalty 
 Clawback where 
bonus>penalty 
 Clawback where 
bonus<penalty 
 Choice of compensation contract The experiment compares five 
economically equivalent compensation 
contracts. The contracts differ in their 
inclusion of bonus, penalty, and 
clawback features. The experiment 
shows that people are less willing to 
accept contracts that include malus 
clauses or clawback clauses. 
[1] n/a 
[2] 156 students (thereof 
 102 undergraduate and 







Archival  Firm visibility 
 Firm size 
 Recent issuance of 
debt or equity 
 CEO influence 
 CEO tenure 
 CEO duality 
 Percentage of inside 
directors 
 Board size 
 Type of clawback 




n/a Firm visibility, previous restatements, 
extraordinary M&A bonuses, and 
goodwill impairments increase the 
likelihood of clawback adoption. 
Influencial CEOs reduce a firm’s 
propensity to adopt a clawback 
provision. 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 
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 M&A bonus size 
 Previous restatement 






Archival  M&A announcement 
returns 
 Accounting quality of 
acquired targets 
n/a  Investor perception of M&A 
quality 
 Responsiveness of executives to 
the market when completing 
M&A deals 
Clawback improve investors’ 
perceived M&A quality and make 
executives more responsive to the 
market in case they complete M&A 
deals. 
Firms are more likely to adopt 
compensation clawbacks when they 
have more negative M&A 
announcement returns and when they 
acquire targets with poor accounting 
quality. 








Archival  Complexity 
 Firm size 
 Leverage 
 Growth options 
 Prior stock 
performance 
 Creditor relationship 
 Prior malfeasance 
 Investment grade 
debt outstanding 
 External monitoring 
 Presence of financial 
analysts 
 Percent institutional 
investors 
 Percent blockholders 
 CEO compensation 
incentives 





 State of Maryland 
incorporation 
 CEO duality 
 % owned by insiders 
 Poison pill indicator 
n/a  Market response 
 Monthly raw return 
 Abnormal return 
Results show a positive market 
response to clawback adoption by real 
estate investment trusts (REITs). 
REITs are more likely to adopt 
clawback provisions with increasing 
complexity. The authors find some 
evidence that clawback adoption is 
determined by a firm’s creditor 
relationship, the CEO’s compensation 
incentives, and managerial 
entrenchment. 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 
[2] Real Estate Investment 
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 Board quality 
 Board size 
 Board independence 
 Staggered board 
indicator 
Chan, Chen, Chen 
2013 
JFE 
Archival n/a  High restatement risk 
before clawback adoption 
 Number of financial covenants 
per loan contract 
 Interest rate 
 Loan maturity 
 Loan collateral 
Firms use more financial covenants in 
their loan contracts after clawback 
adoption. Also, following the 
clawback adoption, their loans have 
lower interest rates, higher maturities 
and fewer collaterals compared to non-
adopting firms. Above effects are 
more pronounced for firms with poor 
reporting quality prior to clawback 
adoption. 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 
[2] Russel 3000 
[3] 2005-2009 
[4] 147 




Archival n/a n/a  Likelihood of accounting 
restatements 
 Perceived accounting quality  
 Auditor's assessment of internal 
controls  
 Audit risk  
 Audit fees  
 Lag of audit report issuance 
Firms with compensation clawbacks in 
place are less likely to issue 
accounting restatements and are 
perceived to have a higher accounting 
quality by investors. Also, in case of 
clawback adoption, auditors report less 
internal control weaknesses, demand 
fewer audit fees and make timelier 
audit reports.  
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 
[2] Russel 3000 
[3] 2000-2009 
[4] 343 




Archival n/a  Institutional ownership 
 Growth opportunities 
 AEM 
 REM 
Subsequent to the adoption of 
clawback provisions, AEM decreases 
and REM increases. The substitution 
effect is more pronounced for firms 
with high growth opportunities or high 
transient institutional ownership. 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 






Theoretical n/a n/a n/a The study models a two-period 
principal-agent setting in which a 
manager can manipulate both, the 
earnings report based on which she is 
paid as well as the signal based on 
which the clawback is triggered. When 
influencing the signal that triggers the 
clawback is very costly, clawback 
provisions can completely eliminate 
the manager’s incentive to misreport. 
However, even if the signal that 
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 Risk aversion 
 % shares outstanding 
held by CEO 
 Closeness of CEO to 
retirement age 
 Fundamental earnings 
risk 
 Noisiness of 
information available to 
top management 
 Age of the firm 
 Avg. sales growth 
over the last 3 years 
 Occurrence of 
previous restatement 
 CEO served for at 
least 2 years in 
current position 
n/a  Aggressiveness of financial 
reporting 
 Frequency of restatements 
 AEM 
 Total CEO pay 
 Pay-for-performance sensitivity 
 Abnormal return 
Clawback adoption reduces 
aggressiveness of financial reporting 
and increases both, CEO pay-for-
performance sensitivity and total CEO 
pay. The results are in line with the 
authors’ theoretical predictions of a 
simple contracting model. 
Firms are more likely to adopt 
clawbacks when managerial risk 
aversion, the noisiness of information 
available to the firm, and the 
fundamental earnings risk are low.  
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 





Int. J. Corporate 
Governance 
Archival  Internal corporate 
governance 
 Board independence 
 Number of board 
meetings 
 Board size 
 CEO-duality 
 CEO tenure 
 External corporate 
governance 
 Leverage 
 Percentage of 
institutional investors 
n/a  Firm performance 
 ROE 
 Adjusted ROE 
 ROA 
 Adjusted ROA 
The adoption of compensation 
clawbacks is positively associated to 
measures of internal corporate 
governance and to measures of 
external corporate governance. 
Clawback adopters have a 
significantly higher future 
performance than non-adopting firms. 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 






Archival  Strength of the board  
 Board independence 
 Board diligence  
 Board size 
 Management 
entrenchment  
 CEO duality  
 CEO tenure  
n/a  Abnormal investment  
 Corporate risk-taking  
Clawback adoption is more likely 
when the internal corporate 
governance is strong. Abnormal 
investment and corporate risk-taking 
decrease following the adoption of 
compensation clawbacks. 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 
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 CEO ownership 
percentage  
 CEO pay slice 




Archival  Fraction of clawback 
firms in blockholder 
portfolios 
 
 Blockholder is activist 
indicator 
 Board independence 
 Previous restatement 
 Competitiveness of 
industry 
 
 Earnings quality 
 Firm value 
 R&D expenditure 
Clawback adoption is more likely 
when institutional blockholders of the 
firm have other firms in their portfolio 
that already have clawbacks in place. 
The effect is stronger for activist 
blockholders than for non-activist 
blockholders and is more pronounced 
when the firms have a restatement 
history, less independent boards, or act 
in a highly competitive market. 
Following clawback adoption, 
earnings quality, firm value, and R&D 
expenditure increases. 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 







Archival  Previous restatement  Voluntary vs. TARP-
clawback adoption 






The response to earnings surprises 
significantly declines following the 
voluntary adoption of performance-
based and fraud clawbacks. 
Conversely, there is an increase in 
ERC when mandatory TARP-
clawbacks are adopted. Firms are more 
likely to adopt compensation 
clawbacks in case they have a previous 
restatement. 
[1] Voluntary and 
 mandatory clawbacks 
[2] n/a 
[3] 2004-2009 







Archival n/a n/a  Actual financial reporting 
quality  
 Meet-or-beat behavior 
 Unexplained audit fees 
 # of restatements 
 Perceived financial reporting 
quality  
 Earnings response coefficient  
 Analyst forecast dispersion 
 Pay-for-performance sensitivity  
 CEO compensation  
 Total compensation 
 Base pay 
 Incentive pay 
Both, actual and perceived financial 
reporting quality increase following 
clawback adoption. When a firm has 
clawback provisions in place, 
responsiveness of CEO compensation 
to accounting performance increases. 
However, CEOs demand a higher base 
and total compensation when 
clawbacks are introduced. 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 
[2] n/a 
[3] 2005-2010 
[4] 228 (compensation 
 sample) / 258 (finan-
 cial reporting sample) 
Erkens, Gan, 
Yurtoglu 
Archival n/a  Strength of the clawback 
 
 Reporting quality 
 CEO turnover 
Compared to adopters of a weak 
clawback policy, adopters of strong 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 
[2] Russel 3000 
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2017 
Working Paper 
 Total CEO compensation 
 Non-incentive CEO 
compensation 
 Incentive CEO compensation 
 
clawbacks experience an increase in 
reporting quality and a decrease in 
CEO turnover. Conversely, firms with 
weak clawbacks show higher increases 
in total and incentive-based CEO pay 
than adopters of strong clawbacks. 
Clawback adopters do not differ in the 
percentage of non-incentive CEO pay 








Archival  Top-executive pay level 
 CEO power 
 CEO pay slice 
 CEO tenure 
 CEO duality 
 Corporate governance 
 Board size 
 Percentage of 




 Management ownership 
 Deterrence of clawback 
adoption (used instead of 
clawback adoption as a 
dependent variable) 
n/a The authors construct a deterrence 
index of clawback policies. They 
provide some evidence that firms are 
more likely to adopt low deterrent 
clawbacks when they exhibit increased 
levels of CEO power, a high executive 
pay level, or weak corporate 
governance structures. The deterrent 
level increases with profitability and 
management ownership. 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 
[2] Russel 3000 
[3] 2007-2012 
[4] n/a 
Fung, Raman, Sun, 
Xu 
2015 
J. Account. Public 
Policy 
Archival n/a  Presence of insider 
trading 
 
 Fraud risk 
 
Clawback adopters experience a 
significant decrease in fraud risk 
following clawback adoption. The 
effect disappears in presence of insider 
trading. 








Archival n/a  Financial reporting 
quality 
 Abnormal accruals 
 Fraud risk 
 Likelihood of a management 
earnings forecast 
 Time horizon of management 
earnings forecast 
 Earnings warning 
 Short-term forecast 
 Long-term forecast 
 Specificity of the management 
earnings forecast 
 Nature of forecast news 
Following clawback adoption, firms 
are more likely to issue management 
earnings forecasts. Subsample 
analyses show that the effect is driven 
by firms with high financial reporting 
quality who issue more long-term 
forecasts. There is some evidence that 
firms increase the specificity of 
forecasts following clawback 
adoption. The increase in forecasts is 
not biased toward either negative or 
positive news. 






Archival  Firm size 
 Leverage 
Moderators regarding the 
stock market reaction: 
 Stock market reaction 
 
Firms that adopt clawback policies 
experience positive stock market 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 
[2] Russel 3000, 
 






 Negative earnings 
indicator 
 Growth opportunities 
 Previous restatement 
 Pay-for-performance 
sensitivity 
 Equity incentives 
 CEO entrenchment 
 CEO turnover 
 CEO tenure 
 Corporate governance 
climate 
 Board independence 
 CEO duality 




 Previous restatement 




 CEO entrenchment 
 CEO turnover 
 CEO turnover 
 CEO duality 
reactions. The market reaction is more 
pronounced for firms with a previous 
restatement or an entrenched 
management. The market response is 
highest for firms with a previous 
restatements and a tilt toward equity-
based incentives. 
Large firms, firms with a previous 
restatement, and firms with high board 
independence are more likely to adopt 
clawbacks. There is a negative 
association between clawback 
adoption and leverage, growth 
opportunities, and CEO influence. 
 S&P 1500, 







Experiment n/a  Board monitoring  AEM 
 REM 
 Total earnings management 
Managers switch from AEM to REM 
after clawback adoption. The total 
amount of earnings management 
remains unchanged. Under board 
monitoring, managers reduce AEM, 
REM, and TEM and the substitution 
effect of clawback adoption turns 
insignificant. 
[1] Mandatory clawbacks 






Experiment n/a  Indicator of previous 





 No recovery 
 
 Change in riskiness of reporting 
 Perceived responsibility 
 Anger 
 
The experiment compares clawbacks, 
holdbacks, and compensation contracts 
without recoveries with respect to the 
risk that managers take in reporting. 
Managers reduce risky reporting 
choices after a clawback/holdback 
clause is triggered by a restatement. 
The effect is more pronounced for 
managers who made relatively more 
risky reporting decisions before the 
trigger event. When clawbacks are in 
place, managers with relatively 
conservative reporting choices prior to 
the restatement even increase risky 
reporting decisions. This is mainly 
because they do not feel responsible 
[1] Mandatory clawbacks 
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Archival n/a  Previous restatement  Valuation of cash holdings 
 
Investors value cash of firms with 
clawback policies more positively. The 
effect is stronger for firms with a 
previous restatement. 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 
[2] Russel 3000 
[3] n/a 
[4] 3897 





Archival  Percentage of directors 
appointed after the CEO 
(co-opted directors) 
 CEO tenure 
 Presence of co-opted 
directors in the 
compensation committee 
 Likelihood of future 
enforcement of the 
clawback 
n/a Clawback adoption is less likely the 
higher the percentage of co-opted 
directors. Board tenure mediates the 
relationship between board co-option 
and clawback adoption. The negative 
effect of co-opted directors on 
clawback adoption is more 
pronounced when co-opted directors 
are also part of the compensation 
committee or when there is a higher 
likelihood of future enforcement of the 
clawback. 







Archival  Firm size  Publication of a 
restatement in the 4 years 
preceding the adoption of 
the clawback 
 Market response  
 Information quality  
 Bid-ask spread  
 Share turnover 
 Executive compensation  
 Total CEO compensation 
 Fixed CEO compensation 
 Performance-based CEO 
compensation 
Firms experience a positive market 
response and an increase in 
information quality following 
clawback adoption. The effects are 
more pronounced for firms with a 
previous restatement. There is no 
evidence of increased CEO 
compensation after clawback adoption.
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 
[2] Russel 3000, 
 S&P 1500, 







Archival n/a  CFO indicator 
 Type of clawback 
 Performance-based 
 Fraud-based 
 Susceptibility to 
misreporting 
 Internal control 
material weakness 
disclosures 
 Absolute abnormal 
accruals 
 Power differential 
between CEO and 
CFO 
 CFO bonus pay-for-performance 
sensitivity 
 Bonus pay-for-performance 
sensitivity of named executive 
officers 
 CFO equity pay-for-performance 
sensitivity 
 Level of CFO pay 
 CFO total compensation 
 CFO salary 
 CFO bonus 
 CFO option awards 
CFO bonus incentives increase 
following clawback adoption. This 
increase is higher than the increase in 
bonus incentives of other executives. 
The relation between accounting 
performance and CFO bonus is weaker 
in subsamples that indicate that firms 
are highly susceptible to misreporting. 
 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 
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 Power differential 
between audit 





Archival n/a n/a  Effective tax rate 
 Tax planning activities 
 Tax haven use 
 Investments in auditor-
provided tax-services 
 Connections to other low-tax 
companies 
 Tax outcome volatility 
 Tax disclosure 
 Gunning-Fog index 
 Smog readability index 
 Length of footnotes 
 Number of sentences 
 Accruals 
 Pre-tax accruals 
 Tax accruals 
The effective tax rate declines 
significantly when clawbacks are 
adopted. Results suggest that the 
decrease is due to better tax planning 
activities of clawback adopting firms. 







Experiment n/a  Previous restatement  Investor skepticism toward REM
 Investment attractiveness 
Unsophisticated investors become less 
skeptical toward REM when 
clawbacks are adopted and the effect is 
stronger for firms with a previous 
restatement. Conversely, accounting 
professionals are not affected in their 
skepticism when clawbacks are 
implemented. 
[1] Mandatory clawbacks 
[2] 99 university students 








Archival n/a  Net operating assets 
(NOA) 
 Use of short-term 
incentive plans 
 Frequency of non-GAAP 
earnings 
 Quality of non-GAAP earnings 
 Use of non-GAAP earnings to 
meet or beat benchmarks 




Managers more frequently release 
non-GAAP earnings disclosures 
following clawback adoption. In 
addition, the disclosure quality of non-
GAAP earnings deteriorates while 
meet-and-beat-behavior increases. The 
increase in non-GAAP earnings works 
as a substitute for the decrease in 
AEM. 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 






Theoretical n/a n/a n/a The study sets up a two period 
principal-agent model to test under 
which circumstances, clawback 
contracts are efficient. A no-clawback 
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contract if the cash realization is 
relatively noisy, earnings management 
is difficult, or the agent is very 
impatient. Otherwise clawback 




Event study n/a  Risk of earnings 
restatement 
 Restatement 3 years 
prior to event date 
 Material internal 
control weakness 
 Earnings quality 
 REM 
 Managers' risk aversion 
 Market reaction  Clawback enforcement is value-
increasing for firms with a higher 
likelihood of restating earnings and is 
value-decreasing for firms with more 
REM and where managers are risk-
averse. 
[1] Mandatory clawbacks 
[2] All companies with 
 available data from 
 Audit Analytics, 
 Compustat and CRSP 
 databases. 
[3] November 15, 2011 









 Financial reporting quality  Adoption of voluntary clawbacks 
increases the likelihood of 
restatements in case of fraud 
clawbacks but not in case of error 
clawbacks. 






Corp Govern Int 
Rev 
Archival n/a  Overconfidence  
 Option compensation  
 Overinvestment  The adoption of compensation 
clawbacks mitigates overinvestment. 
The effect is more pronounced when 
executives are overconfident or when 
they have a higher option 
compensation. 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 
[2] n/a 
[3] 2006-2012 
[4] 1093  




Archival n/a  Board governance 
 Board independence 





 Audit committee size 
 Board size 
 Overinvestment Firms decrease their overinvestments 
following clawback adoption. The 
reduction in overinvestments is diluted 
when board governance is weak. 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 
[2] Russel 3000 
[3] 2005-2014 




Archival n/a n/a  Performance  
 Risk-taking behavior  
 Ration of long-term debt to 
capitalization 
 Standard deviation of EBIT 
Companies exhibit higher operating 
risk and a decrease in firm 
performance following clawback 
adoption. 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 






Archival n/a n/a  REM 
 Abnormal production cost 
The total measure of REM increases 
following clawback adoption, but 
individual measures provide 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 
[2] n/a 
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 Abnormal cash flow from 
operations 
 Abnormal discretionary 
expenses 
 CEO and CFO risk-taking 
 Vega 
 Proportion unexercised in-
the-money options to total 
compensation 
 Executive total compensation 
 Proportion of executive 
bonuses to total compensation 
 Analyst forecast accuracy 
 Analyst forecast errors 
 Combined measure of 
forecast accuracy 
 Financial analyst following 
 Innovation output 
inconclusive evidence. The authors 
find weak evidence of a decrease in 
managerial risk-taking. Measures of 
analyst following and analyst forecast 
accuracy are widely unaffected by the 
clawback. Clawback adopters 
significantly reduce their innovation 







Archival n/a n/a  CEO and CFO risk-taking 
 Vega 
 Proportion of unexercised in-
the-money options to total 
compensation 
 Executive total compensation 
 Proportion of executive 
bonuses to total compensation
Following clawback adoption, CEOs' 
proportion of unexercised in-the-
money options to total compensation 
and CFOs' proportion of bonus to total 
compensation decreases and provides 
weak evidence for reduced executive 
risk-taking behavior. 
The authors do not find that the CEO 
and the CFO of clawback firms show 
lower levels of risk-taking as measured 
by Vega.  







Archival n/a  CEO in-the-money option 
value 
 Likelihood of a 
restatement 
 CEO duality 
 Likelihood of financial 
restatements 
 CEO salary 
The authors examine effects of the 
SOX-clawback. The relation between 
CEO in-the money stock options and 
the likelihood of financial restatements 
weakens following the SOX. Firms 
with a high likelihood of an 
accounting restatement and where the 
CEO is also the chair of the board 
experience an increase in CEO salary 
following the SOX-clawback 
imposition. 




Ng, Wu, Zhai, 
Zhao 
Archival n/a  Auditor entrenchment 
 External monitoring 
 AEM 
 REM 
Instead of examining the clawback 
adoption itself, the authors investigate 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 
[2] S&P 1500 and 500 
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2018 
Working Paper 
 Analyst coverage 
 Institutional investor 
ownership 
the effects of shareholder proposals. 
They find that shareholder proposals 
that demand a clawback decrease 
AEM and increase REM. The effects 
are more pronounced when firms have 
an entrenched auditor or when there is 
poor external monitoring. 
 other widely held 
 firms 
[3] 1997-2014 
[4] 46 audit and clawback 




Experiment n/a  Quality of the auditor   Acceptance of restatement 
recommendations from the 
auditor 
Executives are less likely to accept a 
restatement recommendation from a 
low quality auditor when their 
incentive based compensation is high 
vs. low. In case of high incentive 
based pay, executives are less likely to 
accept a restatement recommendation 
from a low quality auditor than from a 
high quality auditor. 
[1] n/a 









 Firm size 
 Director independence 
 Peer adoption 
 Pay-for-performance 
sensitivity of short-term 
compensation 
 Pay-for-performance sensitivity 
 Short-term incentives 
 Long-term incentives 
 Total incentives 
 Earnings management 
 Frequency of restatements 
 Announcement of earnings 
close to the analyst forecast 
Clawback adoption reduces the 
frequency of accounting manipulations 
and the effect is less pronounced when 
the firm previously relied on short-
term incentives. Clawback adoption is 
significantly positively associated with 
firm size, director independence and 
peer adoption. 







Archival n/a n/a  AEM 
 REM 
After the adoption of compensation 
clawbacks, both, AEM and REM 
decrease. 
[1] Voluntary clawbacks 







Archival n/a  Type of clawback 
 Fraud-based  
 Performance-based 
 Other 
 Debt costs 
 Long-term 
 Short-term 
Costs of debt decrease significantly in 
the short- and the long-term following 
the adoption of fraud-based and 
performance-based clawbacks.  







Archival  Previous restatement 
 
 
 Audit committee financial 
expertise 
 Accounting expertise 
 Non-accounting 
expertise 
n/a Firms with a restatement history are 
more likely to adopt clawbacks that 
are related to misrepresentation of 
financials. Audit committees with high 
financial expertise mitigate the effect 
of the previous restatement on 
clawback adoption. When no previous 
restatement exists, high accounting 
related financial expertise increases 
clawback adoption. 
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ESSAY 2 
Mandatory Compensation Clawbacks: Do Directors Reimburse Managers 
for Compensation Recoveries that Managers may Perceive as Unfair? 
Matthias S. Gnägi 
University of Bern 
Abstract 
I conduct an experiment to examine whether mandatory clawback recoveries affect directors’ 
decisions about the future compensation of managers. I find that, following mandated clawback 
recoveries, directors use their discretion in setting management compensation to favor executives in 
two ways. First, directors increase compensation for managers who are not responsible for triggering 
the clawback compared to managers who are responsible. Results indicate that directors do so to 
reimburse non-responsible managers as directors anticipate that these managers perceive recoveries 
to be unfair. Second, directors give responsible managers the benefit of the doubt when the cause for 
triggering the clawback (error vs. misconduct) is unknown. That is, they pay managers an undue 
amount of compensation by treating managers as if they triggered the clawback due to unintentional 
error rather than intentional misconduct. Results suggest that, following clawback recoveries, 
directors incorporate justice considerations into their compensation decisions, thereby undermining 
the regulator’s intention. Directors’ decisions are potentially detrimental to shareholder value 
because they are likely to induce a deviation of management compensation from true performance. 
My findings have important policy implications by documenting that, contingent on their design, 
mandated clawbacks may have unintended side effects. 
Keywords: clawback provisions; corporate governance; board of directors; accounting restatements 
Send correspondence to Matthias Gnägi, University of Bern, Institute for Accounting, 
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1. Introduction 
Recent regulatory attempts to introduce mandatory clawback provisions have increased 
academic attention to compensation clawbacks. Clawbacks recover executive compensation 
when it is based on financial performance that is subsequently invalidated, most typically 
through an accounting restatement (Kyung et al. 2019). The board of directors is responsible 
for a firm’s compliance with regulatory policies such as a clawback mandate (Cohen et al. 
2013). However, playing a key part in the firm’s corporate governance, the board has also 
means available to affect a regulation’s effectiveness (Fama and Jensen 1983; Williamson 
1984). That is, directors may take actions to negate the clawback policies if they expect the 
rule to harm the firm (Babenko et al. 2017). Whereas a strict clawback mandate may require 
the board to comply by always recovering compensation from executives in case the 
clawback is triggered, directors may use other mechanisms to undermine the proper 
functioning of the mandate. In this study, I focus on the setting where directors may adjust 
managers’ future compensation to account for mandated clawback recoveries. In particular, 
I explore how directors set a manager’s compensation after a restatement depending on i) 
whether the manager was responsible for the restatement (responsible vs. not responsible) 
and ii) the cause for the restatement (error, misconduct, or unknown). 
It is important to examine directors’ compensation decisions following clawback recovery 
for several reasons. First, boards have large discretion when it comes to determining 
management compensation (Bushman et al. 1996; Hall and Murphy 2000; Murphy 2001). 
Second, how directors react on clawback policies may depend on the design of the mandatory 
provisions. A current debate exists about whether a clawback mandate should cover 
managers who are not responsible for the restatement. Regulators and researchers have 
advocated clawback provisions that make managers subject to clawback recoveries 
independent of their responsibility for the restatement. Managers should return any 
compensation they would not have received, had the financial statements been issued 
correctly (White 2015). Permitting managers to keep excess compensation makes managers’ 
compensation less sensitive to actual performance, thereby weakening the incentive 
alignment between owners and managers (Fried and Shilon 2011). 
Conversely, critics support the view that it is unfair to require managers to forfeit their 
compensation if managers are not responsible for a restatement (Borges 2015; Donnelly 
2015; Francis 2015; Gallagher 2015). Furthermore, recoveries from non-responsible 
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managers do not help to deter future misconduct and may therefore constitute an overly far-
reaching regulatory intervention (Fried 2016; Savarese and Carlin 2009). 
Drawing on psychological theory, I predict that following clawback recoveries, directors 
provide a higher compensation to non-responsible managers than to responsible managers. 
The basis for this prediction is that directors fear having dissatisfied managers when 
managers have to pay back compensation despite not being responsible for the restatement 
(Hodge and Winn 2012). Directors anticipate the perceived unfairness of their managers and 
therefore pay them a higher compensation (Agell and Lundborg 1995, 2003; Bewley 1999; 
Bol et al. 2010). Thus, directors’ willingness to restore justice drives their compensation 
decisions. 
Additionally, I posit that when a manager is responsible for the restatement, directors’ 
decisions about managers’ compensation depend on the cause for the restatement. Generally, 
restatements can be broadly categorized as either stemming from unintentional error or 
intentional misconduct (Hennes et al. 2008). I argue that following clawback recoveries, 
directors provide a lower compensation to responsible managers in case of misconduct than 
in case of error. In reality, however, the cause of restatements is often unknown (Plumlee 
and Yohn 2010a). If there is no clear evidence of misconduct, directors may give managers 
the “benefit of the doubt” (e.g. Erickson et al. 2017; Koonce et al. 2010). Therefore, I 
hypothesize that board members react to a restatement with unknown cause in a similar 
manner as to an error restatement. In particular, I predict that following clawback recoveries, 
directors’ compensation decisions about a responsible manager do not differ from an error 
restatement when the cause of the restatement is unknown.  
Using a 2 × 3 between-subjects design, I test how directors compensate managers following 
clawback recoveries depending on the responsibility (responsible vs. not responsible) and 
the cause for the restatement (error, misconduct, or unknown). The experiment is self-
contained and abstracts away from a firm-context. That is, I model an environment that is 
abstract but captures the incentives of a director who is required to make a compensation 
decision about a manager whose previous period compensation was partly recovered due to 
a clawback. My task environment consists of four players. I assign the subjects to a role 
analogous to directors. They are informed about three other hypothetical players who 
represent the owner of the firm (Red) and two division managers (Blue and Green). Red, 
Green, and Blue engage in a simple production game that captures the main incentives 
present in a firm-context. Subjects learn that they are hired by Red to set the future 
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compensation of Blue. To make their decision, they are provided with information about the 
performance and the compensation of Blue in the previous period. Subjects also learn that 
Blue’s past period compensation was partly recovered due to a clawback. I vary between 
conditions whether Blue or Green was responsible for triggering the clawback. As a second 
manipulation, I vary the cause for triggering the clawback (error, misconduct, or unknown 
cause). After the subjects learn whether Blue was responsible and what led to the 
restatement, they decide on Blue’s compensation for the next period. 
Results show that directors favor managers following clawback recoveries in two ways. 
First, I find that directors pay more compensation to managers who were not responsible for 
the restatement compared to managers who were responsible. The effect is mediated by 
directors’ willingness to restore justice. Second, I find support for the notion that directors 
give responsible managers the benefit of the doubt when the cause of the restatement is 
unknown. That is, directors pay responsible managers a lower compensation if managers 
intentionally misreported financial information (misconduct) compared to when managers 
made unintentional errors. But directors’ compensation decisions do not differ when the 
restatement is due to error or of unknown cause. 
My findings provide evidence of potential unintended consequences of mandatory 
compensation clawbacks. First, by making reimbursements to non-responsible managers 
following clawback recoveries, directors undermine the regulator’s intention to return 
managers’ excess compensation to shareholders. A mandate that covers managers 
irrespective of responsibility therefore runs the risk of becoming partly obsolete. Investors 
will ultimately bear the administrative cost of covering non-responsible managers, 
potentially without reaping any benefits. More so, since directors are likely to make 
reimbursements to managers in periods after the clawback recovery, the reimbursements are 
likely to distort managers’ pay-for-performance incentives in these future periods. 
Regulators should be aware of this potential side effect when deciding about how to 
implement a clawback mandate. Second, I reveal a behavioral bias by documenting that 
directors give responsible managers the benefit of the doubt when the cause for the 
restatement is unknown. That is, directors pay managers who misreport an undue amount of 
compensation when they are unable to determine the cause of the restatement. The excessive 
compensation will be paid out of shareholders’ pockets and weakens the incentive alignment 
between owners and managers. This may have detrimental effects on shareholders’ 
investments. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information about clawbacks and the current regulatory environment. In section 3, I draw on 
psychology theory to develop my hypotheses. Section 4 describes the experiment. Section 5 
discusses the results and section 6 summarizes the findings and provides avenues for future 
research. 
2. Institutional Background and Previous Literature 
Compensation clawbacks constitute a corporate governance mechanism to ex-ante deter 
managers from releasing incorrect accounting information and ex-post penalize managers 
who nonetheless do so (Dehaan et al. 2013). In particular, clawback provisions allow to 
recover compensation paid out to executives who acted in ways that are detrimental to 
companies and their shareholders (Kapner and Lucchetti 2012). The provisions define 
preconditions (so-called “trigger events”), based on which compensation can be recovered 
(Sharp 2012). Most compensation clawbacks tie the trigger event of the provision to the 
issuance of an accounting restatement (Babenko et al. 2017). That is, managers have to return 
incentive-based compensation if it is determined that, on the basis of restated financials, they 
are not entitled to parts of their compensation. As such, the clawback aims to more directly 
link compensation to managers’ behavior (Hodge and Winn 2012). 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) first introduced mandatory clawbacks in 2002. The rule 
designated the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to recover bonus compensation 
from the CEO and the CFO when a company issued an accounting restatement due to 
misconduct (U.S. House of Representatives 2002). However, because of the SEC’s 
constrained resources and the high difficulty of proving misconduct, the SEC executed the 
SOX-clawback only in a handful of cases (Fried and Shilon 2011; Iskandar-Datta and Jia 
2013). 
The Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) of 2010 expanded the scope of the clawbacks considerably, 
though it is not enforced yet. The DFA introduced mandatory clawback policies for firms 
that are listed at U.S. stock exchanges (U.S. House of Representatives 2010). To implement 
the provision, the SEC proposed a rule requiring executive officers to pay back any excess 
incentive-based compensation paid out due to overstated financials in case of a material 
accounting restatement (SEC 2015).1 Notably, the rule proposes to make clawback recoveries 
                                                 
1  The term executive officer includes the company’s president, principal financial officer, principal 
accounting officer, any vice-president in charge of a principal business unit, division, or function, and 
any other person who performs policy-making functions for the company (SEC 2015, 41152-41153). 
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from managers independent of the responsibility or the cause of the restatement. That is, the 
rule requires managers to forfeit compensation even if they are not responsible (Bainbridge 
2011). The proposal is consistent with the idea that managers should return any 
compensation they would not have received, had the financials been issued correctly (White 
2015). Such excess compensation is paid out at the expense of shareholders and is thus 
detrimental to firm value. Furthermore, excess compensation does not reflect managers’ true 
performance, thereby weakening incentive alignment between owners and managers if 
managers are allowed to keep it (Fried and Shilon 2011). 
Conversely, a new bill, the Financial Choice Act, aims at limiting the DFA-clawback to 
apply only to managers who were responsible for the financial reporting that led to a 
restatement (U.S. House of Representatives 2017). The underlying motive of this initiative 
is that a mandate should not cover non-culpable managers because they may perceive 
recoveries as unfair (Gallagher 2015). Moreover, covering such managers does not deter 
future misconduct (Savarese and Carlin 2009) and may thus constitute a too far-reaching 
intervention (Fried 2016). The two proposals for mandatory clawback implementation reflect 
the current debate about whether managers who are not responsible for a restatement should 
be subject to clawback recoveries. 
Although regulators have been discussing clawbacks for several years, research on the 
consequences of mandatory clawbacks is relatively scarce. Experimental research provides 
some initial evidence of potential unintended effects of a clawback mandate. Pyzoha (2015) 
reports that in the presence of a restatement-triggered clawback, managers will try to resist 
the issuance of a restatement, and that this tendency is highest when managers face high 
financial incentives and low quality auditors. Hales et al. (2018) demonstrate that under 
mandated clawbacks (compared to no clawbacks), managers increase the use of earnings 
management practices that are less subject to the provision. I extend this stream of research 
by examining how directors make decisions about the future compensation of managers 
following mandated clawback recoveries. Board members play an important role for a firm’s 
corporate governance structure and are likely to affect the effectiveness of new regulations, 
such as clawbacks (Cohen et al. 2013; Fama and Jensen 1983; Williamson 1984). Rather 
than analyzing the consequences of the adoption of a mandatory clawback, I examine 
director behavior after clawback recoveries. In particular, I investigate whether the board of 
directors uses its discretion in setting management pay as a response to managers’ unfairness 
perceptions of mandated clawback recoveries. In the next section, I develop hypotheses on 
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how the clawback recoveries will affect directors’ future compensation decisions depending 
on whether a manager was responsible for triggering the clawback.  
3. Theory and Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Responsibility and Perceived Fairness 
Fairness perceptions significantly influence employees’ job satisfaction and effort 
motivation (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001; Colquitt et al. 2001). Perceived unfairness in 
compensation may give rise to retributive responses such as effort reduction (Hannan 2005), 
self-dealing behavior (Asay et al. 2018; Chen and Sardino 2012; Houser et al. 2012), or 
destructive work behavior (Cohen-Charash and Mueller 2007). From a contracting 
perspective, agents will regard a compensation contract as fair when it is based on objective 
criteria that agents accepted (Asay et al. 2018). However, individuals may change their 
perception of fairness after the outcome of the contract is revealed (Trautmann and Van de 
Kuilen 2016). For instance, when an uncontrollable event negatively affects the outcome of 
a contract, individuals perceive the compensation as unfair even though they agreed upon 
the contract and perceived it as being fair ex-ante (Asay et al. 2018). Analogously, managers 
may consider compensation recoveries based on pre-defined trigger events as fair ex-ante. 
However, they are likely to view them as unfair ex-post when they have to pay back 
compensation, especially in absence of their personal responsibility for triggering the 
clawback. 
Hodge and Winn (2012) provide evidence that managers react differently to compensation 
recoveries depending on the degree to which they feel responsible for the restatement. The 
authors demonstrate that managers view recoveries as more unfair when they do not feel 
responsible for them. This causes feelings of anger and frustration on the part of managers 
who, as a consequence, engage in overly risky behavior (Hodge and Winn 2012). Anecdotal 
evidence additionally supports the premise that innocent managers perceive recoveries to be 
unjust. Maynard Jenkins, the former CEO of CSK Auto Corp., argued that any recovery 
constitutes a punishment in absence of wrongdoing (Villareal et al. 2010). The SEC sued 
him based on the SOX-clawback to seek recovery in absence of personal responsibility. 
Jenkins was willing to put up with a costly and lengthy lawsuit to defend himself against the 
recovery, potentially to protect his reputation. 
The endowment effect is likely to reinforce managers’ perceived unfairness of clawback 
recoveries. Psychology theory suggests that individuals value things more when they belong 
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to them (Kahneman et al. 1990; Thaler 1980). The endowment effect increases the loss felt 
from the recovery compared to the situation where the manager didn’t receive the money in 
the first place. Brink and Rankin (2013) conduct a set of experiments where they offer 
subjects various economically equivalent compensation contracts. They find that participants 
prefer malus clauses over clawback clauses if expected payoffs are equal. Malus clauses 
penalize participants directly for poor performance and only pay out the net amount of 
compensation. Conversely, clawbacks allow to later recover paid-out compensation in case 
of poor performance. The result indicates that individuals suffer more from clawed back 
amounts compared to not receiving the compensation in the first place. 
3.2 Directors’ Response to Perceived Unfairness of Managers 
Prior research suggests that people are not simply concerned about experiencing fairness 
themselves but they also care about others being treated fairly (Blader et al. 2013; O’Reilly 
et al. 2016; Skarlicki and Kulik 2005; Turillo et al. 2002). That is, people try to evade 
behavior that may be perceived as unfair by others. Weiner (1995) argues that when someone 
is negatively affected by an event for which one was not responsible, observers feel 
sympathy and compassion for that individual. Such feelings evoke prosocial behavior, such 
as offering help (Weiner 1995). Observers are willing to accept a personal cost to make up 
for the harm done to the victim. By compensating them they intend to restore victims to their 
pre-transgression state (Darley and Pittman 2003). Such behavior is likely to be founded in 
reciprocity, a mechanism that allows to sustain cooperation over time (Axelrod 1984).  
Prior research documents that compensatory payments reduce injustice in various business 
settings. In supervisor-employee relationships, several studies provide evidence that 
supervisors favor employees who feel unfairly treated. Surveys (Agell and Lundborg 1995, 
2003; Bewley 1999, Bol et al. 2010) find evidence that employers (i.e. personnel managers) 
anticipate perceived unfairness of their employees. Bol et al. (2010) report that supervisors 
make use of their discretion in target setting to address fairness issues. Nadisic (2008) 
documents that supervisors allocate company-owned resources to unfairly treated employees 
to mitigate injustice. 
Applied to compensation clawbacks, I argue that directors will account for the perceived 
unfairness of non-responsible managers and therefore increase their future compensation as 
a compensatory measure. Previous research reports that compensation committees are in 
most cases responsible for determining management compensation (Hermanson et al. 2012) 
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and generally have substantial discretion (Bushman et al. 1996). Fairness considerations play 
an important role for board members when it comes to management compensation 
(Hermanson et al. 2012). Thus, directors are likely to use their discretion to balance 
perceived injustice from clawback recoveries.2 I claim that directors’ future compensation 
decisions differ depending on whether a manager was responsible for triggering the clawback 
that led to the recovery. 
H1: After clawback recoveries, directors pay a higher (lower) compensation to managers
who were not responsible (were responsible) for triggering the clawback. 
I additionally argue that the differences in compensation decisions are a result of directors’ 
justice considerations. I predict that board members pay non-responsible managers a higher 
compensation because they intend to make up for managers’ perceived unfairness. 
H2: Directors’ willingness to restore justice mediates the effect of managers’
responsibility for the trigger event on directors’ compensation decision. 
3.3 The Benefit of the Doubt 
Next, I consider how directors’ make compensation decisions about a manager who was 
responsible for triggering the clawback. Specifically, I examine how directors’ decisions 
about the future compensation of a responsible manager are affected by the cause of the 
trigger event. The most commonly used trigger-event for both voluntary and mandatory 
clawbacks is an accounting restatement (Babenko et al. 2017). Investors, boards, and 
regulators generally distinguish between error and misconduct as cause for a restatement 
(Hennes et al. 2008). The two possible causes for a restatement are likely to affect board 
members differentially when making compensation decisions about a responsible manager. 
Weiner (1995) suggests that people hold others more accountable for a negative outcome 
when they perceive the act as being committed intentionally compared to when it is due to 
negligence. They consider intentional transgressors to assert superiority to the accepted 
moral system (Miller and Vidmar 1981). The intentional violation of norms upsets people 
                                                 
2  The proposed rule prohibits that firms indemnify their managers or pay for insurance that protects 
managers from reimbursements (SEC 2015, 41168-41169). Whereas mandatory clawbacks may prohibit 
that firms indemnify managers whose compensation is recovered, directors will likely find ways to 
camouflage compensatory payments via pension plans, deferred compensation, perks, or consulting 
contracts (Bebchuk and Fried 2004).  
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because they place the offender above the normative standards used to govern social life 
(Folger et al. 2005). They therefore perceive intentional wrongdoing as more severe because 
it threatens the social order (Heider 1958; Miller and Vidmar 1981). Conversely, in case of 
negligence, they do not judge the perpetrator as harshly compared to when transgressions 
occurred intentionally (Weiner 1995). 
Prior research provides evidence that observers react more negatively when the transgressor 
causes damage intentionally (Umphress et al. 2013). The phenomenon reconciles with 
negative reciprocity (Güth et al. 1982) that constitutes a mechanism to prevent future 
opportunistic behavior of individuals (Fehr and Gächter 1998). In a firm context, Brown and 
Moser (2017) find that investors are willing to pay money to litigate managers who engaged 
in misreporting even if investors do not have a direct financial incentive to do so. Research 
suggests that whether a restatement is due to error or misconduct is likely to affect board 
members’ behavior (Burks 2010). In absence of clawbacks, boards deny discretionary 
bonuses to CEO’s to punish them in case of a restatement (Burks 2010). Moreover, they fire 
responsible managers more often after intentional misstatements than after error 
misstatements (Hennes et al. 2008).3 In contrast, a clawback recovery forces managers to 
return the excess compensation regardless of managerial intent. Thus, directors may use their 
discretion in setting management compensation to additionally account for a manager’s 
intentional misreporting. I posit that when the board is forced to seek recovery of a manager 
following a misconduct restatement, board members are likely to pay a lower compensation 
to the manager as compared to when the restatement is due to error. 
I argue that directors treat responsible managers differently depending on whether 
misstatements result from error or misconduct. However, the real reason behind the 
misstatement is often unknown (Ettredge et al. 2010; Hennes et al. 2008; Palmrose and 
Scholz 2004; Plumlee and Yohn 2010a). Thus, directors need to use judgment when 
assessing whether the faulty financial reports result from intentional or unintentional 
behavior. 
Prior research documents that investors as well as auditors are generally trusting of 
management unless there is evidence that proves otherwise (Erickson et al. 2017; Hirst et al. 
2003; Kachelmeier and Van Landuyt 2017; Koonce et al. 2010). This tendency is called the 
“benefit of the doubt effect”. Hirst et al. (2003) find that investors do not punish firms that 
                                                 
3  Whereas my experiment does not provide the option of firing the manager, I predict that directors will 
decrease the compensation of a culpable manager for the next period in order to punish her. 
 
- 114 - 
engage in seemingly opportunistic sales estimates. In a related study, Koonce et al. (2010) 
provide evidence that, unless industry information is provided, investors are likely to 
attribute managers’ estimate inaccuracy to environmental causes rather than opportunistic 
behavior. Relatedly, Erickson et al. (2017) find evidence for a benefit of the doubt effect by 
documenting that investors assign low risk to smooth earnings in presence of volatile cash 
flows. Investors only suspect earnings to be managed when provided with additional data on 
managers’ incentive or opportunity. 
Analogously, I expect directors to give responsible managers the benefit of the doubt when 
the cause for the restatement is unknown, inferring that the restatement is due to error rather 
than misconduct. As a consequence, I expect that directors’ compensation decisions do not 
differ when the cause for the restatement is unknown compared to when it is due to error. 
H3: After clawback recoveries, directors pay a lower compensation to responsible
managers in case of misconduct than in case of an error, but compensation decisions 
of directors do not differ when the cause for triggering the clawback is unknown
compared to when it is due to error (the benefit of the doubt). 
I additionally examine the process underlying directors’ compensation decision. I expect 
that directors will assess the extent to which managers acted intentionally when setting the 
future compensation of a manager. That is, after learning about the cause of the 
restatement, directors will form beliefs about how opportunistic a manager is. I 
hypothesize that directors’ perception of the manager’s opportunism mediates the benefit 
of the doubt effect. 
H4: Directors’ perception of the manager’s opportunism mediates the relationship 
between the cause for triggering the clawback and directors‘ compensation decisions
about a responsible manager. 
4. Experiment 
I examine how directors set management’s future compensation after a clawback recovery 
triggered by a restatement. I employ a 2 × 3-design that manipulates the manager’s 
responsibility for the restatement (responsible vs. non-responsible) and the cause for the 
restatement (error, misconduct, or unknown). In absence of sufficient empirical data on 
clawback recoveries in practice (e.g., Babenko et al. 2017), I conduct an experiment to test 
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my hypotheses. An experiment allows me to hold all information about the recovery of the 
excess compensation constant while manipulating the responsibility and the cause for the 
restatement. I test my predictions in a setting that abstracts away from a firm environment. 
While being abstract, the setting captures the main incentives that are present in a situation 
where a director is required to set the future compensation of a manager. 
4.1 Participants 
I use participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform. MTurk is increasingly 
used for experiments in accounting studies (e.g. Asay 2018; Koonce et al. 2015; Rennekamp 
2012; Rennekamp et al. 2015). The platform provides relatively low cost and easy access to 
participants (Brandon et al. 2014) who are reported to be representative of the U.S. 
population (Buhrmester et al. 2011; Paolacci et al. 2010). I do not rely on actual directors to 
test my hypotheses because I examine fundamental psychological effects. Experiments that 
test fundamental psychological processes can inform our understanding of individuals’ 
decision-making without requiring participants to possess specialized knowledge 
(Bloomfield et al. 2016). Thus, I employ an abstract setting that does not require the use of 
experienced practitioners (Kachelmeier and King 2002).4 My experiment only requires 
participants to be able to read and understand English. As such, the choice of participants 
matches the demand profile.5 The experimental design that I employ is a conservative way 
of testing my hypotheses as participants do not interact with actual individuals. To the extent 
that my experiment examines participants’ fairness considerations, potential effects may be 
stronger in a real world setting where directors decide about actual individuals to whom they 
may have social ties.  
I pay participants a fixed fee of $1.20 for the 10 minute experiment. The compensation 
corresponds to the U.S. national minimum wage of $7.25 per hour and is well above the 
reservation wage.6 On MTurk, I filter for participants that are from the U.S. I additionally 
require workers to have a minimum of 500 completed surveys and an approval rate of at least 
                                                 
4  Previous research similarly uses abstract tasks to test fundamental psychological effects in accounting 
(Asay 2018; Kachelmeier and Van Landuyt 2017; Libby and Rennekamp 2012). 
5  According to Libby et al. (2002) experimenters should not target participants that are more sophisticated 
than needed to achieve the research goal. 
6  Horton and Chilton (2010) document a median reservation wage of $1.38 per hour for workers on MTurk. 
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95%.7 The mean participant is 37.45 years old, has 15.93 years of work experience, and has 
taken 1.54 accounting and finance courses. 46.19% of the participants are female. 
4.2 Experimental Design 
4.2.1 Setting 
In my experiment, I model a setting that reflects a situation where a director makes a 
compensation decision about a manager whose previous period compensation was partly 
recovered due to a clawback. However, I abstract away from a firm environment.8 I assign 
participants to a role analogous to a director of a firm. There are three additional hypothetical 
players in the setting, representing the owner of the firm (Red) and two division managers 
(Blue and Green). These three players interact in a multi-period production game (described 
further below). Red asks the participants to set Blue’s compensation for the next period. The 
participants receive information about Blue’s past performance and compensation. Blue’s 
previous period compensation was partly recovered due to a clawback. I manipulate the 
responsibility for triggering the clawback between conditions by varying whether Blue or 
Green was responsible for the trigger event. I also manipulate the cause for triggering the 
clawback at three different levels. The cause for triggering the clawback is either i) 
misconduct, ii) error, or iii) unknown. I measure the amount of compensation that subjects 
set for Blue’s next period compensation as my dependent variable. Figure 1 depicts the basic 
setting. 
                                                 
7  Limiting participation to participants with a 95% acceptance rate is a commonly used method for M-Turk 
studies in accounting research (e.g. see Asay 2018; Krische 2018). Participants with an acceptance rate 
of at least 95% have been shown to pay more attention to the task than participants with a lower acceptance 
rate (Peer et al. 2014). 
8  In contrast, having a scenario setting with high experimental realism is beneficial when drawing on 
participants’ experience. Such experiments are suitable when the theory that is tested involves significant 
knowledge of accounting, incentives, or institutions that participants acquired in practice settings. In my 
experiment, MTurkers would need to take on the role of board members though it is unlikely that they 
have any prior experience acting as board members. Participants may, as a consequence, act in a way they 
suspect board members to behave. Subjects are likely to make these real world assumptions despite their 
insufficient knowledge about directors. Bloomfield et al. (2016) describe this phenomenon as bringing 
“baggage” into the experiment and warn that such studies impose less control over the setting. 
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FIGURE 1 





4.2.2 Multi-Period Production Game 
Each period, Blue and Green produce units of output for Red who pays them for the total 
production. The output units can either be of high or low quality. Blue and Green are advised 
to only produce high quality units that require a higher production effort than low quality 
units. Red pays Blue and Green for their output independent of the quality. However, Red 
only profits from high quality units, low quality units do not contribute to Red’s earnings. 
Consequently, when producing low quality output, Blue and Green increase their 
compensation at the expense of Red. 
The setup of the production game reflects the general financial reporting environment of 
division managers. In particular, high quality output represents truthfully reported 
performance that is valuable to companies. Conversely, low quality output mirrors 
misstatements of performance that benefit division managers, but harm shareholders. In 
practice, misstatements may stem from unintentional error or intentional misconduct. The 
                                                 
9  Icons retrieved from https://icons8.com. 
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game also reflects this characteristic. Specifically, low quality output may arise because of 
two possible reasons. First, low quality output may result from unintentional error when Blue 
or Green do not work carefully. Second, the players may engage in intentional distortions.10 
That is, they may deliberately inflate the output by producing low quality units to increase 
their compensation. 
Red cannot observe the amount and quality of Blue and Green’s individual outputs. Instead, 
Red only observes the total number of units produced by the team (Blue and Green together) 
during the current period. Red compensates the two players according to their combined 
team output, independent of quality. As such, any low quality units in the output will harm 
Red because such units do not generate earnings, but Red will still have to compensate Blue 
and Green for all units produced. Thus, Blue and Green benefit from low quality units 
because their compensation does not depend on output quality. Players’ compensation is tied 
to team performance rather than individual performance, such that both players are affected 
by clawback recoveries, independent of their responsibility for the low quality output.11 To 
make sure that Red is unable to infer the quality of the output from the total earnings 
obtained, a lottery determines the amount earned by Red for units of high quality output. 
Red uses the proceeds from the high quality output to cover the compensation costs of Blue 
and Green. 
After each period, a quality control analyzes part of the team output. The quality control 
examines a sample of total output and identifies the number of low quality units it contains. 
Since the quality control only inspects a fraction of total output, any low quality units that 
are not subject to the quality control will not be discovered. For each unit of low quality 
output detected, the quality control identifies the player who produced it. Red then recovers 
the compensation paid out to Blue based on those low quality units. Recoveries are made 
independent of whether low quality output was produced by error or distortion and regardless 
of whether Blue or Green is responsible for the low quality output. Thus, Blue is required to 
return to Red all compensation received based on the low quality team output that is 
discovered by the quality control. Following recoveries, Blue and Green’s compensation 
scheme for the next period is set and then the next production period begins. 
                                                 
10  I use contextually abstract terminology, such as “distortion” instead of “misconduct” to reduce role-
playing and demand effects (Kachelmeier and Van Landuyt 2017). 
11  Team-based incentive compensation schemes are commonly used in practice to reward worker 
productivity (Blinder 1990; Brown and Armstrong, 1999; Pizzini 2010). 
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The quality control is an important feature of the production game because it reflects that 
misstated financial information may be detected subsequent to the reporting date. Given that 
not all misstatements are necessarily detected in reality, the quality control only examines a 
fraction of total output. Moreover, I introduce a clawback by forcing the players to return 
excess compensation based on low quality output detected. As proposed by regulators, 
recoveries in the production game are independent of responsibility and cause for the 
restatement. 
4.2.3 Participants’ Task 
Participants’ task is to set the piece-rate that Blue will earn per unit of team output in the 
next period. Subjects are instructed to envision the following details about the previous 
period: i) Blue earned a piece-rate of 10 cents per unit of output produced by the team; ii) 
Blue and Green produced a total team output of 14 units. Accordingly, Red paid a 
compensation of $1.40 to Blue (10 cents x 14 units); iii) After paying out the money, the 
quality assessment discovered that two units of team output were of low quality; iv) Blue 
had to pay back 20 cents of the previously received compensation. 
4.3 Manipulations and Dependent Variable 
I manipulate the responsibility and the cause for triggering the clawback by varying the 
information that participants receive about the outcome of the quality control (see Table 1). 
To manipulate responsibility, subjects either learn that Blue (responsible) or Green (not 
responsible) respectively produced the low quality output detected by the quality control. 
Independent of condition, I inform subjects that Blue had to return part of the previously 
received compensation due to the clawback. This keeps pay-offs constant across conditions. 
As a second manipulation, I alter the cause for triggering the clawback. To implement the 
manipulation, I vary whether the low quality units detected by quality control were produced 
i) by error, ii) by distortion, or iii) whether no information was provided on the cause for the 
low quality output. For the error conditions, participants read that the errors resulted because 
the player did not work carefully. To manipulate misconduct, participants learn that the 
player distorted the output intentionally to increase compensation. The unknown condition 
does not provide subjects with any information on the cause for the low quality output. 
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 TABLE 1 
Experimental Manipulations 
 
   
  Cause for Triggering the Clawback  
Error Misconduct 
Unknown 

































Not Responsible / 
Unknown 
 
   
 
I examine how my manipulations affect participants’ compensation decisions about Blue. I 
ask participants to set the piece-rate that Blue will earn per unit of team output in the next 
period on a scale from 1 to 19 cents.12 
4.4 Experimental Procedures 
The experiment consists of four parts. In the first part of the experiment, participants begin 
by reading background information about their role and task. They learn about the rules and 
incentives of the game, the compensation scheme of Blue, and the potential after-period 
recoveries. The second part requires participants to answer three comprehension questions 
and to indicate their general attitude toward compensation recoveries. A third section of the 
experiment provides subjects with the results of the previous period. That is, the materials 
inform participants about the team output (14 units) and the resulting compensation that Blue 
received ($1.40). They also learn that the after-period quality check detected two low quality 
units of output. Depending on the condition, either Blue or Green produced the low quality 
units. Participants also receive information about the cause (error, distortion, or unknown) 
for the low quality output. 
                                                 
12  The endpoints 1 cent and 19 cents are chosen to be symmetric around the previous period piece-rate (10 
cents). Also a piece-rate of 0 cents was not allowed as zero compensation would change the incentives of 
the game such that there is no financial incentive to work anymore. Only seven out of 197 participants 
chose one of the endpoints. I infer that the large majority of subjects were not constrained by the scale. 
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FIGURE 2 





In a fourth step, participants make their compensation decision about Blue for the next 
period. I elicit the reasons behind their decision, manipulation checks, and potential process 
variables. Finally, subjects provide demographic information. Figure 2 depicts the timeline 
of the experiment. 
5. Results 
5.1 Attention and Manipulation Checks 
I collect a total of 310 observations. I remove 12 observations with duplicate IP addresses or 
duplicate worker IDs to reduce the risk that the same participant completes the task more 
than once (e.g. Rennekamp 2012). To determine whether subjects read the questions, I 
include an attention check (Oppenheimer et al. 2009). Specifically, I instruct participants to 
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place the slider of one question element on a scale from 0-100 on 20. I exclude 49 participants 
from the sample who did not pass the attention check.13 
I use manipulation checks to verify whether my manipulations have worked.14 First, I ask 
participants to indicate the player (Blue or Green) who produced the units that were found 
to be of low quality in the previous period. As a second question, I ask subjects about the 
cause for the low quality units that were detected. The answer choices were that i) the low 
quality resulted from error, ii) the low quality resulted from distortion, or iii) the reason for 
the low quality was not revealed. 52 subjects did not correctly answer the two manipulation 
checks.15 The correct answer to both manipulation checks is key for my results because a 
false answer to either one of the questions is likely to lead to behavior that should be observed 
in a different condition. I exclude participants who did not correctly answer both 
manipulation checks from the sample.16 The final sample comprises 197 subjects who passed 
the attention as well as both manipulation checks. My results stay inferentially identical 
when including all observations in the analysis.  
5.2 Hypotheses Test 
5.2.1 Test of H1 
I predict that directors are willing to pay managers more following a clawback recovery 
when they are not responsible for the trigger event compared to when they are responsible. 
                                                 
13  For the payment of participants, I allowed for a range between 18 and 22 as correct answers. 13 
participants placed the slider not more than two points away from 20. However, further inspection 
suggests that those participants did not pay attention to the task. They answered significantly fewer 
comprehension questions correctly than subjects who placed the slider on 20 (p<0.01, two-tailed). I 
therefore exclude these participants for the analysis as well. However, the exclusion of the participants 
does not inferentially change any of the results. 
14  I conduct a pre-test using 30 participants to verify whether subjects understand the experimental materials 
and to estimate the amount of time participants use to read and fill out the questionnaire. The subjects 
answer two out of three comprehension questions correctly and 87% of the workers pass both 
manipulation checks. The results increase the confidence that most people understand the materials. They 
use 8 minutes and 19 seconds on average to fill out the study, which is somewhat less than the projected 
10 minutes. 
15  The number of participants who do not pass the manipulation checks is relatively high (21%). Previous 
literature documents that MTurkers are less attentive to experimental materials than participants from 
traditional samples (Goodman et al. 2013). However, despite the higher rate of inattentive subjects, there 
is little evidence to suggest that the collected data is of poorer quality (Krantz and Dalal 2000). Prior 
research documents that a wide range of JDM-findings replicate using participants on MTurk (Mason and 
Suri 2012). 
16  Supplemental analyses show that both, subjects who did not pass the attention or a manipulation check 
answered significantly fewer comprehension questions correctly (both p<0.001, two-tailed). 
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I expect the effect to be present independent of the cause for the restatement. Panel A of 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the compensation for each condition. 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Test of H1 
Panel A: Means, [Standard Deviation], Number of Observations for Compensationa 
  No Responsibility  Responsibility  Average 






































Panel B: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)   
Source of Variation  SS  df  MS  F-statistic  p-value 
Cause  21.10  2  10.55  1.41  0.25 
Responsibility  245.73  1  245.73  32.80  <0.001 
Cause × Responsibility  25.74  2  12.87  1.72  0.18 
Error  1430.93  191  7.49     
Panel C: Simple Effects 
      
Comparison    df  F-statistic  p-value 




 1  12.39  <0.001 




 1  19.84  <0.001  




 1  3.70  0.056 
Panel A shows the means, standard deviations, and number of observations for Blue's compensation. Panel B 
provides the analysis of variance (ANOVA) and Panel C presents the simple main effects. All p-values are two-
tailed. 
a The question to assess the compensation required participants to set the amount of piece-rate that Blue would 
earn in the next period from 1 cent to 19 cents. 
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On average, participants set a compensation for Blue of 11.7 cents when Blue was not 
responsible for the low quality output and 9.4 cents when the manager was responsible. I use 
a conventional ANOVA to test my first hypothesis.17 The results of the ANOVA as reported 
in Panel B show a significant main effect for responsibility (F1,191 = 32.8, p<0.001). Follow-
up simple effects reported in Panel C indicate that, independent of the cause, participants 
provide a lower compensation to Blue when Blue is responsible for the low quality output 
compared to when Blue is not responsible (error: p<0.001, misconduct: p<0.001, unknown: 
p=0.056, all two-tailed). The findings are consistent with the notion that following clawback 
recoveries, directors use their discretion in setting management compensation as a function 
of a managers’ responsibility for the restatement. They are likely to pay a higher 
compensation to managers who were not responsible compared to managers who were 
responsible for triggering the clawback. 
5.2.2 Test of H2 - Mediation Analysis 
The results presented above suggest that directors pay a higher amount of compensation to 
non-responsible than responsible managers. My theory predicts that directors find it unfair 
to recover compensation from managers who are not responsible for triggering the clawback. 
As a consequence, they increase management compensation to make up for the manager’s 
perceived unfairness. However, other potential explanations may similarly explain the 
results. An alternative explanation for the difference in compensation is that participants may 
view the incentive system as inadequate to maintain effective control over responsible 
managers (Balsam et al. 2014; Burns and Kedia 2006; Hoitash et al. 2012). Thus, they may 
lower the incentives of responsible managers in order to protect themselves against 
misstatements. Another potential reason for the difference in compensation is that the 
information that a manager is responsible for the restatement may be interpreted as a signal 
for low ability (Demerjian et al. 2013). Studies show that decision makers allocate more 
compensation to high performers than to low performers (Fodor 1973; Kipnis and 
Vanderveer 1971). Consequently, directors may pay responsible managers less compared to 
managers who did not produce any low quality output. These alternative explanations would 
also predict a difference in compensation between responsible and non-responsible 
                                                 
17  The Shapiro-Wilk (1965) test indicates that the normality assumption of the ANOVA is violated for my 
dependent variable in three of six cells. My sample size of no less than 29 observations per condition 
suggests that parametric tests are robust to the normality violation (Keppel and Wickens 2004). However, 
inferences remain the same when I test my hypotheses with non-parametric tests, such as Mann and 
Whitney (1947) and Kruskal and Wallis (1952). 
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managers.18 However, I argue that the higher compensation of non-responsible managers is 
driven by directors’ willingness to restore justice. To investigate this construct, I ask 
participants to rate the extent to which their compensation decision is attributable to their 
intention to reimburse Blue because Blue had to pay back part of his compensation in the 
previous period. Subjects indicate their intention on a scale from 0-100. They also rate 
various other potential intentions to prevent experimenter demand effects. 
FIGURE 3 
Mediation of Willingness to Restore Justice 
 
 
Indirect effect: The indirect effect represents the mechanism by which responsibility transmits its 
effect on compensation through willingness to restore justice (Path A × Path B). 
Direct effect: The direct effect is the effect of responsibility on compensation when controlling for 
the willingness to restore justice (Path C'). 
Total effect: The total effect of responsibility on compensation (Path C) is the sum of the direct 
and the indirect effect (Path C' + [Path A × Path B]). 
This figure shows bootstrapped structural equation modeling results to test a mediation effect of the willingness 
to restore justice. The dependent variable is participants' assessment of the piece-rate that Blue would earn in 
the next period from 1 cent to 19 cents. To measure the willingness to restore justice, participants rate the extent 
to which their compensation decision is attributable to their intention to reimburse Blue because Blue had to 
pay back part of his compensation in the previous period. I present the standardized coefficients and 
corresponding p-values next to each link. All reported p-values are two-tailed. 
 
 
                                                 
18  Other alternative explanations are conceivable as well. The decision to pay responsible and non-
responsible managers differently may also be because responsible and non-responsible managers differ 
in their responsiveness to incentive-based compensation or because responsible managers are additionally 
punished by directors for their wrongdoing. 
 
- 126 - 
I test whether directors’ willingness to restore justice mediates the effect of responsibility on 
compensation. I test the mediation using structural equation modeling (SEM).19 Since the 
multivariate normality assumption of the endogenous variables is violated,20 I use 
bootstrapping (5,000 replications) to estimate the mediation model (Cheung 2007). 
Bootstrapping is a nonparametric resampling procedure that does not assume normality of 
the sampling distribution (Preacher and Hayes 2008). For easier interpretation I show 
standardized coefficients because the scales of the mediator and the dependent variable 
differ. Figure 3 depicts the mediation model. The total effect of the independent variable 
(responsibility) on the dependent variable (compensation) can be divided into a direct and 
an indirect effect. The indirect effect is the path coefficient for the effect of responsibility on 
compensation through the intervening variable (willingness to restore justice). The direct 
effect denotes the effect of responsibility on compensation that is independent of the 
influence of willingness to restore justice. To test my mediation hypothesis I follow 
established procedures by examining whether the indirect effect is statistically significant 
(e.g. MacKinnon et al. 2002; Preacher and Hayes 2004). The mediation analysis shows 
support for hypothesis 2. It reveals that directors’ willingness to restore justice partially 
mediates the relation between responsibility and compensation. That is, there is a significant 
indirect effect from responsibility over willingness to restore justice to compensation (coeff: 
-0.25, p<0.001, two-tailed). The 95% confidence interval for the indirect path does not 
include zero and thus supports mediation (-0.34, -0.15). The result suggests that directors 
pay a higher compensation to non-responsible managers in order to make up for the loss that 
managers experience from the recovery. The direct effect from responsibility to 
compensation is marginally significant (p=0.08, two-tailed), suggesting a partial mediation. 
That is, the effect of responsibility on compensation is at least in part attributable to the 
willingness to restore justice. The finding that there is no full mediation is not surprising. As 
mentioned before, other intentions may also have an effect on the difference in 
compensation. 
                                                 
19  I use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the model. The model has perfect fit because it is fully 
saturated. 
20  Mardia’s (1970), Henze and Zirkler’s (1990) and Doornik and Hansen’s (2008) tests all reject the 
hypothesis of multivariate normality. Under conditions of severe non-normality, multiple likelihood 
parameter estimates are likely to be inefficient (Schermelleh-Engel et al. 2003). 
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5.2.3 Supplemental Analysis 
Next, I examine the absolute levels of compensation more closely to provide additional 
insight into the direction and magnitude of the effects. Specifically, I compare the 
compensation levels set by directors to the previous period piece-rate of 10 cents. The 
previous period piece-rate is an arbitrarily chosen amount that may not be relevant for 
participants’ compensation decisions. However, previous research suggests that in absence 
of other information, individuals heavily rely on points of reference provided to them 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974). According to the anchoring heuristic, people use such 
starting points when making decisions even when they are uninformative (Chapman and 
Johnson 1999). The following analyses should be interpreted with care, as they depend on 
the presumption that people used the previous period piece-rate as a point of reference that 
denotes an adequate compensation for the average worker. Under this assumption, directors 
may make adjustments to this piece-rate when they believe that it does not correctly reflect 
what managers deserve. 
The mean compensation of Blue in the no responsibility condition is 11.7 cents. Compared 
to the previous period piece-rate of 10 cents this constitutes a significant increase (p<0.001, 
two-tailed). Thus, the increase in compensation can be viewed as a reimbursement for the 
recovery that was considered to be unfair. In fact, this compensation increase is likely to 
entirely offset the amount that managers previously had to return due to the clawback 
provision. I calculate the increase in Blue’s total compensation in the next period using the 
piece-rate of 11.7 cents, assuming the two players will perform identically as in the previous 
period. Blue’s new piece-rate results in an expected increase in Blue’s compensation of 20.4 
cents and comes close to the previous recovery of 20 cents. Thus, managers are almost 
perfectly restored to a situation where they did not have to return any money. The analysis 
provides some indication that within the experimental setting, people - in expectation - pay 
back to non-responsible managers the full amount of the recovery. While this finding is 
unlikely to be generalizable, it provides some additional evidence that directors are willing 
to reimburse non-responsible managers for clawback recoveries. 
5.2.4 Test of H3 - The Benefit of the Doubt 
In the third hypothesis I focus on the responsibility conditions only. I presume that directors’ 
compensation decisions about responsible managers depend on the cause of the previous 
restatement. I hypothesize that, compared to an error restatement, responsible managers are 
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compensated less in case of misconduct but receive similar amounts of compensation when 
the cause for the restatement is unknown. That is, I predict that directors give managers the 
benefit of the doubt by treating managers similarly to those in the error condition when the 
cause of the restatement is not known. I examine the compensation decisions of participants 
in conditions where managers are responsible for triggering the clawback. I use planned 
contrasts in a single factor ANOVA to test the pattern Error = Unknown > Misconduct, as 
predicted by H3. In comparison to the conventional ANOVA, contrast coding allows to 
specify the predicted pattern of relationships among cell means which provides a more 
powerful test of my hypothesis (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990). I apply contrast weights 
of +1 for the error and the unknown condition and -2 for the misconduct condition. I follow 
the 3-step procedure recommended by Guggenmos et al. (2018) to evaluate the contrast. 
First, I analyze how well the observed means fit the predicted pattern. The means of the error 
(9.80 cents) and the unknown (9.74 cents) conditions are similar in their level and higher 
than the mean of the misconduct condition (8.68), indicating that the contrast weights will 
fit the results. In a second step, I examine the significance of the contrast test as well as the 
non-significance of the residual between-cells variance (see Panel A of Table 3). In line with 
my hypothesis, the contrast is statistically significant (F1,101=4.02, p<0.05). The insignificant 
p-value of the residual between-cells variance (p=0.95) provides further support that the 
contrast results are not due to chance. In a third step, I evaluate the Contrast Variance 
Residual (q2), a measure to quantify the variance related to other potential effects present in 
the data. The q2 measure of 0.09% suggests that the unexplained non-random variance 
constitutes only a small fraction of the total between-cell variance. Overall, these pieces of 
complementary evidence provide support for my contrast hypothesis.  
Follow-up simple effects as presented in Panel B of Table 3 are also in line with the predicted 
pattern. There is a significant difference between the error and the misconduct condition as 
well as between the unknown and the misconduct condition (both, p<0.05, one-tailed). 
Conversely, the means of the error and the unknown condition do not differ (p=0.92). Results 
suggest that following clawback recoveries, directors compensate responsible managers less 
when the restatement was triggered due to misconduct compared to when it was triggered 
due to error. However, directors give managers the benefit of the doubt when the cause for 
a restatement is not known. 
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Having examined the conditions where managers are responsible for the restatement, I 
additionally investigate whether directors are influenced by the cause of the restatement 
when managers are not responsible. I expect that when a manager is not responsible for the 
restatement, the cause of the restatement will not matter for directors’ compensation 
decisions. A single factor ANOVA of the three levels of cause of the no responsibility 
manipulation does not reject the hypothesis that the groups have the same means (p=0.33). 
Thus, directors’ decisions are unlikely to be influenced by the cause of a restatement when 
TABLE 3 
Test of H3: The Benefit of the Doubt 
Panel A: Planned Contrasts for Compensation 
Source of Variation  SS  df  MS  F-statistic  p-value 
Model Contrast (+1, -2, +1)a  25.89  1  25.89  4.02  <0.05 
Residual between-cells varianceb  0.02  1  0.02  0.00  0.95 
Total between-cells variance  25.91  2  12.96  2.01  0.14 
           
Error  649.74  101  6.43     
Total  675.65  103       
           
Contrast Variance Residualc (q2)  0.09%         
Panel B: Simple Effects 
      
Comparison    df  F-statistic  p-value 
Error vs. Misconduct    1  3.22  0.038d 
Unknown vs. Misconduct    1  2.98  0.044d 
Error vs. Unknown    1  0.01  0.916 
Panel A presents the contrast coded test of hypothesis 3, residual between-cells variance test, as well as the 
contrast variance residual (q2). Panel B presents simple main effects. 
a +1 for the Responsibility/Error condition; 
-2 for the Responsibility/Misconduct condition; 
+1 for the Responsibility/Unknown condition; 
b The residual sum of squares is the between-group variance that is unexplained by the model contrast. The 
model contrast explains the variation in the data well when the residual is insignificant (Buckless and 
Ravencroft 1990). 
c The Contrast Variance Residual (q2) is the proportion of between-cells variance that is left unexplained by the 
contrast. 
d One-tailed equivalent 
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they are asked to set the compensation of a manager who was not responsible for triggering 
the clawback. 
5.2.5 Test of H4 - Mediation Analysis 
Having found evidence for the benefit of the doubt effect in terms of compensation levels 
for responsible managers, I examine the process that is underlying participants’ 
compensation decisions. I argue that the compensation decisions are driven by directors’ 
perception about how opportunistic a manager is. That is, I claim that after learning about 
the cause of the restatement, directors will form beliefs about the likelihood of the manager’s 
intentional misreporting. I expect that directors assess a responsible manager’s opportunism 
to be higher when the restatement is due to misconduct than when it is due to error. However, 
directors are unlikely to perceive the manager’s opportunism to differ after an error 
restatement compared to when the cause for the restatement is unknown. 
In the experimental instructions, participants learned that only a part of the output is subject 
to a quality control. As a consequence, there may exist units of low quality output that are 
not detected by the control mechanism. In the post-experiment questionnaire I ask 
participants to indicate the likelihood that Blue intentionally distorted the output that was 
not subject to the quality control on a scale from 0 (very unlikely) to 100 (very likely). The 
answer to this question reflects participants’ expectations about how opportunistically the 
manager acts. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics by condition (Panel A) along with two-
sample t-tests to compare each pair of causes (Panel B). As expected, the mean perception 
of manager’s opportunism is significantly higher in the misconduct condition than in the 
error (p<0.001, two-tailed) and in the unknown (p<0.001, two-tailed) condition. However, 
judgments about managerial opportunism do not differ between the error and the unknown 
condition (p=0.75, two-tailed). 
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I examine whether participants’ perceptions of the manager's opportunism mediate the 
relationship between the cause of the restatement and participants’ compensation decisions. 
I follow the mediation analysis for multicategorical variables as proposed by Hayes and 
Preacher (2014). I use indicator variables to represent the three levels of my manipulation 
for cause of the restatement (error, misconduct, or unknown). Specifically, two indicator 
variables take the value of one if the cause for the low quality output is unknown or due to 
error respectively, and zero otherwise. Doing so allows me to compare the unknown and the 
error conditions to the misconduct condition which is used as a baseline. I predict that 
compared to the misconduct condition, both, the error and the unknown condition are 
associated with higher levels of compensation and that this effect is mediated by participants’ 
perceptions of manager’s opportunism. I also expect that the size of the mediated effect will 
not differ between the error and unknown conditions. 
Based on the terminology of indirect, direct and total effect to describe mediation models, 
Hayes and Preacher (2014) introduce the terms relative indirect, direct and total effect to 
TABLE 4 
Perception of the Manager's Opportunism for Participants in the Responsibility 
Conditions 
Panel A: Means, [Standard Deviation], Number of Observations for Perception of the 
Manager's Opportunisma 















Panel B: t-tests for Perception of the Manager's Opportunism 
Comparisons 
(for Responsibility conditions) 
Difference df t-value  p-value
Error = Unknown 1.8 71 0.32  0.750 
Error < Misconduct 46.7 64 -7.93  <0.001 
Unknown < Misconduct 44.9 67 -7.98  <0.001 
Panel A shows the means, standard deviations, and number of observations for the participants' assessments of 
perception of the manager's opportunism. Panel B provides the two sample t-tests for each pair of causes. Tests 
are reported two-tailed. 
a The perception of the manager's opportunism was assessed by asking participants to indicate the likelihood 
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refer to the effects of each indicator variable (unknown, error) with respect to the control 
group (misconduct). To analyze the mediation, I examine the significance of the relative 
indirect effects of unknown and error compared to the baseline condition (misconduct). 
FIGURE 4 
Mediation of Perception of the Manager’s Oppurtunism 
 
Relative indirect effects The relative indirect effect for each indicator variable (error, unknown) relative 
to the baseline (misconduct) is the effect on compensation that passes through the 
mediator (perception of the manager's opportunism). 
Relative direct effects: The relative direct effect of each indicator variable (error, unknown) relative to 
the baseline (misconduct) is the effect on compensation when controlling for 
mediator (perception of the manager's opportunism). 
Relative total effects: The relative total effects represent the sum of the relative direct and the relative 
indirect effect of each indicator variable (error, unknown) compared to the 
baseline (misconduct). 
This figure shows bootstrapped structural equation modeling results to test a mediation effect of the willingness 
to restore justice. The dependent variable is participants' assessment of the piece-rate that Blue would earn in 
the next period from 1 cent to 19 cents. To measure the willingness to restore justice, participants rate the extent 
to which their compensation decision is attributable to their intention to reimburse Blue because Blue had to 
pay back part of his compensation in the previous period. I present standardized coefficients and corresponding 
p-values next to each link. All reported p-values are two-tailed. 
 
 
I use SEM to analyze the mediation and employ bootstrapping (5,000 replications) due to a 
violation of the multivariate normality assumption (Cheung 2007). The mediation analysis 
using standardized coefficients is presented in Figure 4 and provides supporting evidence 
for the expected relationship. First, I find that participants in the error condition pay a 
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significantly higher compensation to managers relative to the misconduct condition (relative 
total effect: +0.208, p = 0.044). The effect is mediated by the perception of the manager’s 
opportunism. That is, when comparing error to misconduct, the relative indirect effect over 
subjects’ perception of the manager’s opportunism to compensation is highly significant 
(+0.243, p = 0.003) and the 95% confidence interval does not include zero (+0.08, +0.40). 
Second, I find higher compensation levels in the unknown compared to the misconduct 
condition (relative total effect: +0.200, p = 0.056). The relative indirect effect over 
participants’ perception of manager’s opportunism to compensation is also significant 
(+0.238, p= 0.003) and the 95% confidence interval does not include zero (+0.08, +0.39). 
The results suggest that the compensation levels can be explained by differences in the 
perception of the manager’s opportunism. The insignificant relative direct effects for both, 
error and unknown compared to misconduct suggest a full mediation. I additionally examine 
whether the mediated effects of error and unknown are different in size. Untabulated tests 
reveal that there is no statistically significant difference between coefficient estimates of the 
relative indirect effects (χ2(1) = 0.11, p = 0.746, two-tailed). Furthermore, a likelihood ratio 
test suggests that the proposed model is not superior to an alternative model where the 
indicators are pooled into a variable that takes the value of one for misconduct and zero 
otherwise (χ2(2) = -113.87 , p = 1.00, two-tailed). The results indicate that, relative to 
misconduct, the mediation effects of error and unknown do not differ. 
5.2.6 Supplemental Analysis 
I further examine the levels of compensation that subjects chose for responsible managers. 
On average, directors set a piece-rate of 8.7 cents when the responsible manager engaged in 
misconduct. The piece-rate was 9.8 cents in case of error and 9.7 cents when the cause of the 
restatement was unknown. Compared to Blue’s previous period piece-rate of 10 cents, the 
levels of Blue’s compensation in the error and unknown conditions do not significantly differ 
(both p>0.56). Thus, when the cause of the restatement is an error or is unknown, directors 
consider the clawback recovery as a remedy for the excess compensation paid out to 
managers and continue to pay similar levels of compensation to managers as in the previous 
period. Conversely, following a restatement due to misconduct, directors decrease 
responsible managers’ compensation significantly (p=0.001). This reduction in the piece-
rate is likely to constitute a punishment in addition to the recovery.  
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6. Conclusion 
My study demonstrates that after clawback recoveries, directors will favor managers in two 
distinct ways. First, directors are likely to increase the compensation of non-responsible 
managers to make up for their clawback-induced recoveries. Regulators should consider this 
potential consequence when mandating clawback policies. That is, when clawback policies 
recover compensation independent of the manager’s responsibility, directors may use their 
discretion in setting future management compensation to offset the recoveries of non-
responsible managers. Such behavior contradicts the regulator’s intention to return excess 
compensation to shareholders and thus renders the clawback mandate partly obsolete. 
Additional regulation that restricts the amount of management compensation following 
recoveries may be necessary to prevent compensatory payments. The finding is especially 
relevant for the SEC when formulating the final rules on how to implement the DFA-
clawback. 
Second, directors will give responsible managers the benefit of the doubt when the cause for 
the restatement is unknown. That is, following clawback recoveries, the board of directors 
will pay an undue amount of compensation to misreporting managers when the directors do 
not know the cause for the restatement. This effect may harm investors in two ways. First, 
managers may receive compensation that actually belongs to shareholders. Second, the non-
optimal compensation decision may impair the incentive alignment between managers and 
shareholders. The payout differential between high performing and poor performing 
managers is reduced which weakens the pay-for-performance sensitivity (Fried and Shilon 
2011). Thus, investors should be aware that a clawback does not necessarily improve 
managers’ reporting incentives. In contrast, managers’ incentives for misreporting may even 
increase following clawback adoption when managers anticipate directors’ lenient 
compensation decisions when the cause of the restatement is unknown. That is, managers 
may increase intentional misreporting if they are able to conceal information about the cause 
of the restatement. I leave it to future research to examine whether managers anticipate 
directors’ compensation decisions following clawback recoveries. 
My findings also speak to researchers by providing a contribution to the literature on 
unintended effects of compensation clawbacks. The study suggests that the board of directors 
may react to clawback initiation in unexpected ways. That is, directors will use their 
discretion in setting management compensation to avoid that managers feel unfairly treated. 
This finding provides some indication that directors incorporate justice considerations into 
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their compensation decisions that may lead to a deviation of managers’ total compensation 
from true performance. As such, the clawback mandate is likely to distort managers’ pay-
for-performance incentives. In sum, my study shows that director behavior needs to be 
factored in when mandating governance mechanisms. 
The effects found in this study are likely to be reinforced by two phenomena documented in 
practice. First, directors may be influenced in their compensation decisions by the ties that 
often exist between board members and managers (Carcello et al. 2011; Rose et al. 2014). 
Such ties affect board members’ social and psychological incentives to favor managers with 
increased compensation (Bebchuk and Fried 2004). Thus, directors may be even more 
inclined to reimburse non-responsible managers after a recovery and to give responsible 
managers the benefit of the doubt. Second, the problem of excessive compensation is 
exacerbated by the observation that compensation is sticky (Keynes 1964). Wage stickiness 
theory predicts that compensation increases are likely to persist over time (Gaver and Gaver 
1998). As such, directors’ compensation decisions that favor managers may carry over to 
future periods and may harm the firm in the long-run. 
A limitation of this study is that the experiment was conducted with participants who are 
unlikely to have any experience as directors. I argue that the results are due to fundamental 
psychological effects, and thus independent of the type of subjects. However, to the extent 
that board members develop skills that allow them to overcome justice considerations in the 
described situation, the applicability of my results in practice is limited.21 
Another potential limitation of my study is its abstract setting. The use of an abstract 
experiment allows me to isolate my variables of interest while controlling for firm and 
environmental characteristics. However, the incentive structure only captures the most 
important aspects of a clawback environment. Factors not captured in my design may affect 
the results in a real world setting. For example, I hold the compensation and the reputation 
of directors’ constant in my experimental setting. Negative reputational consequences for 
directors from favoring managers after recoveries may weaken my results. Similarly, when 
board members have strong financial incentives to maximize firm value they may be less 
lenient when setting management compensation. However, prior research suggests that 
directors suffer from severe reputational consequences only when their compensation 
arrangements for managers are outrageous (Bebchuk and Fried 2004). Also, directors’ 
                                                 
21  Contrary to this argument, Singer (1996) documents that managerial professionals make similar 
evaluations of moral intensity, fairness, and ethicality as M-Turkers. 
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incentive-based compensation usually plays a minor role in their compensation schemes 
(Fried and Shilon 2011). Nonetheless, director compensation or reputation may interact with 
their compensation decisions about managers and harm the generalizability of my results.  
Modifying aspects in my experiment such as increasing directors’ financial incentives or 
allowing for reputational effects may represent interesting areas for future research. Also, an 
extension of the experiment could investigate differing forms of responsibility that may exist 
for triggering the restatement in more detail. The Financial Choice Act proposes to limit the 
scope of the clawback to managers who have both authority and control over the financial 
reporting that led to the restatement. Future research could shed light on how each of the two 
dimensions affects directors’ justice perceptions about managers following clawback 
recoveries. Future research could additionally examine how directors’ judgments are 
influenced by differing justifications for the cause of a restatement provided by managers. 
After a restatement, managers may provide explanations about the reason for the restatement 
(Files et al. 2009; Gleason et al. 2008; Myers et al. 2010; Plumlee and Yohn 2010b). These 
explanations may affect board members’ attributions of blame and eventually their 
compensation decisions.  
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Abstract 
We examine whether the introduction of a clawback mandate renders non-professional investors less 
skeptical toward real earnings management (REM). Clawbacks make executive compensation 
subject to recovery in case of overstated financial statements. We predict that a clawback mandate 
creates a general feeling of security that impairs investors’ skepticism toward REM, although 
clawbacks do not offer any protection against REM. In particular, we posit that investors fall prey to 
a judgment error, called halo effect, that lets investors judge the likelihood of REM based on their 
overall impression of the firm’s potential for opportunistic behavior. Results of a controlled 
experiment suggest that investors are less likely to detect REM when a clawback is mandated, and 
consequently consider an investment in the firm to be more desirable. We also document that the 
halo effect is stronger for firms with a prior history of misreporting. Our findings provide a potential 
explanation for the puzzling results reported in previous research that investors react positively to 
clawback adoption although a firm’s long-term value appears to be negatively affected by the 
clawback because of increased REM. These seemingly inconsistent findings can be reconciled with 
investors being misled by the protective nature of the clawback. Interestingly, a supplemental 
experiment shows that the halo effect does not apply to more sophisticated investors. In view of the 
imminent enforcement of mandatory clawbacks in the United States, our study has important 
implications for regulators by informing them about a potential judgment error among less 
sophisticated investors. 
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1. Introduction 
Executive compensation schemes frequently include incentive compensation to mitigate 
effort aversion (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Mehran 1995). However, incentive compensation 
also fosters managers’ incentives to manipulate accounting information to maximize their 
pay (Dehaan et al. 2013). Compensation clawbacks are an instrument to discourage 
accounting manipulations by making incentive compensation subject to recovery if financial 
information is overstated. In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act has mandated compensation 
clawbacks in the United States but the rule is yet to be implemented.1 
To date, little is known about potential consequences of clawback mandates. Some indication 
is provided by the literature that examines the effects of voluntary clawback adoption. 
Numerous studies report positive market reactions to the voluntary adoption of clawbacks 
suggesting that investors view clawbacks as a beneficial corporate governance instrument 
(Babenko et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2015; Gao et al. 2011; Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2013). 
However, there is no indication that clawback adoption actually decreases managers’ 
opportunistic behavior. In contrast, prior research finds that, while a clawback effectively 
decreases accrual-based earnings management (AEM), managers continue to manipulate 
financial reports using increased real earnings management (REM) (Chan et al. 2015; Hales 
et al. 2018). Given that REM comprises managers’ deliberate use of non-optimal operating 
transactions to influence the financial report (Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005), such 
manipulations do not violate generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and are not 
subject to clawback recovery (Carcello et al. 2006). In addition, results suggest that the shift 
from AEM to REM impairs future firm value (Chan et al. 2015). The adverse consequences 
on firm value reported by Chan et al. (2015) are difficult to reconcile with the positive 
investor reactions to clawback adoption reported in previous studies. That is, if investors 
fully anticipate the potential negative effects of clawback adoption on firm value, they should 
not react positively to clawback adoption. Investigating clawbacks in a mandatory setting, 
we provide an explanation for these seemingly incompatible results. 
Denis (2012) argues that a clawback mandate turns investors into too credulous consumers 
of financial information. Similarly, we propose that a clawback initiates a general feeling of 
security that leads investors to worry less about opportunistic behavior. This overall feeling 
                                                 
1  Section 954 of the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” was signed into law 
in 2010. To date, the rule has not been enforced by the Securities and Exchange Commission. However, 
a proposal for the amendment of the clawback mandate is pending in the Senate. 
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of being protected against opportunistic behavior creates a halo effect, rendering investors 
less wary of any type of earnings manipulations. Therefore, we predict that the introduction 
of a clawback mandate makes investors less skeptical toward REM although the clawback 
does not inhibit this particular earnings manipulation strategy. 
In contrast, rational investors not subject to the halo effect should actually be more skeptical 
toward REM following a clawback mandate. This is because rational investors should 
anticipate that managers are likely to substitute AEM with REM under a clawback mandate. 
By deterring AEM, the clawback comparatively increases managers’ propensity to use 
alternative earnings manipulation strategies not subject to the clawback provision, such as 
REM. A sufficiently skeptical investor should envisage the potential substitution in 
manipulations and thus should be more skeptical toward REM. Overall, the halo effect may 
harm investors by making them less skeptical about potential real earnings manipulations, 
despite managers’ incentives to increase REM following a clawback mandate. 
Additionally, we expect that investors’ reactions to a clawback mandate depend on a firm’s 
prior reporting history. Investors usually view firms that issued a restatement in the past with 
increased skepticism because they doubt the firm’s intent to produce undistorted financials 
in the future (Anderson and Yohn 2002; Hribar and Jenkins 2004; Nguyen and Puri 2014). 
Investors are likely to consider a restatement as an indication that the management is willing 
to also engage in opportunistic behavior in related settings (Chakravarthy et al. 2014). 
Therefore, we expect investors to be more skeptical toward REM when a firm has previously 
issued a restatement. However, the implementation of corporate governance instruments, 
such as a clawback, can restore investor confidence in such firms (Wiedman and Hendricks 
2013). Clawbacks are likely to be regarded as a remedy for investors’ increased concerns 
about opportunistic behavior (Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2013). We thus predict the effect of a 
clawback mandate to be stronger for firms with a previous restatement. That is, following 
the initiation of clawbacks, we expect the decrease in investor skepticism with regard to 
REM to be larger for firms that previously had to issue an accounting restatement compared 
to firms without a previous restatement. Lastly, we posit that the decrease in investor 
skepticism toward REM initiated by the clawback translates into a higher desirability to 
invest in the firm. 
We test our hypotheses using a laboratory experiment. Students assume the role of non-
professional investors and analyze the financial report of a hypothetical firm. The report 
contains apparent manipulations of real earnings that are likely to have negative future 
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consequences for the firm. We manipulate the presence of a clawback and the reporting 
history of the firm. To capture investor skepticism toward REM we elicit participants’ 
detection of REM in the report. The results are largely in line with our predictions and 
indicate that clawbacks provoke a decrease in investor skepticism toward REM. 
Furthermore, investors are more suspicious of REM of firms with a previous restatement. 
However, the presence of a clawback decreases investor skepticism toward REM more for 
firms with a previous restatement than for firms with no prior history of misreporting. 
Finally, our results indicate that the investor bias ultimately affects investors’ investment 
desirability. The presence of a clawback mandate increases investors’ perceived desirability 
to invest in the firm. This effect is mediated by investors’ skepticism toward REM. 
We additionally test our hypotheses using business professionals to examine whether the 
halo effect of a clawback mandate persists for more sophisticated investors. However, using 
a sample of experienced participants from accounting-related professions, we do not find 
support for any of our hypothesized effects. In particular, participants’ skepticism toward 
REM does not differ between conditions and the presence of a clawback mandate does not 
affect participants’ investment desirability. In sum, the results suggest that sophisticated 
investors are not subject to the halo effect that we find for less sophisticated investors. 
Our research contributes to the body of research on unintended effects of compensation 
clawbacks by examining potential negative effects of mandatory clawbacks. We detect a 
clawback-induced bias among non-professional investors that is likely to adversely affect 
their investment decisions. Prior literature shows that behavioral biases may persist in 
financial markets (Daniel et al. 2002). The resulting misallocation of capital is likely to 
deplete shareholder value. More so, a false sense of security with respect to REM leaves 
investors vulnerable to management’s discretion. Investors are more susceptible to the bias 
when analyzing firms with a previous restatement, providing managers of such firms with a 
large potential to manipulate their reports using REM without being adequately sanctioned. 
Non-professional investors are likely to suffer most from the judgment bias. This clearly 
works against the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) efforts to protect individual 
investors (White 2014). In view of the imminent enforcement of mandatory compensation 
clawbacks in the U.S., our study helps to reveal potential adverse effects of clawbacks before 
their actual implementation. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide background on 
clawbacks and review the history and evolution of clawbacks. Section 3 develops our 
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hypotheses drawing on previous literature and theory. Section 4 describes the experiment 




Companies commonly use performance-contingent bonus schemes to motivate managers. 
However, incentive-based pay may also increase the risk of earnings management. In 
particular, managers may try to increase short-term compensation instead of following the 
owners’ objective of long-term value maximization. Fama (1980) suggests that future wage 
revisions serve as an ex-post settling up mechanism to mitigate the problem. Compensation 
clawbacks constitute one such instrument to address differing time horizons of owners and 
managers (Babenko et al. 2017). 
Clawbacks are contractual agreements between a firm and its executives that specify 
conditions under which the firm can recover previously paid out compensation (Sharp 2012). 
The conditions that trigger the clawback may vary widely and can range from misstated 
accounting information to excessive risk-taking. Thereby, clawbacks provide a means to 
better link executive compensation to compliance. In practice, the most widely used trigger 
of clawbacks is the issuance of an accounting restatement (Dehaan et al. 2013). Firms publish 
accounting restatements to correct previously issued financial statements if they contain a 
material inaccuracy, i.e. do not provide an accurate description of the firm’s financial 
condition. Material inaccuracies may be due to AEM.2 Prior research provides evidence that 
self-dealing executives engage in AEM to increase their performance-based compensation 
(Burns and Keida 2006; Efendi et al. 2007; Healy 1985). By recovering compensation from 
managers who publish misstated accounting information, clawbacks work as an effective ex-
post settling-up mechanism (Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2013). Moreover, the mere threat of the 
compensation recovery should lower executive’s incentives to engage in AEM in the first 
place. This argument is further backed as there may be reputational consequences of 
clawback activation (Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2013). Taken together, by allowing to recover 
                                                 
2  Material inaccuracies may also be due to unintentional accounting errors. However, the focus of this study 
in on intentional manipulations. 
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incentive-based pay that was based on incorrect financial statements, the clawback more 
directly links compensation to management’s behavior (Hodge and Winn 2012). 
In absence of clawback provisions, a firm could still file a lawsuit based on unjust enrichment 
in the event of managerial misconduct.3 A lawsuit would allow the firm to reclaim 
compensation using judicial means. However, the burden of proof in such a case is much 
larger (Addy and Yoder 2011).4 
2.2 Institutional Background 
Since the first introduction of compensation clawbacks in the U.S in 2002, regulators made 
several attempts to mandate clawback provisions. Appendix A presents the timeline with the 
most important events regarding clawback initiation in the U.S. and Appendix B provides an 
overview of the main features of previous clawback mandates. 
Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 initiated mandatory clawbacks in the 
U.S for stock exchange-listed firms. The regulation rules that any bonus and incentive-based 
pay of CEOs and CFOs is subject to recovery if the firm has to restate its earnings due to 
material noncompliance as a result of misconduct (U.S. House of Representatives 2002). The 
SEC has the sole authority to enforce this provision. However, the SEC has only litigated a 
handful of cases because of its constrained resources (Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2013) and the 
difficulty to prove misconduct as cause for a restatement (Fried and Shilon 2011). 
During the financial crisis of 2007-2008, U.S. regulators took a second attempt at initiating 
mandatory clawbacks. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) made all 
recipients of federal bailout funds under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) subject 
to a clawback.5 The clawback’s scope was later extended under the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA).6 To date, the clawback is of decreasing relevance (The 
Department of the Treasury 2015).7 
                                                 
3  In the common law, the “faithless servant doctrine” allows to reclaim compensation in the event of breach 
of fiduciary duty, but only in “egregious” situations (Schneider 2010). 
4  Lawsuits only cover major cases where misconduct can clearly be proven. In contrast, clawbacks can be 
designed flexibly and apply to small cases as well. Also, clawbacks are more efficient as no costly 
litigation is needed (Kroos et al. 2018). 
5  See Section 111(b)(2)(B) of the EESA. 
6  See Section 111(b)(3)(B) of the ARRA. 
7  For an overview of the recipients that are still subject to the TARP program see: 
https://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list/index 
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In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) imposed a restatement-triggered clawback on all firms 
listed at U.S. securities exchanges. The DFA placed major regulations on the financial 
industry to improve accountability and transparency in the financial system. Section 954 
requires the SEC to instruct U.S. securities exchanges to demand the adoption of clawbacks 
from their issuers. Importantly, compared to the SOX-clawback, the DFA-clawback 
regulation abandons the misconduct requirement and requires firms themselves (e.g. the 
board or the compensation committee) to enforce the recovery provision. Also, the DFA-
clawback extends the scope of the provision to all former and current executive officers (SEC 
2015).8 Despite being signed into law, the DFA-clawback is not yet enforced. On July 1, 
2015 the SEC issued a proposed rule that is not yet finalized. Currently, a new bill, the 
Financial Choice Act (FCA), proposes to limit the DFA-clawback’s scope to executives who 
had “control and authority over the financial reporting that resulted in the accounting 
restatement”. The FCA has yet to be voted on by the Senate and is likely to further delay the 
adoption of final rules by the securities exchanges. Until then, the decision, whether a firm 
includes a clawback in the compensation contract of their managers remains voluntary. 
Voluntary adoption of clawbacks began following the introduction of the SOX in 2002. In 
2006, firms with voluntary clawbacks in place were encouraged to disclose them.9 The 
number of firms that have adopted clawbacks voluntarily has rapidly increased over the last 
two decades (Babenko et al. 2017; Rappeport 2008). Firms have great flexibility in how to 
structure voluntarily adopted clawbacks. Features like clawback triggers, look-back period, 
employees covered, or compensation components subject to recapture may differ 
significantly from the DFA-clawback.10 However, the DFA will set a minimum standard for 
clawbacks in the U.S., as soon as properly enforced.  
3. Previous Research, Theory, and Hypothesis Development 
Whereas research on mandatory clawbacks is scarce, most of the empirical literature 
examines the adoption of voluntary clawbacks in the U.S. Archival research largely finds 
positive stock market reactions to voluntary clawback announcements (Babenko et al. 2017; 
Chen et al. 2015; Gao et al. 2011; Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2013). Furthermore, studies report 
investors’ perceived reporting quality to increase (Chan et al. 2012; Dehaan et al. 2013; 
                                                 
8  The DFA-clawback additionally differs from the SOX-clawback in that it sets the look-back period to 3 
years and only makes the erroneously paid out bonus (excess pay) subject to recovery rather than the total 
bonus. 
9  See Section 402(b)(2)(viii) of regulation S-K. 
10  Beck (2015) provides an overview of the defining features of voluntary clawback policies. 
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Huang et al. 2016). Interestingly, investor reactions are strongest for firms with previous 
reporting problems, i.e. firms that issued a previous restatement (Huang et al. 2016; Iskandar-
Datta and Jia 2013). These findings suggest that clawbacks are regarded as a valuable 
corporate governance instrument by investors who may consider the provisions as a fix for 
managerial incentive problems. 
Research also observes adverse effects of clawback adoption. Because clawbacks aim to 
deter AEM, one stand of literature focuses on whether managers try to influence investors 
by using means not subject to the clawback. The literature documents that, following 
clawback adoption, managers both increase the frequency and decrease the quality of non-
GAAP earnings disclosures (Kyung et al. 2019), and publish financial reports that are less 
readable (Bao et al. 2018). However, potentially the most striking negative consequence of 
clawback adoption is that managers switch to alternative practices of opportunistically 
manipulating earnings. In particular, Chan et al. (2015) find that managers substitute AEM 
with REM. As REM does not violate GAAP, it does not trigger clawback recovery 
(Commerford et al. 2018). The findings reported by Chan et al. (2015) are supported by 
experimental evidence from Hales et al. (2018) who also document a substitution effect 
between AEM and REM when clawbacks are adopted. The substitution of AEM with REM 
following clawback adoption is particularly problematic because Chan et al. (2015) find that 
the switch of manipulations harms long-term firm value.11 
The positive stock market response following clawback announcements (Iskandar-Datta and 
Jia 2013) is difficult to reconcile with Chan et al.’s (2015) finding of long-term firm value 
depletion from increased REM. Specifically, if investors anticipate the negative long-term 
effects of clawback adoption, they should not react positively to the clawback adoption. 
When analyzing financial statements to examine a potential investment in a firm, investors 
should take potential opportunistic manipulations of reports into account. Extant research 
provides indication that financial statements contain earnings manipulations (Burgstahler and 
Dichev 1997; Healy 1985; Roychowdhury 2006). To the extent that investors do not detect 
these manipulations, they may be deceived (Dechow and Skinner 2000). That is, when 
assessing the value of a firm, they may base their evaluation on wrong expectations (Strobl 
2013). Conversely, if investors are aware of manipulations, they can discount the financial 
information and rely less on the published numbers (Healy and Wahlen 1999). 
                                                 
11  Extant research reports negative long-term consequences of REM (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Gunny 
2005; Vorst 2016). 
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The extent to which investors detect potential manipulations is likely to be a function of how 
skeptically they analyze the reports with respect to earnings management. Investors may be 
particularly wary of earnings manipulations, when managers have strong incentives to 
misreport (Cressey 1953; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Mercer 2004). By recouping managerial 
pay that is based on overstated financial statements, a clawback is likely to weaken 
managers’ incentives to engage in AEM (Chen et al. 2015). Therefore, investors may rely 
more strongly on financial statements when a firm has adopted a clawback provision (Chan 
et al. 2012; Dehaan et al. 2013). Importantly however, the clawback does not generally deter 
managers’ propensity to engage in opportunistic behavior. In contrast, a clawback may 
actually increase managers’ incentives to engage in REM. That is, because clawbacks make 
AEM more costly for executives who face increased risk of losing their bonus, managers’ 
relative costs of engaging in REM decrease (Chan et al. 2015). Managers thus have an 
incentive to substitute AEM with REM (Drymiotes 2011; Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005; Zang 
2012).12 
Considering the likely increase in managers’ propensity to engage in REM, a rational 
investor should assess the financial statements of a firm with a clawback with increased 
skepticism toward REM. However, investors may not always act rationally, as they are likely 
to be subject to cognitive limitations that prevent them from fully incorporating all available 
information (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003). To reduce processing costs, they rely on simplified 
heuristics and decision shortcuts that make them prone to biases (DeBondt and Thaler 1995; 
Hirshleifer 2001; Kahneman and Riepe 1998). The extent to which information initiates 
effortful cognitive processing seems to be largely driven by situational and social cues 
(Smith and Semin 2004). We investigate whether the presence of clawback policies serves 
as a cue that lets investors fall prey to a cognitive bias, called the halo effect. 
3.1 The Halo Effect 
The halo effect is a simplifying heuristic used by evaluators who rate specific dimensions of 
an entity on the basis of their global judgment of the entity, rather than evaluating each 
dimension independently (Leuthesser et al. 1995; Nathan and Tippins 1990). The halo effect 
was first observed by Thorndike (1920). He noticed that individuals tend to rate traits of 
                                                 
12  The substitution effect between AEM and REM has already been documented for different regulations 
that restrict managers’ potential to engage in AEM, such as the SOX (Bartov and Cohen 2009; Cohen et 
al. 2008) or the adoption of stricter accounting standards such as IFRS (Ferentinou and Anagnostopoulou 
2016; Ho et al. 2015; Ipino and Parbonetti 2016). 
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another person (specific dimensions) according to their overall impression of that person 
(global judgment). An example of the halo effect is that people ascribe more favorable 
personality traits and more successful life outcomes to attractive people (Eagly et al. 1991). 
Thus, people are unable to judge the separate qualities of a person without being influenced 
by their general feeling of the person.13 The effect occurs because individuals generally adopt 
a top-down, categorization-based strategy (compared to a bottom-up, data-driven strategy) 
for processing ratee-related information (Nathan and Lord 1983; Lance et al. 1991). This 
categorization-based strategy reduces processing effort and use of cognitive resources (Fiske 
and Neuberg 1990).14 
Importantly, the halo effect is not solely applicable to evaluating individuals but is much 
more general. For instance, the halo effect has been shown to be present for evaluations of 
objects, organizations, or technologies (Soper 2014). In accounting, the halo effect has 
mainly been studied in the context of auditing. Several studies document that overall 
impressions of a firm may influence auditors’ skepticism when evaluating accounting 
details. O’Donnell and Schultz (2005) find that that auditors’ overall strategic risk 
assessments determine auditors’ ability to recognize inconsistent audit evidence contained 
in accounting details. Grambling et al. (2013) provide evidence that auditors who are made 
aware that an unrelated material weakness has been identified by the audit team, are more 
likely to assess a control deficiency as a material weakness. Hatherly et al. (1991) find that 
expanded audit reports create an overall impression of well-being, which spills over into 
dimensions not addressed by the expansion of the report. That is, when the audit report 
includes expanded wording, auditors perceive financial statements to be more credible and 
are less wary of fraud risk. The studies in audit research suggest that auditors fall prey to 
halo effects which may influence their skepticism. The halo effect has been applied to 
investors as well. Wang and Tuttle (2014) document that investors use CSR-information to 
form overall impressions of a company. They draw on their general impressions to assess 
the credibility of financial information as well as the valuation of the company. That is, the 
halo created by a good CSR-report increases firm value because investors assess the financial 
information to be more credible. 
                                                 
13  The halo effect has also been documented in accounting research. Studies in performance evaluation have 
shown that supervisors attend to general impressions when evaluating specific performance dimensions 
of an employee (Bol and Smith 2011; Fox et al. 1983; Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Tan and Jamal 2001). 
14  The tendency to confirm overall judgments in specific dimensions is likely to be due to the need to reduce 
cognitive dissonance between the global judgment and the judgment of specific dimensions (Beckwith 
and Lehmann 1975). 
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We posit that investors fall prey to the halo effect when assessing the risk of REM in financial 
reports. In particular, we examine whether, following a clawback initiation, investors assess 
the likelihood of REM on the basis of their overall impression of the likelihood of 
opportunistic behavior. We posit that the presence of a clawback serves as a cue that 
investors use to judge the likelihood that financial statements are influenced by opportunistic 
behavior. Aimed at deterring misreporting, the clawback is likely to be regarded as indication 
that investors need to worry less about opportunistic behavior. That is, the clawback may 
generate a general feeling of security on the part of investors, making them less concerned 
about manipulations of financial statements (Denis 2012). We posit that the general feeling 
of security induced by the compensation clawback (global judgment) creates a halo effect 
when investors assess specific types of opportunistic behavior such as the likelihood of AEM 
and REM (specific dimensions). Thus, we predict that investors judge the likelihood of REM 
based on their overall impression of the firm’s potential for opportunistic behavior, rather 
than evaluating the risk of REM independently. As a consequence, they become less 
skeptical toward REM. 
H1: Investors are less skeptical toward REM when a clawback is present than when no 
clawback is present. 
3.2 Previous Restatements 
If a firm has to issue a restatement, investors learn that the report contains misrepresentations 
and that the published accounting information cannot be relied on (Anderson and Yohn 2002; 
Palmrose and Scholz 2004; Wu 2002). A restatement also challenges the firm’s intent to 
produce undistorted financials in the future (Anderson and Yohn 2002; Hribar and Jenkins 
2004; Nguyen and Puri 2014). Therefore, investors will be more wary of opportunistic 
behavior when evaluating financial information in subsequent years. Investors are likely to 
view the restatement as a signal for the willingness of the management to also engage in 
opportunistic behavior in related settings (Chakravarthy et al. 2014). Thus, restating firms 
are more suspicious of earnings manipulations of any kind, including REM. We posit that 
when assessing a firm that had to issue a restatement in the past, investors are more skeptical 
toward REM. 
H2: Investors are more skeptical toward REM when a firm has previously restated its
earnings than when a firm has no previous restatement. 
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3.3 Clawbacks and Previous Restatements 
We expect that the incidence of a previous restatement and the presence of a clawback have 
interactive effects on investor skepticism toward REM. In particular, we posit that a 
clawback decreases investors’ skepticism toward REM more when a firm has issued a 
previous restatement than when a firm has no prior history of misreporting. 
Firms take a variety of measures in order to relief the burden of increased investor skepticism 
subsequent to a restatement. Investors’ concerns about future misbehavior may be mitigated 
when firms dismiss the management (Desai et al. 2006), increase corporate governance 
(Wiedman and Hendricks 2013) or use extraordinary communication strategies (Elliot et al. 
2012). The enforcement of regulations to increase reporting quality may also alleviate 
investors’ increased concerns about managerial opportunism (Li et al. 2008). We believe that 
the presence of a mandatory clawback may similarly soothe investors’ increased concerns 
about opportunistic behavior of firms with a restatement. 
Clawbacks aim at improving the integrity of financial statements by punishing misreporting 
managers. Investors are likely to perceive the corporate governance instrument as a deterrent 
to opportunistic behavior. Investors who analyze a firm with a previous restatement may 
view the clawback as remedy for increased concerns about managerial opportunism. That is, 
the clawback may restore the confidence in the financial statements of firms with a prior 
history of misreporting (Iskandar-Datta and Jia 2013). We thus predict that, when a clawback 
mandate is introduced, investors’ perception of the likelihood that the firm engages in 
opportunistic behavior will decrease more for a firm with a previous restatement than for a 
firm with no previous restatement. 
As in hypothesis 1, we predict that investors who evaluate financial statements are subject 
to a false sense of security initiated by the clawback. That is, the clawback will give investors 
a general feeling of being protected against opportunistic behavior. This overall feeling will, 
in turn, bias them when judging the specific dimensions of earnings management. As a result, 
they will not incorporate the substitution effect between AEM and REM but will instead be 
less skeptical toward REM. Because we expect that the presence of a clawback reduces 
investors’ suspicions of managerial opportunism more for firms with a previous restatement, 
we predict the halo effect to be stronger. 
H3: The presence of a clawback reduces investor skepticism toward REM more for a firm
that has previously restated its earnings than for a firm with no previous restatement.
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Overall, we posit that, in presence of mandatory clawbacks, investors are less skeptical 
toward REM. We also expect investors to be more skeptical toward REM of firms with a 
previous restatement. However, we predict that clawback adoption decreases investor 
skepticism toward REM more for firms with a previous restatement than for firms with no 
previous restatement. The pattern predicted by hypotheses 1-3 is depicted in Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1 





3.4 Clawbacks and Investment Desirability 
We argue that the presence of a clawback policy decreases investor skepticism toward REM. 
That is, investors may not sufficiently challenge financial reports regarding the objective of 
managers’ operating decisions. Investors may thus be unable to determine when a transaction 
serves the purpose of self-dealing behavior rather than value maximization. When missing 
non-optimal REM transactions, investors will ceteris paribus judge the firm’s economic 
prospects more favorably because they do not incorporate the negative long-term effects of 
REM. Thus, investors will assess a firm to be more desirable as an investment when a 
clawback is present than in absence of such a policy. We therefore expect that the skepticism 
toward REM mediates the positive effect of a clawback initiation on investors’ desirability 
to invest in a firm. 
H4: Investors consider the desirability to invest in a firm to be higher when a clawback
is present compared to when no clawback is present and the effect is mediated by
investors’ skepticism toward REM. 
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To test our hypotheses we conduct a laboratory experiment. We do this for two reasons: 
First, in real world data, a multitude of effects vary simultaneously, making it difficult to 
isolate the effect of policy adoptions (Kachelmeier and King 2002). An experiment allows 
us to hold the financial information constant while being able to manipulate the presence of 
a clawback policy. Second, using an experiment we are able to examine potential effects of 
mandatory clawbacks although the DFA-clawback is not yet properly enforced. Thus, 
insights on potential downsides of the new policy allow for timely amendments of the 
clawback proposal. 
4.1 Participants 
99 students with a major in business administration participated in the experiment. We 
recruited 28 master students and 71 bachelor students from two Swiss universities. We 
invited them into a computer lab where they participated in the study. The experiment took 
approximately 45 minutes and was conducted in German. We ran 13 session with 3-17 
participants each. Subjects were compensated with a flat fee of 26 CHF (approx. 27 USD). 
We used business students as proxies for nonprofessional investors. Nonprofessional 
investors own approximately one-third of all U.S. stocks (Bogle 2005) and thus have a 
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significant influence on the U.S. capital market. Previous research indicates that this class of 
investors can impact security prices (DeLong et al. 1989; 1991). Elliot et al. (2007) suggest 
that students may be used as reasonable proxies for nonprofessional investors. Following 
Libby et al. (2002) we did not use more sophisticated participants than necessary to achieve 
our research goal.15 We judged the students’ accounting and finance knowledge to be 
sufficient to master the task. 57% of the students had previously analyzed the financial 
statements of a firm. Participants had taken 4.2 accounting and finance classes and had 2.5 
years of work experience on average. 40% of participants were female. The average age was 
24.7. All these characteristics do not differ significantly between conditions (all p>0.10). 
4.2 Design 
We employ a 2 (presence of clawbacks) × 2 (incidence of a previous restatement) factorial 
between-subjects design. Participants assume the role of prospective investors of a 
hypothetical firm on which they receive background information. They are also provided 
with the firms’ current financial statements. We ask participants to analyze the financial 
information and to answer questions about the firm and its economic prospects. The firm’s 
financial report contains five manipulations of real earnings. There is strong indication that 
the manipulations were performed to maximize the CEO’s bonus. Our questions elicit 
participants’ skepticism toward REM by measuring the extent to which they detect the REM 
in the report. To ensure experimental control, we conduct the experiment in laboratories 
where we are able to restrict internet access and prevent participants from communicating 
with each other. We implement the study using the “Qualtrics” survey software. 
4.3 Manipulations 
We manipulate the presence of a clawback and the incidence of a previous restatement (see 
Table 1). We do so by varying the background information that participants receive on the 
firm. Participants in the clawback conditions learn that a new regulation makes the firms 
subject to a mandatory clawback. In case of an accounting restatement, the clawback allows 
                                                 
15  Numerous studies (e.g., Elliott et al. 2007; Frederickson and Miller 2004; Hirst et al. 1999; Hirst et al. 
2007; Hodge 2001; Hodge et al. 2004; Maines and McDaniel 2000) have used MBA students as 
nonprofessional investors. We have no reason to believe that our participants’ answers differ from those 
of MBA students or nonprofessional investors in the task at hand. 
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the firm to recover bonus payments of its CEO.16 For the control group, the experimental 
material remains silent about clawbacks. To attenuate potential demand effects, we refrained 
from explicitly informing participants that no clawback is present. 
TABLE 1 
Experimental Manipulations 
    
  Incidence of a Previous Restatement  
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No Previous Restatement 
No Clawback / 
Previous Restatement 
 
      
 
As a second manipulation, we vary whether the firm issued an accounting restatement in the 
past. Participants in the previous restatement conditions are informed that the firm had to 
publish an accounting restatement three years prior to the reported period. Conversely, the 
control group learns that the firm has never issued any restatement. 
To test our hypotheses we investigate whether participants differ in their skepticism toward 
REM contingent on conditions. The measures to capture subjects’ expectations about REM 
are explained later on. We also elicit participants’ perceptions of the desirability of the firm 
as an investment.  
4.4 Materials and Procedure 
The experiment consists of three consecutive stages. Figure 3 summarizes the experimental 
procedure. 
                                                 
16  The clawback covers the total bonus paid out to the CEO. This feature of the clawback moves away from 
the DFA-clawback which only recovers the excess bonus. The design choice is made to strengthen the 
manipulation. 
 






Stage 1. In the first stage, we provide participants with information necessary for the 
experimental task. We inform participants about their role as prospective investors of the 
hypothetical firm Laudio PLC. To provide some context, we shortly describe the firm and 
its strategic positioning. Next, we lay out the CEO’s compensation scheme. The information 
about the CEO’s compensation should make participants aware of the CEO’s bonus system 
and that the bonus may provide the CEO with incentives to manage earnings. Participants 
learn that the CEO’s bonus depends on reaching the consensus analyst forecast of net 
income.17 The bonus increases linearly the more net income exceeds the analyst forecast and 
is limited by a cap. Figure 4 presents the bonus compensation of the CEO as a function of 
the firm’s net income. 
                                                 
17  We tie the bonus to exceeding analyst forecast because we think that it informs investors that the threshold 
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To ensure that participants possess the technical knowledge to solve the experimental task, 
we provide participants with information about i) the purpose of financial statements, ii) how 
financial information can be influenced through AEM and REM, iii) the potential negative 
effects of AEM and REM, and iv) when an accounting restatement is triggered. Depending 
on the condition, participants then learn about the existence of a government-mandated 
clawback and about Laudio PLC’s reporting history (i.e. incidence of a previous 
restatement). Next, participants receive a newspaper article that describes the business 
environment in which Laudio PLC operates. The article highlights the key resources of the 
firm. At the end of stage 1, participants answer five comprehension questions with regard to 
the background information. These questions serve as a check to assess whether subjects 
have thoroughly read and understood the material. 
Stage 2. After the participants read the background material and answered the 
comprehension questions, we provide them with Laudio PLC’s balance sheet, income 
statement, notes, and some industry comparison figures. The financial information shows 
that the net income exceeds the analyst forecast by an amount which makes the CEO eligible 
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for the maximum bonus.18 The CEO achieving the maximum bonus should make investors 
wary of potential manipulations of the report. 
We construct the financial statements such that they include five incidences of REM that 
increase the firm’s net income. Each manipulation of real earnings affects a different line 
item of the income statement. The operating transactions that boost net income are each 
explained in the notes of the financial statements. Participants should be alert regarding these 
transactions because they clearly contradict the firm’s business strategy and are harmful to 
the key resources as previously laid out in the newspaper article. Together with the 
information that the CEO reaches the maximum bonus, the experimental materials provide 
strong evidence for the presence of real earnings manipulations. 
The five incidences of REM that Laudio PLC engages in are common examples of REM 
mentioned in previous literature (Gunny 2005). The REM-transactions are i) abnormal price 
discounts granted to customers in the fourth quarter, ii) a discretionary reduction of product 
development expenditure, iii) a cut-back in advertising expenditure, iv) a cancellation of 
employee training programs, and v) a timed sale of specialized machines. For instance, the 
notes of the financial report state that Laudio PLC reduced research and development (R&D) 
expenditure by decreasing investments in product development. However, subjects learn 
from the background information that a cut-back in R&D is a major risk in this industry 
because firms that lack innovation cannot keep up with the rapidly progressing development 
of technology. A reasonably skeptical investor should be concerned that the reduced 
spending on R&D may harm the firm in the long-run. Table 2 summarizes for each 
manipulated item of the income statement, the operating transaction described in the notes 
and its contradicting piece of information from the background material. 
                                                 
18  We designed the experiment such that the CEO earns the maximum bonus by meeting the previous year’s 
net income. The design choice allows us to hold the earnings constant between the current and the 
comparative period. This simplifies the search for changes across periods and thereby facilitates the 
detection of manipulations. 
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TABLE 2 
REM Seeded in the Financial Statements 
   
Manipulated Item of the 
Income Statement 
Operating Transaction 
Described in the Notes 
Contradicting Piece of Information in 
the Background Information 
Sales  Price discounts at year-end. The firm has adopted a premium pricing 
strategy to signal quality. 
Research and development 
expenses 
Reduction of product 
development expenditure. 
In the industry in which the firm 
operates, innovations are a critical 
factor to stay in business. 
Sales and marketing 
expenses 
Cut-back in advertising 
expenditure. 
The firm’s distribution strategy requires 
high advertising expenditure to 
maintain brand awareness. 
Administration expenses  Cancellation of training 
programs. 
Know-how is a key resource to 
harmonize the individual components of 
the products in the assembly process. 
Other operating income and 
expenses 
Sale of specialized machines. Specialized machines are a limiting 
factor in production. 
   
To facilitate the detection of REM, we include two more leads that could help investors 
discover that the financials might be managed. That is, we show participants the percentage-
of-sales figures of the income statement together with industry and prior year comparison 
figures. As a result of the REM, the percentage-of-sales values of the managed items of the 
income statement experience an abrupt change compared to both, prior year numbers and 
industry means. Also, we design the financial statements such that without the REM, the 
CEO would not have been eligible for any bonus.19 
Stage 3. In a third step, participants fill out the post-experimental questionnaire. In the first 
set of questions we require them to assess the economic situation of the firm. To measure 
our main dependent variables we elicit participants’ skepticism toward REM and their 
investment desirability (see next section). Then, participants are required to answer 
                                                 
19  We conduct a pre-test of our experimental materials to investigate whether a reasonably attentive and 
skeptical participant is able to detect that the firm engaged in REM. It is crucial that the detection of REM 
is neither too easy nor too difficult to have sufficient variation to exploit potential effects of our 
manipulations. We test our experimental materials with 12 master graduates in business administration. 
We count how many of the real earnings manipulations participants mention in their justifications when 
assessing the firm’s creation of future value. On average, participants find three out of the five 
manipulations seeded in the report. The result indicates that the task is adequate in terms of difficulty. 
The REM is neither too salient nor too unnoticeable for our participants. 
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manipulation and comprehension checks as well as other questions on the experiment. 
Finally, participants answer some demographic questions. 
4.5 Dependent Measures 
Our primary dependent measures are designed to capture participants’ skepticism toward 
REM when analyzing the financial statements of Laudio PLC as well as their perceived 
desirability of the firm as an investment. To avoid potential demand effects, we indirectly 
elicit participants’ skepticism toward REM using two questions. 
Expected change in operating cash flow. We ask participants how they expect the operating 
cash flow of the firm to change in the next year compared to the reported year. We use a 
101-point response scale with labeled endpoints. 0 corresponds to “cash flow decreases 
strongly”, 100 corresponds to “cash flow increases strongly”, and 50 is labeled “cash flow 
stays the same”. The question takes advantage of the negative cash flow effects that REM is 
likely to have in the future. That is, when a firm uses income increasing REM, the operating 
cash flow temporarily increases in the year of the manipulations. However, the increase does 
not persist in future periods and is likely to reverse (Vorst 2016). Also, the non-optimal 
business decisions are likely to have negative effects on future firm performance (Cohen and 
Zarowin 2010; Vorst 2016). An investor who detects the manipulations would therefore have 
lower expectations of future operating cash flows compared to an investor who does not 
detect the REM. 
Number of real manipulations detected. We require participants to distribute 100 points to 
the items of the income statement depending on how important they considered each item 
for the assessment of the future value creation of the firm. We then ask them to justify their 
decisions for important items. Two independent raters analyze participants’ justifications to 
assess how many incidences of REM participants recognize. The number of real earnings 
manipulations that participants make a reference to (0-5) serves as our second variable of 
investor skepticism toward REM.  
Investment desirability. We request participants to evaluate the desirability of the stock of 
the Laudio PLC as an investment. Subjects state their investment desirability on a 101-point 
response scale with endpoints labeled “very low” and “very high”. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Manipulation Checks 
Participants are required to answer two manipulation check questions. For the clawback 
manipulation we ask subjects whether, according to the background information, the firm 
had a mechanism in place that allowed it to recover its CEO’s bonus under certain 
conditions. 91% give the correct answer to the clawback manipulation check. To check the 
previous restatement manipulation we ask participants whether there was an instance in the 
past where the firm had to publish an accounting restatement. 89% of all participants 
correctly answer the manipulation check with regard to the previous restatement. The 
results indicate that our manipulations are successful. We keep all responses in the analysis 
because our sample size is rather small. However, the exclusion of participants who did not 
pass either of the manipulation checks yields inferentially identical results. 
We also ask five comprehension questions about the background information to check 
whether participants read the experimental material thoroughly. On average, subjects 
answer 91% of the comprehension questions correctly and there are no significant 
differences across conditions (p=0.29, two-tailed). The result suggests that participants 
understood the instructions and that they were sufficiently attentive. 
We additionally check whether people understood that i) REM cannot trigger a 
restatement, and that ii) the clawback is exclusively activated by a restatement.20 People 
who believe that REM can trigger the clawback or who do not understand the functioning 
of the clawback may make judgments that affect the results in favor of our hypotheses. 
65% of participants correctly answer that REM cannot trigger a restatement when correctly 
accounted for. Also, 76% of participants know that a clawback is activated only in case of 
a restatement. While these percentages seem rather low, all results stay inferentially the 
same when excluding those participants who incorrectly answer either of the two 
questions. 
5.2 Test of H1 and H2 
We separately test hypotheses H1 and H2 with our two measures that capture the skepticism 
toward REM: The expected change in operating cash flow and the number of real 
                                                 
20  The latter comprehension check is asked to participants in the clawback treatment only. 
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manipulations detected. Descriptive statistics per condition are presented in Panel A of Table 
3. 
In our first hypothesis, we predict that the presence of mandatory clawbacks reduces investor 
skepticism toward REM. Panel B of Table 3 reports a conventional ANOVA with the 
expected change in operating cash flow as the dependent variable and the presence of a 
clawback and the incidence of a previous restatement as independent factors.21 In line with 
our first hypothesis, we find that participants in the clawback conditions expect future 
operating cash flow to be more positive than participants in the no clawback conditions 
(p<0.01, two tailed). The result suggests that participants are less skeptical toward REM in 
presence of a compensation clawback. They find less indication of REM and are therefore 
more optimistic about future cash flows. Thus, our findings indicate that investors’ general 
feeling of security due to the introduction of clawbacks spills over to areas where the 
provisions are not effective. Rather than anticipating the likely increase in REM, investors 
feel unwarrantedly safe and are less skeptical toward REM. 
We additionally find a significant main effect (p<0.05, two-tailed) consistent with hypothesis 
2. Specifically, when a firm issued a previous restatement, investors expect the future 
operating cash flow to be lower than when the firm has a no prior misreporting history. This 
result suggests that investors analyze firms with a previous restatement with increased 
skepticism toward REM. They are likely to find more indication of REM and thus judge the 
future cash flows to be lower. 
                                                 
21  An assumption of the ANOVA is that the sampling distribution of means must be normal for each level 
of the independent variable (Rutherford 2011). We test our dependent variable for normality using the 
Shapiro-Wilk (1965) test. For all conditions and all variables the null hypothesis of normal distribution is 
not rejected. The results indicate that the scores in each condition are normally distributed. We also test 
the dependent variable for homogeneity of variances. We use Levene’s (1960) test that tests the null 
hypothesis that the variances of all conditions of the variable are the same. Significant p-values indicate 
that the variances of the groups are heterogeneous. For our dependent variables, Levene’s test statistic 
yields insignificant results indicating that we do not have any concerns regarding heterogeneity of 
variances. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Test of H1 and H2 
Panel A:  Means, [Standard Deviation], Number of Observations for Dependent 
Measures 
  Expected Change in Operating 
Cash Flowa  
Number of Real Manipulations 
Detectedb 
































Panel B:  Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) for Expected Change in Operating Cash 
Flowa 
Source of Variation  SS  df  MS  F-statistic  p-value
Clawback  1111.82  1  1111.82  6.96  <0.01 
Restatement  816.76  1  816.76  5.11  0.03 
Clawback × Restatement  7.54  1  7.54  0.05  0.83 
Error  15181.84  95  159.81     
Panel C: Poisson Regression for Number of Real Manipulations Detectedb 
Source of Variation  Coefficient  z-statistic  p-value
Clawback  -0.30  -1.27  0.10c 
Restatement  0.16  0.75  0.23c 
Clawback × Restatement  0.21  0.67  0.25c 
Panel A shows the means, standard deviations, and number of observations for our dependent measures. Panel 
B provides the results of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the Expected Change in Operating Cash Flow. 
Panel C shows the Poisson regression results for Number of Real Manipulations Detected. 
a The question to assess the Expected Change in Operating Cash Flow requires participants to judge whether 
they expect the firm’s operating cash flow to increase, decrease, or stay the same in the following year as 
compared to the reported year. 
b To measure the Number of Real Manipulations Detected, subjects are asked to comment on important items 
of the income statement when assessing the change in future value creation of the firm. The measure captures 
the number of REM items mentioned in those comments. 
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We also test our hypotheses using the number of real manipulations detected as dependent 
variable. The variable more directly captures the extent to which investors detect REM, 
compared to the first variable (expected change in operating cash flow) which measures the 
implications of REM detection.  
Two junior assistants who are blind to treatment conditions independently evaluate 
participants’ answers to examine whether they contain references to REM. The inter-rater 
reliability using Cohen’s (1960) kappa is 0.8879 (p<0.0001). The ratings that differ between 
raters are subsequently reconciled by discussion. 
Panel C of Table 3 presents the Poisson regression results of the alternative dependent 
variable (number of real manipulations detected).22 We find a marginally significant effect 
for the clawback treatment in line with hypothesis 1 (p=0.10, one-tailed). However, while 
directionally consistent with our prediction, we do not find support for hypothesis 2. That is, 
the number of real manipulations detected does not differ between the previous restatement 
and the no previous restatement conditions (p=0.23, one-tailed).23 
5.3 Test of H3 
For our third hypothesis, we examine whether the reduction of investor skepticism toward 
REM is larger for a firm that has previously issued a restatement relative to a firm with no 
previous restatement. We use planned contrasts to allow for powerful and efficient tests of 
the predicted ordinal interaction (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990). For our expected change 
in operating cash flow measure we use contrast weights of -1 in the no clawback/no previous 
restatement condition, +3 in the clawback/no previous restatement condition, -4 in the no 
                                                 
22 The detected amount of REM-manipulations is counted data. Ordinary linear regression is generally less 
suitable to analyze such data due to two reasons. The restricted range of counted data biases parameter 
estimates. Also, the variance of a count commonly increases with its value which introduces 
heteroscedasticity that biases test statistics (Gardener et al. 1995). A regression model that relies on a 
Poisson distribution addresses the problems. 
23  There might be two potential explanations as to why the results of our second measure are rather weak. 
First, as we could not ask participants directly about their suspicions about REM due to experimenter 
demand effects, we had to elicit participants’ thoughts about real manipulations using a less specific 
question. Consequently, there is naturally much unexplained variation in our dependent measures. Second, 
about one third of our participants are first-year students. As advanced students are hard to recruit, we 
were compelled to extend the experiment to first-year students despite their relatively lower level of 
accounting knowledge. First-year students detected significantly less REM compared to more 
sophisticated subjects, independent of condition (p<0.01, two-tailed). On average, they only found one of 
five real earnings manipulations. Thus, task complexity might have been too high for our less 
sophisticated subjects, consequently introducing noise into our dependent variable. However, excluding 
first-year students or controlling for investment expertise does not increase the significance of our results 
due to a lack of statistical power. 
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clawback/previous restatement condition, and +2 in the clawback/previous restatement 
condition. The applied contrast weights reflect the pattern as predicted in Figure 1 above. 
However, the weights take into account that the expected change in operating cash flow 
variable is measured on an inverted scale, i.e. higher scores indicate less skepticism toward 
REM. 
 
The contrasts allow to simultaneously test for two main effects and a very specific type of 
interaction effect between the presence of a clawback and the incidence of a previous 
restatement. The interaction contrast determines whether the difference in mean expected 
change in operating cash flow between the two no previous restatement conditions is less 
than the difference in mean expected change in operating cash flow between the two previous 
restatement conditions. Table 4 shows the main and interaction effect contrast for our change 
in operating cash flow variable. In line with hypothesis 2, we find the contrast to be 
TABLE 4 
Test of H3 
Planned Contrasts for Expected Change in Operating Cash Flow 
Source of Variation  SS df MS F-statistic  p-value
Model contrast (-1, +3, -4, +2)a  1739.13 1 1739.13 10.88  <0.01 
Residual between-cells varianceb  253.21 2 126.60 0.79  0.46 
Total between-cells variance  1992.34 3 664.11 4.16  <0.01 
           
Error  15181.84 95 159.81    
Total  17174.18 98     
           
Contrast Variance Residualc (q2)  12.71%      
This Table presents planned contrasts and residual between-cells variance test results, as well as the contrast 
variance residual (q2) metric for the Expected Change in Operating Cash Flow. 
a  -1 for the No Clawback/No Previous Restatement condition; 
+3 for the Clawback/No Previous Restatement condition; 
 -4 for the No Clawback/Previous Restatement condition; 
+2 for the Clawback/Previous Restatement condition. 
b The between-group variance that is unexplained by the model contrast is the residual sum of squares. An 
insignificant p-value suggests that the model contrast explains the variation in the data well. 
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statistically significant (p<0.01, two-tailed).24 Results indicate that if clawbacks are imposed 
on a firm, investor skepticism toward REM decreases more when the firm has published a 
restatement in the past compared to when the firm has no previous restatement. 
Guggenmos et al. (2018) warn that the model contrast may be significant even if no 
interaction exists. A visual inspection of the means per condition suggests a pattern as 
predicted by Figure 1. The between-cells residual variance25 is not significant (p=0.46) and 
the proportion of variance left unexplained by the contrast is low (q2=12.71%). These 
analyses suggest that our joint main and interaction effect contrast explains the variation in 
our dependent measure well (Guggenmos et al. 2018).  
We also test hypothesis 3 using our second variable, number of real manipulations detected. 
Untabulated results of planned comparisons suggest that the model contrast is not 
statistically significant for the number of real manipulations detected.26 Whereas our second 
dependent variable does not produce significant results, the significant contrast of our first 
dependent variable (expected change in operating cash flow) gives us some confidence that 
the interaction exists. 
5.4 Test of H4 
Having found supportive evidence for the existence of an investor bias following the 
initiation of a clawback mandate, we next investigate whether the bias affects participant’s 
investment desirability. Specifically, we set up a model that tests whether participants’ 
skepticism toward REM mediates the relationship between the presence of a clawback policy 
and the investment desirability. We rely on structural equation modeling (SEM) to test the 
mediation. We treat skepticism toward REM as a latent construct that we capture using the 
variables expected change in operating cash flow and number of real manipulations detected. 
The reason for using skepticism toward REM as a latent construct is that it allows to measure 
a variable with multiple items (indicators) and thereby reduces random measurement error 
(Acock 2013). Consequently, latent variable SEM provides more accurate estimates than do 
                                                 
24  We test the robustness to alternative coding schemes that assume two main effects as well as the difference 
in means between the two no previous restatement conditions to be lower than the difference in means 
between the two previous restatement conditions (all p<0.01, two-tailed). 
25  The residual represents the between-group variance unexplained by the model contrast used to test the 
hypothesis. 
26  We calculate the planned contrast based on an ANOVA model. However, we use Poisson regression for 
our first two hypotheses because it allows for a more precise and powerful testing. 
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traditional approaches (Russel et al. 1998). As a dependent measure we use participants’ 
investment desirability. 
To test for mediation, we investigate whether the indirect effect from clawback on 
investment desirability through the intervening variable, skepticism toward REM, is 
statistically significant. A mediation would indicate that the reduction in investor skepticism 
toward REM evoked by the clawback affects investors’ investment decisions. 
The structural equation model uses a two-step estimation procedure. First, the measurement 
model estimates the factor loadings of the paths from the latent variable to its indicators (as 
well as the error terms of the indicators). In a second step, the structural model estimates the 
links and correlations between the theoretical variables. We employ the widely used 
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation procedure. The main assumption that needs to be 
satisfied to use ML to estimate the structural model is multivariate normality of the 
endogenous variables. The Doornik-Hansen (2008) test significantly rejects the hypothesis 
that the data follows a multivariate normal distribution. We thus apply a robust estimation 
procedure that uses a Huber-White sandwich estimator (Huber 1967; White 1980). The 
estimator calculates standard errors that are robust to multivariate normality. The overall 
goodness of fit of the model is good as indicated by the standardized root mean squared 
residual (SRMR)27 of 0.028 that is below a maximum acceptable value of 0.08 (Hu and 
Bentler 1999).28  
To test our model, we use standardized parameter estimates because variable units have no 
particular meaning.29 We first turn our attention to the measurement model. According to 
Hair et al. (2010) factor loadings of standardized estimates should be 0.5 or higher for 
construct validity. The loadings of our two indicator variables are above this threshold. Also, 
the loadings for the paths which lead to our indicator variables are highly significant (all 
                                                 
27  The SRMR measures how close we come to reproducing each correlation of the correlation matrix, on 
average (Acock 2013). 
28  The robust estimation procedure does not provide a chi-squared test statistic and some of the indices for 
overall goodness of fit cannot be calculated. We therefore additionally employ the Satorra and Bentler 
(1994) estimation procedure. Satorra and Bentler (1994) developed a set of corrected test statistics that 
adjust the goodness-of-fit chi-square for bias due to multivariate non-normality. The results stay 
qualitatively equivalent to the Huber-White sandwich estimator. The Satorra-Bentler scaled model vs. 
saturated chi-squared is non-significant which indicates that our model fits the data well. A significant 
chi-squared would mean that our model fails significantly to reproduce the covariance matrix of our 
variables. 
29  The standardized solution rescales the observed variables to have a variance of one (Acock 2013). 
Standardized path coefficients are easier to interpret and allow researchers to compare the size of the 
effects (O’Rourke and Hatcher 2013). 
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p<0.01). Results of the measurement model indicate that the latent variable is sufficiently 
well defined by the indicators expected change in operating cash flow and number of real 
manipulations detected. 
FIGURE 5 
Mediation of Skepticism toward REM 
 
 
Indirect effect The indirect effect is the effect of Clawback on Investment Desirability that is transmitted 
through the intervening variable, Skepticism toward REM (Path A × Path B). 
Direct effect: The direct effect is the effect of Clawback on Investment Desirability when controlling for 
the Skepticism toward REM (Path C'). 
Total effect: The total effect of Clawback on Investment Desirability (Path C) is the sum of the direct and 
the indirect effect (Path C' + [Path A × Path B]). 
This figure shows structural equation modeling results to test a mediation effect of the Skepticism toward REM. 
Skepticism toward REM is a combined measure of Expected Change in Operating Cash Flow and Number of 
Real Manipulations Detected. Investment Desirability measures participants' evaluation of the desirability of 
the company stock as an investment. All reported p-values are two-tailed. 
 
 
Figure 5 presents the results of the mediation analysis. Next to the links we provide the 
standardized coefficients and corresponding p-values (all two-tailed). The total effect of 
clawback on investment desirability has a positive coefficient (+0.20) and is statistically 
significant (p<0.05, two-tailed). The result indicates that when a clawback is mandated, 
participants evaluate the firm to be significantly more desirable as an investment than when 
no clawback is present. The indirect effect, meaning the effect of clawback presence over 
skepticism toward REM on investment desirability (+0.21) is significant (p=0.05, two-tailed) 
and provides supporting evidence for a mediation. The result suggests that the increased 
desirability to invest in the firm when a clawback is present is likely to be due to decreased 
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skepticism toward REM. Lastly, the direct effect of clawback on investment desirability is 
insignificant (p=0.92, two-tailed) suggesting a full mediation. 
Overall, the mediation analysis supports our prediction that clawbacks affect investment 
desirability through the presence of an investor bias that makes them less skeptical toward 
REM. 
5.5 Supplemental Experiment 
We further investigate whether the bias that non-professional investors are subject to is likely 
to also apply to more professional subjects. We use a sample of 140 U.S. business 
professionals who work in accounting or related fields relying on the online recruiting tool 
“QualtricsPanels”. We replicate our experiment with the same instrument, having only made 
minor modifications to our questions to elicit potential process measures.30 
The great majority of our sample works in accounting (64%). Other fields are financial 
analysis (11%), auditing (6%), and controlling (4%).31 The subjects are, on average, 48.5 
years old and have 24.67 years of work experience. Compared to our student sample our 
business professionals have attended more accounting or finance courses (professionals: 
13.9, students: 4.2) and a higher percentage of participants has previously analyzed financial 
statements (professionals: 80%, students 57%). 
To ensure sufficient accounting knowledge, we require a minimum score in a pre-
qualification questionnaire that assesses their accounting literacy.32 We test the same 
hypotheses as examined using the student sample. Research on the halo effect is inconclusive 
about whether the halo effect is mitigated when subjects have greater task experience 
(Nathan and Lord 1983). If business professionals are subject to the halo effect, we expect 
to see a similar pattern as in the student sample. 
As in the first experiment, we use the expected change in operating cash flow as our first 
dependent measure. Untabulated results of an ANOVA show that there is no significant 
difference in participants’ expectations of the change of future operating cash flow between 
the clawback and the no clawback conditions (p=0.66, two-tailed). Neither do we find an 
                                                 
30  As the first experiment was conducted in German we translated the experimental materials in English. 
31  The remainder has related functions such as in management or tax. 
32  The accounting literacy quiz constitutes of 7 question, 5 of which participants have to answer correctly 
to be forwarded to the experiment. Four questions are taken from the accounting quiz developed by Elliot 
et al. (2007), the remainder are own-developed questions. 
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effect of the restatement treatment on our dependent variable (p=0.45, two-tailed). Not 
surprisingly, the contrast to test a potential interaction effect following hypothesis 3 is also 
insignificant (p=0.47, two-tailed). Similarly, we also find null effects when using the number 
of real manipulations detected as our main dependent variable. That is, there is neither a 
significant effect of the clawback treatment (p=0.66, two-tailed) nor the restatement 
treatment (p>0.47, two-tailed) on the number of real manipulations detected.33 We do not 
find the planned contrast to be significant (p=0.62, two-tailed). Lastly, the presence of a 
clawback does not affect business professionals’ desirability to invest in the firm. 
The results suggest that business professionals are not subject to the bias that the clawback 
evokes in less sophisticated participants. Interestingly, the manipulation of clawback 
presence affects professional participants’ judgments in the opposite direction compared to 
student participants. That is, our measures of skepticism toward REM indicate somewhat 
higher REM-concerns in case of a clawback compared to when no clawback is present. This 
finding is consistent with the view that business professionals can anticipate the potential 
increase in REM following clawback initiation. 
One reason for the null results could be that the business professionals were too inattentive 
since they filled out the questionnaire online rather than in a lab. Indeed we find that the 
business professionals, on average, answered a lower percentage of comprehension questions 
correctly than our student subjects (professionals: 76.8%, students: 91.1%). However, 
excluding participants who scored low on our comprehension questions or controlling for 
other attention measures does not inferentially change the results. Overall, our results 
indicate that business professionals are not subject to the halo effect when assessing the 
likelihood of REM of a clawback firm. Rather, they seem to be at least as skeptical toward 
REM in presence of a clawback.  
 
                                                 
33  Instead of using a Poisson regression to analyze the counted variable number of real manipulations 
detected, we use a negative binomial regression model. A key feature of the Poisson distribution is that 
the mean is equal to the variance. In case this assumption is violated (overdispersion), a model based on 
a negative binomial distribution is preferred (Hilbe 2011). A likelihood ratio test of alpha indicates that 
our data is overdispersed (p<0.01). 
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6. Conclusion 
Previous studies on compensation clawbacks largely report positive stock market reactions 
to clawback adoption. However, these findings stand in contrast to the results of a recent 
study by Chan et al. (2015) who find that clawback adoption negatively affects long-term 
firm performance. Their results suggest that the adverse effects on firm value are induced by 
an increase in REM that is not subject to the clawback. We use an experiment to examine a 
potential explanation that might explain the puzzling results in prior research covering the 
consequences of clawback adoption. Specifically, we propose that investors fall prey to the 
halo effect, a judgment bias which makes investors worry less about manipulations of 
financial reports. We posit that the clawback evokes a general feeling of security against 
opportunistic behavior and that this feeling spills over to investors’ assessments of specific 
types of earnings manipulations. As a consequence, investors are less skeptical toward REM 
despite the likely increase in such manipulations which might hurt long-term firm 
performance as documented by Chan et al. (2015). We additionally investigate whether the 
presence of clawbacks interacts with the incidence of a previous restatement and whether the 
investor bias potentially affects investment desirability. 
Overall, our results provide supporting evidence that non-professional investors are subject to 
the halo effect. That is, in presence of mandatory clawbacks, non-professional investors find 
less indication of REM in a firm’s financial statements. Our findings also indicate that 
investors are more skeptical toward REM of firms with a prior history of misreporting but 
that the halo effect of clawback initiation is more pronounced for such firms. Finally, the 
decrease in skepticism toward REM induced by compensation clawbacks positively affects 
investors’ desirability to invest in the firm. In a supplemental experiment we additionally 
find that the halo effect does not extend to more sophisticated users of financial statements. 
That is, business professionals’ skepticism toward REM does not differ between conditions 
and does not translate into differences in investment desirability. Overall, the results suggest 
that only less sophisticated financial statement users are subject to this specific judgment 
error.  
Our study adds to the ongoing debate about potential unintended consequences of clawbacks 
and provides valuable insights for research and practice. It shows that the presence of a 
clawback impairs non-professional investors’ skepticism toward REM and thus reveals a 
judgment error that potentially has adverse consequences for investors’ investment 
decisions. This is particularly relevant as prior research indicates that REM impairs firm 
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performance in the long-run and is likely to increase following clawback initiation. One may 
argue that more sophisticated investors who are not subject to the halo effect, will take 
advantage of the price distortion using arbitrage. However, prior research indicates that non-
professional investors can influence stock prices (Hirshleifer 2001; Lee 2001; Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). Specifically, if the risk bearing capacity of sophisticated investors is limited, 
a mispricing effect will persist (Daniel et al. 2002; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003). As a 
consequence, the misallocation of capital is likely to deplete shareholder value. More so, 
non-professional investors’ failure to adequately anticipate the change in incentives of the 
management leaves corporate executives room to manipulate their reports using REM 
without being adequately sanctioned by the market. Especially managers of firms with a 
history of misreporting may take advantage of the investor bias as investors of such firms 
are more likely to fall prey to impaired skepticism. 
In sum, our study makes regulators aware that mandatory clawbacks are likely to induce a 
judgment bias among investors that may introduce mispricing in capital markets and may 
increase managers’ incentives to manipulate financial reports via REM. Regulators need to 
carefully weigh whether the clawback mandate’s intended effects of increased management 
accountability outweigh its costs, including those of the investor bias. Our results are timely 
given that the SEC is still in the process of finalizing the implementation rules of the DFA-
clawback. As such, our study helps regulators make more informed decisions on whether 
and how to implement mandatory clawback requirements. 
Our study has several limitations. First, our main dependent variable is not a clean measure 
for investor skepticism toward REM. In particular, participants’ expected change in 
operating cash flow does not directly measure the change in cash flow due to REM. It may 
therefore capture differences in expectations about the future development of the firm’s 
operating cash flow that are independent of suspicions of REM. Thus, the differences 
between conditions could possibly reflect another concept than the skepticism toward REM, 
although we have no indication to support this premise. 
A second limitation is that our findings may suffer from generalizability due to several 
reasons. We reduce the amount of information provided to participants to ensure tight 
experimental control. Results may differ when investors have access to complete financial 
reports (including cash flow statements and additional notes) and other sources of 
information. Also, we use strong manipulations to increase the likelihood to find effects. For 
this purpose we deviate from the properties of the DFA-clawback by making the CEO’s total 
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bonus subject to recapture. As our manipulation does not mirror the actual properties of the 
proposed clawback mandate, the documented effects may not replicate in the real world. 
More so, we make the REM-manipulations very salient by making the CEO’s actions harm 
key resources of the firm. To the extent that these design choices do not reflect characteristics 
of real-world settings, the results may not generalize to practice. Collectively, the above 
mentioned design choices help us extract the effects that we are after. However, while the 
design choices are likely to affect the strength of the observed effects, we have no reason to 
believe that they affect results qualitatively. 
Our study suggests a number of directions for future research. For instance, it is likely that 
the investor bias examined in this paper also applies to voluntary clawback adoption. 
Compared to mandatory imposition, voluntary adoption of clawbacks provides an even 
stronger signal for investors that the firm improves its governance. Thus, the halo effect may 
be even more pronounced in this case. Further, prospective studies could investigate whether 
the investor bias proposed in our experiment applies to other regulatory changes that are 
aimed at deterring earnings management. The halo effect may, for example, pertain to 
initiatives that decrease the flexibility granted by accounting standards or that tighten the 
oversight over financial reporting (e.g. auditing or stock exchange oversight regulations). In 
such cases, investors may be misled by their overall perception of security evoked by the 
new policy and may not accurately anticipate that managers have increased incentives for 
REM. Lastly, future studies could examine whether the investor bias persists in the long-run 
and could test potential remedies for the judgment error (e.g. investment recommendations 
from expert intermediaries such as analysts). We believe that these issues are worthy of 
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Appendix B: Main Features of Clawback Mandates 
  





Dodd Frank Act, §954 
Introduction July 30, 2002 October 3, 2008 July 21, 2010 
Firms covered Firms listed at U.S. stock 
exchanges. 
Financial institutions 
covered by TARP. 
Firms listed at U.S. stock 
exchanges. 
Trigger event Accounting restatement 
due to the material 
noncompliance of the 
issuer, as a result of 
misconduct. 
Statements of earnings, 
revenues, gains, or other 
criteria found to be 
materially inaccurate 
(accounting restatement 
and misconduct not 
required). 
Accounting restatement 
due to the material 
noncompliance of the 
issuer (misconduct not 
required). 
Employees covered CEO and CFO CEO, CFO and 3 most 
highly compensated 
executives. 
Later amended by ARRA:
5 most highly paid senior 
executives and any of the 
next 20 most highly-
compensated employees. 
Any current or former 
executive officer 
(officers who perform 
policy making functions).
FCA proposal: only 
applicable to executives 
who had control and 
authority over the 
financial reporting. 
Look-back period The year following the 
issuance of the misstated 
financial statements. 
Open-ended until TARP 
repayment. 
3-year period preceding 
the date on which the 
issuer is required to 
prepare an accounting 
restatement. 
Compensation 
subject to recovery 
All incentive-based and 
equity-based 
compensation, plus stock 
profits. 




Enforcing institution SEC TARP-recepient Issuer of the report 
(board of directors) 
Current status The clawback continues 
to be applicable. 
However, the SEC only 
litigates a handful of 
cases each year. 
The clawback continues to 
be applicable to those 
financial institutions that 
are still covered by the 
TARP. 
SEC has proposed a rule 
to implement the 
clawback. It is unclear 
when the rule will be 
finalized. 
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